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ARTICLES
LEAVING GUANTANAMO: THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL DETAINEE TRANSFERS
Robert M. Chesney *

"The real problem is not Guantdnamo Bay. The problem is that,
to a large extent, we are in unexplored territory with this unconventional and complex struggle against extremism. Traditional
doctrines covering criminals and military prisoners do not apply
well enough."
-Secretary

of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, June 14, 20051

The United States military has had custody of more than
68,000 detainees since 9/11 as a consequence of the war on terrorism and the war in Iraq.2 The legality of these detentions under
* Associate Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. J.D., 1997, Harvard University. Portions of this paper were presented to the NORAD/NORTHCOM Staff
Judge Advocate's Conference in April 2005, the June 2005 meeting of the Law and Society
Association, and the July 2005 Law of War course at the Judge Advocate General's Legal
Center and School. Thanks to Bo Cooper, Jennifer Elsea, Michael Kelly, Marty Lederman,
Peter Margulies, John Parry, Steve Vladeck, Lieutenant Colonel Mick Waggoner, and Major Sean Watts for their comments and criticisms. Special thanks to Major General Jay
Hood, commander of Joint Task Force-GTMO, and Brigadier General Thomas Hemingway, Legal Adviser to the Appointing Authority, Office of Military Commissions, for their
hospitality during a tour of Camp Delta in September 2005.
1. News Transcript, Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec'y of Def., DoD News Briefing with
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Pace (June 14, 2005), available at httpJ/www.defense
link.mil/transcripts/2005/tr20050614-secdef3042.html.
2. See News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Guantinamo Provides Valuable Intelligence
Information (June 12, 2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2005/nr2005
0612-3661.html (observing that "[m]ore than 68,000 detainees have been held in Afghanistan, Iraq and Guantdnamo"). Iraq-related detainees outnumber those from Afghanistan
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domestic and international law has been explored exhaustively in
scholarship 3 and has been the subject of extensive litigation.4 Until recently, however, relatively little attention has been paid to a
closely related issue: What domestic and international legal
frameworks apply to the transfer of a detainee from U.S. custody
to the custody of another state, particularly where fear of torture
is a concern?
This once obscure topic has become the subject of intense debate in recent months in connection with the CIA's extraordinary
rendition program.5 But the issue also is significant for the U.S.
military's detention facility at the U.S. Naval Station at
Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba ("GTMO"). 6 Significant numbers of
GTMO detainees already have been transferred to the custody of
their own governments, and the Pentagon intends eventually to
transfer most of those who remain. Meanwhile, dozens of detainees have filed motions seeking advance notice of any such transfers, on the theory that such notice will give them an opportunity
to then seek a court order barring the transfer on risk-of-torture
grounds.7 These preliminary motions have met with mixed results, with the judges largely able to avoid coming to grips with
the substantive issues raised by the risk-of-torture issue. Eventu-

and elsewhere. See News Transcript, Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec'y of Def., News Conference at the Meeting of NATO Defense Ministers, Brussels, Belgium (June 9, 2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2005/tr20050609-secdef3O2l.html.
3. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, CongressionalAuthorization and
the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Detention
Power, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 153 (2004); Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the
Use of Force, International Law, and the Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REV. 293
(2005).
4. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (imposing due process requirements on the determination of enemy combatant status with respect to citizens).
5. See, e.g., Jane Mayer, OutsourcingTorture, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 14 & 21, 2005,
at 106; Matthew Rothschild, Stripping Rumsfeld and Bush of Impunity, THE
PROGRESSIVE, July 1, 2005.
6. The issue is, of course, also significant for other military detention contexts such
as the detention facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan. But it is only in the context of GTMO
that the law of international detainee transfers has become the subject of extensive litigation on behalf of non-citizen detainees, as described in more detail in Part I, infra. Cf
Omar v. Harvey, No. 05-2347 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 2006) (granting temporary restraining order
enjoining the military from transferring a U.S. citizen detainee held in Iraq to the custody
of the Iraqi government); Respondents' Opposition to Petitioners' Ex Parte Motion for a
Temporary Restraining Order, Omar v. Harvey, No. 05-2347 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 2006) (urging
court to dissolve TRO on ground that persons detained by U.S. military in Iraq are in legal
custody of the Multi-National Force-Iraq ("MNF-I") and that U.S. courts lack jurisdiction
over MNF-I activities).
7. See infra Part I.
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ally, though, these same judges may be forced to determine
whether they have authority to regulate or perhaps even prohibit
the custodial transfer of a GTMO detainee.8 The relevant law is
not well-understood, unfortunately, and the existing legal scholarship on the topic is too sparse, polarized, and out-of-date to provide guidance.'
This article fills the resulting gap in the literature by examining the full range of legal issues-both domestic and international-presented when the military seeks to transfer a detainee
from GTMO to the custody of another state and the detainee objects on risk-of-torture grounds.' ° Part I begins by describing the
"first wave" of GTMO transfer litigation-a veritable flood of motions filed by detainees in 2005 seeking preliminary relief in anticipation of potential transfers. These motions and the conflicting opinions they generated are harbingers of litigation to come,
and Parts II-IV explore the laws that will be relevant to that litigation. Part II takes up the topic of international human rights
law, focusing on the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the
related issue of "diplomatic assurances." Along the way, I identify
complex issues of statutory implementation associated with the
Convention Against Torture, including potential Department of
Defense obligations under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Against this backdrop, Part III addresses the relationship of international human rights law to the law of war when both apply
simultaneously, with particular reference to the lex specialis rule.
With this relationship in mind, Part IV then considers the extent

8. For a discussion of the impact of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 on this issue
see Epilogue, infra Part VII.
9. There are just two articles that directly grapple with the issues raised by GTMO
transfers. See Joan Fitzpatrick, Rendition and Transfer in the War Against Terrorism:
Guantcnamo and Beyond, 25 LoY. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 457 (2003) (arguing that
detainees are not subject to armed conflict concepts with respect to detainee transfers, at
least when captured outside a zone of actual combat operations); John Yoo, Transferring
Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183 (2004) (arguing that Article II empowers the Executive branch to dispose of the liberty of wartime detainees, in keeping with practices in
past, traditional armed conflicts). Both articles are insightful, but have been superseded in
important respects by post-publication developments such as the Supreme Court's 2004
decision in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that GTMO detainees may invoke
federal habeas corpus statute).
10. I do not in this article address these issues as they arise in the context of "extraordinary renditions." Cf Arar v. Ashcroft, No. 04-cv-249 (E.D.N.Y.) (filed Jan. 22, 2004)
(pending lawsuit filed by Canadian citizen who was allegedly tortured after being rendered by United States to Syria).
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to which any GTMO detainees may be protected by the handful of
transfer rules provided by the law of war. Part V is perhaps the
most unexpected section of the article, as it addresses the extent
to which substantive due process may provide an alternative restraint on GTMO transfers-a discussion necessitated by the Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Rasul v. Bush" and the possibility
that the detainees, though non-citizens, have been invested with
fundamental constitutional rights by virtue of their location at
GTMO. Part VI, originally intended as the conclusion of this article, criticizes the current state of the law of international detainee
transfers both from the perspective of the government and of the
detainees, and offers preliminary suggestions for statutory reform. Finally, the article concludes with an epilogue that address
the impact of the Detainee Transfer Act of 2005-enacted just
prior to publication-on the issues raised by custodial transfer of
GTMO detainees.
I. THE FIRST WAVE OF GTMO TRANSFER LITIGATION

The question of what law comes into play when the military
seeks to transfer a detainee from GTMO to the custody of his own
government is not merely academic. Dozens of such custodial
transfers have taken place, and the first wave of litigation raising
the risk-of-torture issue already is well-underway.
A. GTMO TransfersBefore and After Rasul
The decision to house detainees at GTMO was not made
lightly. Policymakers sought a location that would provide
greater security and convenience than would be available in Afghanistan. 2 GTMO would satisfy both interests, but given the
relatively comprehensive and perpetual nature of U.S. control
there, it also raised the possibility of enabling federal judicial
oversight of the detentions. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense turned to the Department of Justice's Office of

11. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
12. See DoD News Briefing with Secretary Rumsfeld and General Pace, supra note 1
("The detention facility at Guant~namo Bay was established for the simple reason that the
United States needed a safe and secure location to detain and interrogate enemy combatants. It was the best option available.").
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Legal Counsel ("OLC") for an opinion on whether use of GTMO
would lead to federal court involvement, and was told that "the
great weight of legal authority indicates that a federal district
court could not properly exercise habeas jurisdiction over an alien
detained at [GTMOI." 13 OLC cautioned, however, that a "detainee
could make a non-frivolous argument that jurisdiction does exist"
and that "there remains some litigation risk that a district court
might reach the opposite result."1 4
Eventually, these expectations would be dashed by the Supreme Court's decision in Rasul. But in the interim, approximately 748 detainees were sent to GTMO on the assumption that
the change of scenery would not involve a change in legal status
as well.15
Notably, the military began releasing some detainees on its
own initiative long before the pace of GTMO litigation accelerated
in mid-2004. Eighty-four detainees were released during GTMO's
first two years of operation,16 and 55 more were released during
the first six months of 2004, bringing the total to 146. Only 129

13. Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., & John C.
Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. to William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel, Dep't of
Def., Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens Held in Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba 1 (Dec. 28,
2001) [hereinafter OLC Memo] (on file with the author).
14. Id.
15. It is possible to calculate the approximate number of detainees sent to GTMO during the period based on information disclosed in periodic Department of Defense press
statements concerning releases from GTMO. Initially the Department of Defense did not
issue press statements announcing the release of detainees from GTMO. It began to do so
Completed
in October 2002. See News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Transfer of Detainees
20 0 2
2
bt550/blO28
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/200
at
available
2002),
(Oct. 28,
02.html. By the middle of 2003, it also began providing information about the total number of detainees still present at GTMO. Then, in January 2004, it began to provide information about the total number of detainees previously released. See News Release, U.S.
(Jan. 29, 2004), available at
Dep't of Def., Transfer of Juvenile Detainees Completed
2 9 9 34
A careful reconstruction
.html.
-0
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr2004Ol
of these releases indicates that eighteen detainees had been released or transferred as of
November 23, 2003, on which date the Department of Defense described the remaining
population at GTMO as consisting of approximately 660 detainees. See News Release, U.S.
(Nov. 24, 2003), available at
Dep't of Def., Transfer of Guantdnamo Detainees 2Complete
5
.html.
4-068
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2003/nr200311
16. See Transfer of Guantlnamo Detainees Complete (Nov. 24, 2003), supra note 15;
Transfer of Juvenile Detainees Completed (Jan. 29, 2004), supra note 15.
17. See News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Detainee Transfer Completed (Apr. 2, 2004),
available at http://www.defenselink.millreleases/2004/nr20040402-0505.html; News Re(Mar. 15,
lease, U.S. Dep't of Def., Transfer of Afghani and Pakistani Detainees Complete
5 0 4 62
.html; News
2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr2004031 Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Transfer of British Detainees Complete (Mar. 9, 2004), avail-
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of these detainees were released outright, however. The other 17
were transferred from U.S. custody to the continuing custody of
their own governments, as described in Table 1 below:
Table 1-Custodial Transfers (1/2002-6/2004)8

Saudi Arabia
Spain
Russia

4
1
7

United Kingdom

5

These custodial transfers did not occasion much commentary, nor
were questions raised at the time regarding their legality.
The situation grew more complicated in June 2004, after the
Supreme Court held in Rasul that the federal habeas corpus
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, "confers on the District Court jurisdiction to hear petitioners' habeas corpus challenges to the legality
of their detention at the Guantdnamo Bay Naval Base." 9 There
were approximately 595 detainees at GTMO at that time, the
flow of new detainees having largely ceased back in November

able at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004Jnr2004309-0443.html; News Release,
U.S. Dep't of Def., Transfer of Detainees Complete (Mar. 1, 2004), available at http://www.
defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040301-0389.html; News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def.,
Transfer of Detainee Complete (Feb. 25, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
releases/2004/nr20040225-0365.html; News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Transfer of Detainee Complete (Feb. 13, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/
nr20040213-0981.html; Transfer of Juvenile Detainees Completed, supra note 15. See generally News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., DoD Announces Draft Detainee Review Policy
(Mar. 3, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040303-0403.
html (describing the administrative review process for enemy combatants held at GTMO).
18. See Transfer of Detainee Complete (Feb. 13, 2004), supra note 17; Transfer of Detainees Complete (Mar. 1, 2004), supra note 17; News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Release/Transfer of Detainees Completed (May 16, 2004), available at http://www.defense
link.mil/releases/2003/b05162003_bt338-03.html. The language of the press release associated with the U.K. transfer is ambiguous as to the detainees' status, and the numbers
provided along with it suggest that at first it was deemed an outright release. Transfer of
British Detainees Complete (Mar. 9, 2004), supra note 17. Subsequent press releases concerning other detainees, however, made clear that the release of the British detainees had
been classified as a custodial transfer. See News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Transfer of
French Detainees Complete (July 27, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/re
leases/2004/nr20040727-1062.html.
19. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004).
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2003.20 Within a year of Rasul, approximately half of these detainees would have habeas corpus petitions pending in federal
21
district court in the District of Columbia.
During the same post-Rasul period, large numbers of detainees
continued to be released. Fifty additional detainees were released
outright in the sixteen months following Rasul, bringing the alltime total for outright releases (as opposed to custodial transfers)
to 179.22 This reflects a slower pace than before June 2004. In

(July 18,
20. See News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Transfer of Detainees Completed
0 20 7
.html (an2003), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2003/nr20030718nouncing arrival of ten detainees); Transfer of Guantdnamo Detainees Complete (Nov. 24,
2003), supra note 15 (announcing arrival of twenty detainees). Only ten more detainees
were sent to GTMO in the months following Rasul. See News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def.,
Transfer of Detainees Completed (Sept. 22, 2004), available at http://www.defense
22
link.mil/releases/2004/nr200409 -1310.html (announcing arrival of ten detainees). After
September 2004, the government placed further transfers "on hold while officials await
the outcome of ... legal challenges in U.S. federal courts by detainees seeking their release." Robin Wright & Josh White, U.S. Holding Talks on Return of Detainees, WASH.
POST, Aug. 9, 2005, at A13.
21. A table listing these petitions is provided in the online appendix to this article. See
Robert M. Chesney, Online Appendix Table A [hereinafter Table A], available at
In addihttp://www.wfu.edu/-chesner/NationalSecurityLaw/GTMO/OnlineAppendix.doc.
tion to the individual petitions, the Center for Constitutional Rights ('CCR") has filed a
"John Doe" petition on behalf of the class of all GTMO detainees who have not yet filed
their own habeas petition. See John Does 1-570 v. Bush, No. 05-313 (D.D.C. Mar. 13,
2005).
22. See News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Detainee Transfer Announced (Oct. 1, 2005)
(describing release of Egyptian detainee, raising total to 179), available at www.defense
26
.html; News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Detainee
link.millreleases/2005/nr20051001-48
raising total
Transfer Announced (Sept. 12, 2005) (describing release of Afghan detainee,
2 4 7 22
.html; Fact
to 178), available at www.defenselink.mil/releases/2005/nr2005091 Sheet, U.S. Dep't of Def., GuantAnamo Detainees by the Numbers, available at
www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2005/d2005O831sheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2006) (identifying 177 outright releases as of August 31, 2005). Approximately twenty-eight of these
recently released detainees had been found to be "no longer enemy combatants" ("NLEC")
by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal ("CSRT"). See Detention Policies and Military
Justice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Personnel of the S. Comm. on Armed Servs.,
109th Cong. 3 (July 14, 2005), available at http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/
2005/JulyfMcGarrah%2007-14-05.pdf (testimony of Rear Admiral James M. McGarrah,
Director, Office of the Admin. Review of Detention of Enemy Combatants, U.S. Navy)
[hereinafter McGarrah testimony] (explaining that twenty-three of the thirty-eight exonStatus
erated detainees had been released at that point); U.S. Dep't of Def., Combatant
20 0
20 0
5
5/d
Review Tribunal Summary, available at http://www.defenselink.millnews/Mar
0329csrt.pdf (describing CSRT proceedings and exoneration of thirty-eight detainees);
News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Detainee Transfer Announced (July 20, 2005) (describing
release of two detainees exonerated by a CSRT), available at www.dod.millreleases/
2005/nr20050822-4501.html; News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Detainee Transfer Anexonerated by a CSRT),
nounced (July 20, 2005) (describing release of three detainees
22
.html; Guantdnamo Detainees by
availableat www.dod.mil/releases/2005/nr20050720-41
the Numbers, supra. Approximately ten detainees exonerated by the CSRT process, more-
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contrast, the pace of custodial transfers has accelerated, with 51
such transfers occurring during the same post-Rasul period.
These transfers are described in Table 2, below:
Table 2 - Custodial Transfers (7/2004-7/2005)23

Sweden
France
Morocco
Pakistan
Kuwait
United Kingdom
Australia
Belgium
Spain

1
7
5
29
1
4
1
2
1

over, still await their outright release. See McGarrah testimony, supra, at 3. These individuals most likely are Chinese nationals from the Uighur minority group. The United
States is unwilling to return them to China out of concern that they will be abused, and
is
attempting to place them instead with a third country. See Wright & White, supra note
20;
Jackie Northam, Chinese Detainees at Guantdnamo Get Hearing (National Public Radio
broadcast Aug. 25, 2005), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?story
ID=4815020. In any event, some twenty other detainees also have been released during
this period, in some, but perhaps not all, cases in connection with Administrative Review
Board proceedings. See, e.g., Detainee Transfer Announced (July 20, 2005), supra (describing release of three detainees based on ARB determinations, but not indicating the
grounds for releasing one Saudi detainee).
23. See News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Detainee Transfer Announced (July 20,
2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2005/nr20050720-4122.html; News
Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Detainee Transfer Announced (Apr. 26, 2005), available
at
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2005/nr20050426.2821.html;
News Release, U.S.
Dep't of Def., Detainee Transfer Announced (Mar. 7, 2005), available at http://www.de
fenselink.mil/releases/2005/nr20050307-2263.html; News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def.,
Detainee Transfer Announced (Jan. 16, 2005), available at http://www.defense link.mil/re
leases/2005/nr20050116-1986.html; News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Guantdnamo
Detainees to Be Transferred (Jan. 11, 2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/re
leases/2005/nr20050111-1945.html; News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Transfer of Australian Detainee Complete (Jan. 28, 2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/
2
005/nr20050128-2028.html; News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Transfer of British Detainees Complete (Jan. 25, 2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2005/
nr20050125-2007.html; News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Transfer of Detainees Completed
(Sept. 18, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr200409181363.
html; News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Transfer of Five Moroccan Detainees Complete
(Aug. 2, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040802_1081.
html; News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Transfer of French Detainees Complete (July
27,
2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/ 2 004/nr20040727-1062.html;
News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Transfer of Swedish Detainee Complete (July 8, 2004),
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/ 20041nr20040708-0994.html.
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Combined with the 17 custodial transfers that occurred before
Rasul, these transfers bring the all-time total for custodial transfers to 68 (and the absolute number of releases of both varieties to
247).24

It is now clear, moreover, that even larger numbers of additional custodial transfers are on the horizon. In August 2005, the
United States disclosed that it is negotiating with at least thirteen governments whose nationals are held at GTMO, in hopes of
transferring to them the burden of custody for some 400 of their
own nationals and thus reducing GTMO's population to a group
25
of some 100 "hard-core detainees." Unnamed senior U.S. government officials have explained that these transfers will take
26
place "gradual[ly], happening over months or years." It is doubtful that these will go unchallenged.
B. Transfer Litigation Begins
Since the spring of 2005, the docket of the district court in the
District of Columbia has been flooded with motions by GTMO detainees seeking preliminary relief associated with the possibility

24. See Detainee Transfer Announced (Oct. 1, 2005), supra note 22. Notably, not all
detainees transferred to home-state custody remain in custody long. Pakistan, for example, released a group of seventeen transferees, after nine months detention, "after their
parents and guardians furnished guarantees that they would not indulge in terrorist activities." Former Guantdnamo PrisonersFreed by PakistanAllege Abuse of Koran, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE ENGLISH WIRE, June 27, 2005, available at http://freedom4um.com/c-ibinlreadart.cgi?ArtNum=7514 (last visited Feb. 22, 2006). Additionally, at least one transferee who was prosecuted after his return-Nasser al-Mutairi, of Kuwait-has been acAll Charges,
quitted and released. See Associated Press, Ex-Gitmo Inmate Acquitted 2on
93 3
,160999,00.
Fox NEWS, June 29, 2005, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,
html. It also is worth noting that in a few instances, individuals released from GTMO have
returned to combat. See John Mintz, Released DetaineesRejoining the Fight, WASH. POST,
Oct. 22, 2004, at Al.
25. See Wright & White, supra note 20, at A13 (describing negotiations with Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, and Morocco, among others); see also
Josh White & Robin Wright, Afghanistan Agrees to Accept Detainees: U.S. Negotiating
Guantdnamo Transfers, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2005, at Al (describing progress in the negotiations with Afghanistan, and, in particular, concerning Afghan nationals held both at
GTMO and at Bagram).
26. Andrea Koppel & Elise Labott, U.S. Officials: Gitmo Transfer Talks Active,
CNN.COM, Aug. 9, 2005, availableat http://www.cnn.com/2005fUS/08/09/detainee.release/.
Even where agreement already has been reached-as is the case with respect to Afghanistan-transfer is expected to be "gradual," according to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Detainee Affairs Matthew Waxman, Op-Ed, Beyond Guantdnamo, WASH.
POST, Aug. 20, 2005, at A17.
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of a transfer.17 Specifically, detainees have requested thirty-days
advance notice of any custodial transfer, for the specific purpose
of enabling them to make ex-ante challenges to such transfers
should the need arise.2" By the end of July 2005, at least thirtysix motions fitting this general description had been filed on behalf of some ninety-three individual detainees.29 In every instance, the argument turns in significant part on the claim that
the detainees face an unacceptable risk of torture if transferred. °
Are the detainees simply conflating the risks associated with a
custodial transfer at the direction of the U.S. military with those
associated with the CIA's much-criticized program of extraordinary rendition?3 Possibly. But then again, it is worth noting that
in November 2002, an FBI official at GTMO wrote a memo to a
senior FBI attorney describing a laundry list of interrogation
methods under consideration, and noting that one option involved
sending GTMO detainees, either temporarily or permanently, "to
Jordan, Egypt or an unspecified third country" to allow those
countries to employ interrogation techniques that will enable
27. These motions are summarized in Table A of the online appendix. See Table A,
supranote 21.
28. Hard copies of the motion papers are on file with the author and available online
through PACER by reference to the docket numbers and other information provided in
Table A, supra note 21. In four instances, the detainees initially sought an outright transfer ban rather than mere notification. See Petitioners' Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
Batarfi v. Bush, No. 05-409 (D.D.C. Mar. 15, 2005); Petitioners' Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, el-Banna v. Bush, No. 04-1144 (D.D.C. Mar. 15, 2005); Petitioners' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, el-Mashad v. Bush, No. 05-270 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2005); Application
for Temporary Restraining Order, Habib v. Bush, No. 02-1130 (D.D.C. Nov. 24, 2004); Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, id. (Jan. 5, 2005).
29. See Table A, supra note 21. Some request relief in the form of a stay, others in the
form of a preliminary injunction, and still others pursuant to the All Writs Act. There also
is a motion brought on behalf of a purported class action consisting of all GTMO detainees
who have not yet filed a habeas petition. See John Does 1-570 v. Bush, No. 05-313 (D.D.C.
Mar. 13, 2005). I have not included this petition or this motion in my data due to uncertainty as to the viability of that attempt.
30. See supra note 10. The motions also argue in the alternative that transfers may be
unlawful attempts to circumvent judicial review of the detainees' underlying habeas corpus petitions. The merits of that argument are beyond the scope of this Article, but for
compelling criticism of this view, see O.K. v. Bush, 377 F. Supp. 2d 102, 116-17 (D.D.C.
2005). But cf Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 45-51 (D.D.C. 2004) (declining to
dismiss habeas petition alleging that United States had constructive custody of United
States citizen detained by Saudi Arabia).
31. Extraordinary rendition refers to a CIA program in which noncitizens in U.S. custody, usually captured and held overseas, are transferred to the custody of an allied government such as Egypt for interrogation purposes. See Mayer, supra note 5, at 106; Katherine Hawkins, The Practice and Legality of Extraordinary Renditions (forthcoming)
(manuscript on file with author).
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32
them to obtain the requisite information. It is anything but clear
that the transfer-for-interrogation proposal ever was adopted; indeed, a contemporaneous memo to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
seeking his approval for various interrogation methods refers to
every one of the methods described in the FBI memo, except the
transfer proposal.33 Nor does it follow automatically that those
who proposed transfers for interrogation purposes did so in hopes
34
that torture would be used. But the fact that interrogationoriented transfers at least were under consideration should at
least give pause to those who otherwise might be tempted to dismiss the risk-of-torture argument out of hand.

In any event, by the end of June 2005, judges had decided
35
thirty-four of the GTMO transfer motions, with twenty-seven
pro-detainee decisions imposing the requested notice requirement
and six pro-government decisions denying that relief (one split
decision granted relief to one petitioner but denied it to two others). 6 The first four decisions in this line managed for the most
part to avoid the fear-of-torture issue, relying instead on the argument that transfers might unlawfully circumvent review of
37
pending habeas petitions. But the torture issue was central to
3
most of the rulings that followed. "

Be Tortured, MSNBC.COM, Aug.
32. Michael Isikoff, Exclusive: Secret Memo--Send 9to
4 6
1 .
8, 2005, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/876
De33. Memorandum from William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of
fense to Secretary of Defense (Nov. 27, 2002), available at http://www.npr.org/documents/
2004/dod.prisoners20040622doc5.pdf.
by
34. U.S. officials have repeatedly noted that interrogation of noncitizen detainees
matters
and
considerations
language
of
because
effective
non-U.S. personnel may be more
of cultural affinity.
cus35. One motion became moot after the petitioner was transferred to Australian
tody (the detainee had been moved to prevent transfer to Egypt). See Motion for Tempoin
rary Restraining Order, Habib v. Bush, No. 02-1130 (D.D.C. Jan. 5, 2005). The decision
one other case was pending at the time of this writing. See Batarfi v. Bush, No. 05-409
(D.D.C.) (filed Mar. 1, 2005).
36. See Table A, supra note 21. One such ruling-Aboassy v. Bush, No. 05-748 (D.D.C.
in that
Jan. 27, 2006)-was not a ruling on the merits, but instead, a denial of all motions
juriscase (without prejudice) in light of a pending determination by the D.C. Circuit on
Part
infra
Epilogue,
see
issues,
jurisdictional
these
of
discussion
a
For
issues.
dictional
VII.
2005)
37. See Abdah v. Bush, No. 04-cv-1254, 2005 WL 711814 (D.D.C. Mar. 29,
(D.D.C.
(granting relief on habeas avoidance grounds); al-Oshan v. Bush, No. 05-cv-0520
v.
2005) (same); al-Shihry v. Bush, No. 05-490 (D.D.C. Apr. 1, 2005) (same); al-Wazan
(same).
Bush, No. 05-329 (D.D.C. Apr. 1, 2005)
im38. Table A in the online appendix indicates the cases in which the torture issue
21.
note
pacted the judge's ruling. See Table A, supra
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The first opinions to come to grips with the torture issue in this
context--al-Marri v. Bush and al-Joudi v. Bush-are illustrative
of the approach to the issue taken in the twenty-seven prodetainee rulings.3 9 In neither case did the court identify the
sources of law that might give rise to a right not to be transferred
based on risk-of-torture concerns, nor did it explain the substantive standard that would have to be met in order to succeed in invoking such a right or the type of evidence that might suffice to
meet that standard. Instead, the court implicitly assumed the existence of such a right, and built its analysis of the traditional
factors for preliminary injunctive relief (i.e., risk of irreparable
harm and probability of success on the merits) on that foundation.4" Five of the six pro-government rulings on the notice issue
reach contrary conclusions, of course, but otherwise resemble the
pro-detainee decisions with respect to the depth of their treatment of the substantive law applicable in this context.41 Almurbati v. Bush, for example, notes that the detainees invoked the
Geneva Conventions, the Convention Against Torture, and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but does not
in any way explore the many complex issues associated with the
claim that these sources create judicially-enforceable rights for
GTMO detainees.4 2 Ultimately, only one of the thirty-three rulings, al-Anazi v. Bush,4 3 devotes significant attention to exploring
the law applicable to the fear-of-torture issue; and even there, the

39. See al-Joudi v. Bush, No. 05-301 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2005); al-Marri v. Bush, No. 042035, 2005 WL 774843 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2005).
40. First, the court determined-not at all unreasonably-that the prospect of torture
constituted a threat of irreparable harm. See, e.g., al-Marri, 2005 WL 774843, at
*4. In
reaching this determination, the court did not specify any particular source for a right
not
to be subjected to such a risk. In the context of a preliminary injunction ruling, that
discussion might be expected to occur instead in the context of the determination of whether
the movant has a probability of success on the merits. But under that heading, the
court
explained merely that the "issues raised in these motions are sensitive and involve
complex constitutional questions" that most likely will be resolved in the end by the Supreme
Court. Id. at *5.
41. See, e.g., O.K. v. Bush, 377 F. Supp. 2d 102, 115 (D.D.C. 2005) (referring briefly
to
the fact that the Convention Against Torture entails a more-likely-than-not standard
for
measuring the risk a transferee will be tortured, but not otherwise exploring the
issue);
Mammar v. Bush, No. 05-cv-0573 (D.D.C. 2005) (no discussion of possible grounds
for relief related to fear-of-torture). The sixth case-Aboassy--did not turn on the merits.
See
supra note 36.
42. See 366 F. Supp. 2d 72, 80 (D.D.C. 2005). The decision in Almurbati, like the
contrary rulings in al-Marri and al-Joudi, rested instead on the court's assessment
of
whether the proffered evidence supported a finding of a sufficient risk of irreparable
harm
or of a probability of success on (somewhat unspecified) merits. See id. at 75-81.
43. 370 F. Supp. 2d 188 (D.D.C. 2005).
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discussion is limited to a brief review of one statute that bears on
the analysis.4 4
The government has filed interlocutory appeals from the prodetainee decisions. Initially, these appeals were held in abeyance
pending the D.C. Circuit's resolution of the substantive issues
presented by the conflicting decisions in In re Guantdnamo De4
tainee Cases4 5 and Khalid v. Bush, " which dealt with the questions of whether GTMO detainees have constitutional rights and
whether the Geneva Conventions are judicially enforceable. As
described in more detail below, however, subsequent developments have now called into question the jurisdictional basis of
this litigation.4"
With that important caveat in mind, the article proceeds on the
assumption that it will remain possible to litigate the transfer issues raised by the GTMO detainees. In that case, the time eventually will come when courts will be obliged to delve deeply into
the array of domestic and international law concepts that combine to form the law of international detainee transfers. The precise contours of that law are far from clear and deeply contested,
unfortunately, particularly insofar as it concerns the issue of domestic judicial enforceability. In an effort to reduce this uncertainty, I aim in the following pages to identify the many constitutional, statutory, administrative, and international law rules that
speak to this issue, and, especially, to determine the extent to
which each might apply to GTMO detainees.
44. See id. at 194 (discussing § 2242 of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring
against
Act). The court in al-Anazi notes that § 2242(a) purports to establish a policy
purports
2242(d)
§
that
and
torture,
fear
to
grounds
substantial
are
there
where
transfers
to exclude judicial review in most contexts. See id. The court does not discuss, however,
habeas
the substantial authority suggesting that the language of § 2242(d) fails to exclude
III.B.3.c.
Part
corpus review. See infra
45. 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005).
46. 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005).
Ge47. While these appeals were pending, a panel of the D.C. Circuit addressed the
(D.C. Cir.
neva Convention enforceability issue in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33
The
2005), a case primarily concerned with the legality of the military commission process.
See id. at
panel held that the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are not judicially enforceable.
v. Rumsfeld,
39-40. That determination is now before the Supreme Court, see Hamdan
the time of
at
unclear
is
it
although
certiorari),
for
126 S. Ct. 622 (2005) (granting petition
Motion to
this writing whether the Court will proceed to the merits. See Respondents'
For a
2006).
12,
(Jan.
05-184
No.
Rumsfeld,
v.
Hamdan
Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction,
discussion of the issues raised by this motion, see Epilogue, infra Part VII.
Detainee
48. See Epilogue, infra Part VII (discussing the potential impact of the
Treatment Act of 2005 on GTMO transfer litigation).
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II. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

The most significant international human rights instrument
addressing the issue of torture is the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CAT").49 The United States signed CAT in 1988, the Senate consented to it in 1990 subject to a number of reservations,
understandings, and declarations, and the United States became
a party in 1994 when, after passage of certain implementing legislation, the President deposited the instrument of ratification
with the United Nations.5 °
The central features of CAT are its direct prohibitions on torture5 ' and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment,52 as well as its
requirement that member states take steps to ensure punishment
of torturers who come within their jurisdiction. 53 But CAT also attempts to suppress torture indirectly. It does this by limiting the
circumstances in which a person may be transferred from one
state to another where there is a risk the person will be tortured,
a concept often referred to as "non-refoulement."4
I begin below by examining the substantive scope of CAT's nonrefoulement rule, and then turn to a series of questions that
49. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26,
1987)
[hereinafter CAT], availableat http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/cat.pdf
50. See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 101-30 (1990); Letter of Submittal from George P. Shultz,
Sec'y of State, to Ronald Reagan, President (May 10, 1988), reprinted in MESSAGE
FROM
THE PRESIDENT

OF THE UNITED STATES

TRANSMITTING

THE CONVENTION AGAINST

TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT,
ADOPTED BY UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
ON
DECEMBER 10, 1984 AND SIGNED BY THE UNITED STATES ON APRIL 18,
1988, S. TREATY
DOC. NO. 100-20, at v (1988) [hereinafter MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT]; 136 CONG.
REC.
36,625-26 (1990); see also MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
U.N.
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE (CAT): OVERVIEW AND APPLICATION TO INTERROGATION
TECHNIQUES 2-5 (2004), availableat http:www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32438.pdf
51. See CAT, supra note 49, art. 2.
52. See id. art. 16.
53. See id. art. 5.
54. See id. art. 3. Article 3 refers, of course, to extradition and expulsion as well
as
non-refoulement. See id. The non-refoulement (i.e., non-return) concept derives from
Article
33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which similarly
regulates
international transfers of refugees where persecution on certain specified grounds
is an
issue. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, adopted July
28, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Refugee Convention],
available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/refugees.pdf. Note that CAT
does not
also attempt to suppress cruel, inhuman, or degrading ("CID") treatment indirectly
through a comparable transfer ban. See id.
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would arise if a GTMO detainee were to invoke this rule in seeking judicial relief. Do CAT obligations apply in this context? If so,
can they be judicially enforced in a U.S. court via habeas corpus?
If so, is it proper for states to rely on diplomatic assurances to allay fear-of-torture concerns? As it happens, the answers to these
questions turn not so much on CAT itself, but instead on the details of the complex statutory-regulatory structure through which
the United States has partly implemented its CAT obligations.
A. The Nature of the Article 3 Non-Refoulement Obligation
CAT anticipates the situation in which one state seeks to transfer an individual to the custody of another in circumstances involving a risk of torture. Its third article provides: "No State
Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there are substantialgrounds for believing that
he would be in danger of being subjected to torture."5
This non-refoulement prohibition is relatively straightforward
on its face, with the exception of the ambiguous phrase "substantial grounds." That ambiguity is critical, however, because the
phrase functions as a standard of proof, setting the evidentiary
bar for triggering a state's Article 3 obligations.
Recognizing its importance, the President and Senate directly
addressed the meaning of "substantial grounds" during the ratification process. In his message submitting CAT to the Senate for
advice and consent, President Reagan included the State Department's transmittal letter, which in turn attached a memorandum surveying CAT's provisions and detailing the reservations, understandings, and declarations ("RUDs")56 recommended
by the State Department. With respect to Article 3, the State
Department memo recommended that the Senate include an understanding that the phrase "substantial grounds for believing
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture" should

55. CAT, supra note 49, art. 3(1) (emphasis added).
56. For a discussion of RUDs as a mechanism for enabling U.S. participation in multilateral human rights instruments, and a defense of their desirability and validity, see
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and ConditionalConsent,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 399 (2000) (arguing that non-self-execution declarations generally are
constitutional).
57.

See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 50, at vi.
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be read "to mean 'if it is more likely than not that he would be tortured."'' 8 The memo observed that the more-likely-than-not standard already existed in U.S. immigration law with respect to the
analogous practice of withholding deportation of aliens who might
be subjected to persecution on grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion,59
and explained that CAT Article 3 should be understood to extend
that standard to cases of potential torture (as opposed to persecution) that would not already be covered by the immigration provision.6 °
Ultimately, the Senate ratified CAT subject to an understanding adopting the precise language suggested by the State Department's memo. 61 For purposes of domestic law, therefore, it is
well-established that the CAT Article 3 obligation comes into play
only where it is more likely than not that an individual will be
tortured if transferred.62
B. Obstacles to JudicialEnforcement
The fact that the United States is a party to CAT clearly establishes the existence of a non-refoulement obligation as a matter of
international law. But it does not follow automatically that the
GTMO detainees may enforce that obligation in federal court via
their habeas petitions. The judicial enforceability of the international law obligations of the United States is a controversial topic,
particularly with respect to international human rights law instruments such as CAT. Litigants who seek relief on the ground
that the government has breached such obligations encounter a
series of obstacles: Does the treaty apply extraterritorially? Is it

58. See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 50, at 6 (citing CAT, supra note
49, art. 3(1)).
59. See id. (citing INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984) (holding that the standard employed for § 243 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, then codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1253(h)(1), should be understood not as a well-founded fear standard but instead as a likelihood standard)).
60.

See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 50, at 6.

61. See S.EXEC. REP. No. 101-30, at 36 (outlining Understanding 2).
62. This construction most likely defines U.S. obligations under Article 3 on the international plane as well, given that no other State Party clearly objected to this understanding. Cf U.N. Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Declarations and Reservations,
n.20 (listing German statement on Understanding 2, which asserts the understanding
does "'not touch upon the obligations of the United States of America as State Party to the
Convention'"), available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/cat-reserve.htm.
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self-executing, and if not, has it been implemented by statute?
Assuming it does apply and is enforceable (either directly or by
statute), what sort of showing is required to obtain relief? Below,
I consider each of these concerns as they might arise in the context of GTMO transfers and CAT Article 3.63
1. Non-Extraterritoriality
One of the most significant obstacles facing a GTMO detainee
seeking to invoke Article 3 is the argument that CAT obligations
do not apply outside U.S. territory.
The United States takes the position that all of its international human rights treaty obligations, including in particular
CAT, are non-extraterritorial.' This view has been sharply criticized,65 but it also has been endorsed by the Supreme Court with

63. The only one of these issues to receive any serious attention during the first wave
of GTMO transfer litigation is the question of non-self-execution, which was addressed
briefly, and somewhat indirectly, by the court's discussion in al-Anazi. See al-Anazi v.
Bush, 370 F. Supp. 2d 188, 193-97 (D.D.C. 2005).
64. See, e.g., THE JAG'S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 54 (Maj.
Derek I. Grimes ed., 2005), available at https:1l34.11.61.26/CD1lPublications/JA/OL/
OL%20JA%20422%20OpLaw%2OHandbook%20200501.pdf (stating that international
human rights law treaties "do not bind U.S. forces outside the territory of the U.S. because
"the United States interprets [them] to apply to persons living in the territory of the
United States, and not to any person with whom agents of our government deal in the international community"); Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney General,
to Sen. Patrick J. Leahy 1 (Apr. 4, 2005) (stating that CAT Article 16 applies only to overseas locations "under U.S. jurisdiction"), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/movable
type/archives/CAT%20Article%2016.Leahy-Feinstein-Feingold%20Letters.pdf The United
States takes this position not only with respect to treaties such as CAT that employ relatively narrow geographic scope language such as "any territory under its jurisdiction" but
also to more broadly worded language such as "all individuals subject to its jurisdiction."
OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra, at 54 n.30. For an overview of the debate, see Michael J. Dennis, Agora: ICJ Advisory Opinion on Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
PalestinianTerritory:Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritoriallyin Times of
Armed Conflict and Military Occupation, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 119 (2005).
65. See, e.g., U.N. Gen. Assembly, Human Rights Comm., [80] Nature of the General
Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/
Rev.l/Add.13, 1 10 (May 26, 2004) (arguing that ICCPR rights apply not only to persons
within a member state's territory but also "to those within the power or effective control of
the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in
which such power or effective control was obtained"); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136,
180 (July 9) (concluding that ICCPR obligations apply "in respect of acts done by a State in
the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory"); see also Thomas Buergenthal, To
Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 72, 74 (Louis
Henkin ed., 1981) (arguing that the ICCPR applies extraterritorially); Theodor Meron, Ex-
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respect to a provision of the Refugee Convention analogous to
CAT Article 3. In 1993, in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.,66
the Court held that the non-refoulement requirement of Article 33
of the Refugee Convention simply did not apply to the interdiction
and return of Haitians on the high seas en route to the United
States. Citing Sale, Professor Yoo has written that "[gliven the
Supreme Court's interpretation of identical language in the Refugee Convention, it makes no sense to view the Torture Convention as affecting the transfer of prisoners held outside the United
68
States to another country."
Does Sale control the interpretation of CAT Article 3?69 Actually, that question appears to be moot with respect to the GTMO
detainees in light of the Court's 2004 decision in Rasul v. Bush.
Rasul addressed "whether the [federal] habeas statute confers a
right to judicial review of the legality of Executive detention of
aliens in a territory over which the United States exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction,but not 'ultimate sovereignty."'7 °
In a critical passage, the majority opinion by Justice John Paul
Stevens addressed the argument that the detainees should not be
able to invoke the habeas statute because of the canon of construction providing that statutes should not be construed to have
extraterritorial effect in the absence of a clear statement of congressional intent.71 The Court found this canon to be irrelevant
with respect to GTMO:
Whatever traction the presumption against extraterritoriality might
have in other contexts, it certainly has no application to the operation of the habeas statute with respect to persons detained within
"the territorial jurisdiction" of the United States. By the express
terms of its agreements with Cuba, the United States exercises
"complete jurisdiction and control" over the Guantdnamo Bay Naval
Base, and may continue to exercise such control permanently if it so
chooses. 72

traterritorialityof Human Rights Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 80 (1995) (stating tht

the

ICCPR "imposes treaty constraints not only on U.S. armed forces abroad, but also on civilian agents and officials exercising power and authority"). But see Dennis, supra note 64, at
122-27 (criticizing the view that ICCPR protections apply extraterritorially).
66. 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
67. See id. at 187-88.
68. Yoo, supra note 9, at 1229-30.
69. For the argument that Sale was incorrectly decided, and in any event should not
be extended to CAT, see Hawkins, supra note 31, at 78-80.
70. 542 U.S. 466, 475 (2004) (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 480-83.
72. Id. at 480 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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This language strongly implies that GTMO is within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.7 3
If GTMO is "within 'the territorial jurisdiction' of the United
States"74 for purposes of the habeas statute, is there any ground
for concluding that it is not also U.S. territory for purposes of U.S.
treaty obligations?7 5 Nothing in CAT suggests a narrower vision
of the concept of "territory" for purposes of that treaty.76 Nor is
this reading in tension with Sale, which merely addressed the
Refugee Convention's non-refoulement language in connection
with U.S. actions that take place on the high seas. The argument
that CAT lacks extraterritorial effect, even if correct, should
therefore pose no obstacle to finding that CAT's non-refoulement
obligation applies at GTMO.7 7
2. Non-Self-Execution
This does not mean that litigants necessarily may invoke Article 3 as a rule of decision in federal court. The question of
whether they can turns, in the first instance, on whether CAT is a
"non-self-executing" treaty, and if so, what consequences follow.
Non-self-execution refers generally to the situation in which
U.S. obligations under an international agreement are deemed
not to be judicially enforceable without implementing legislation.7" Precisely because non-self-execution allows the U.S. to
73. If the Court had meant only that the non-extraterritoriality canon has no application to the federal habeas statute in general, perhaps on the ground that the only significant consideration was whether the court had jurisdiction over the custodian rather than
the detainee himself, then it would not have included the language "with respect to persons detained within 'the territorial jurisdiction' of the United States," nor the next sentence concerning the nature of U.S. control over GTMO. Id. (emphasis added).
74. Id.
75. Cf. Yoo, supra note 9, at 1230 (referring to a single "canon of construction that
statutes and treaties are not to be read to have extraterritorial effect unless Congress
clearly states its intentions otherwise in the text").
76. Article 3, in fact, does not actually have express language imposing geographic
restraints, although other articles do. See, e.g., CAT, supra note 49, arts. 2, 3, 16. The pattern in the Refugee Convention is comparable. See, e.g., Refugee Convention, supra note
54, arts. 32, 33.
77. This may explain why the extraterritoriality argument did not appear in the government's motion papers in connection with the first wave of GTMO transfer litigation.
See, e.g., el-Banna v. Bush, No. 04-cv-1144 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2005) (consolidated opposition
brief in connection with fifteen transfer motions).
78. See Carlos Manuel Vizquez, The FourDoctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM.
J. INT'L L. 695, 695 (1995). As Professor Vzquez notes, there are several distinct accounts
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avoid at least some of the practical impact of undertaking international obligations, the concept is the subject of considerable
controversy. 79 The issue of domestic judicial enforceability has
arisen in connection with each of the major international human
rights law instruments that the United States has ratified, including CAT. And in each case, the treatymakers responded to
concerns on this score by adopting express declarations to the effect that particular provisions of these treaties are to be understood as non-self-executing. 0 In the case of CAT, for example, the
Senate's resolution consenting to the treaty provides that "the
United States declares that the provisions of Articles 1 through
16 of the Convention are not self-executing.""1 In light of this declaration, courts have uniformly held that CAT Article 3 is not
self-executing. 2
But what precisely does that mean in practical terms? The
question is not as simple as it sounds. Professor Vdzquez has observed that the phrase "non-self-execution" has been used indiscriminately by courts and commentators to refer to several distinct grounds for declining to rely on a treaty absent implement-

of the precise nature of non-self-execution. See id.
79. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 56 (providing a qualified defense of
non-self-execution), Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
2154 (1999) (same), John C. Yoo, Rejoinder, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual
and StructuralDefense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM L. REV. 2218 (1999) (same), and
John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding,99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999) (same), with Thomas Buergenthal,
Modern Constitutions and Human Rights Treaties, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211, 221
(1997) (denying constitutionality of non-self-execution), Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of
the United States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties,
67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 515 (1991) (same), Malvina Halberstam, Alvarez-Machain II: The
Supreme Court's Reliance on the Non-Self-Executing Declarationin the Senate Resolution
GivingAdvice and Consent to the InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, 1 J.
NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 89 (2005) (arguing that non-self-execution declarations should not
be given effect where the treaty text appears self-executing on its face), Jordan J. Paust,
Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760 (1988) (denying constitutionality of non-selfexecution), and David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a ConstitutionalFallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2002).
80. Section 111 of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
identifies several situations in which a treaty should be deemed non-self-executing, including the situation in which the "Senate in giving consent to a treaty ... requires implementing legislation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES, § 111(4)(b) (1986).
81. S. ExEc. REP. 101-30, at 31 (1990).
82. See Akhtar v. Reno, 123 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (collecting cases and
observing that "each court that has considered the issue has determined that the Convention is not self-executing").
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ing legislation.13 Two of these approaches have particular relevance in the context of international human rights instruments:
the right-of-action model and the rule-of-decision model.'s
The right-of-action model interprets the impact of non-selfexecution narrowly,8 5 as meaning merely that the treaty does not
86
itself create the procedural vehicle for its judicial enforcement.
Significantly, this model leaves open the possibility that a rule established by a treaty can be judicially enforced in other ways, as
when the rule is invoked defensively or a statute provides a right
of action.8 7 The rule-of-decision model, in contrast, invests nonself-execution with greater significance. Under this approach,
non-self-execution precludes courts from relying on a treaty provision as a rule of decision under any circumstances (unless and
until the rule set forth by that provision is implemented by legislation, in which case it may be the legislation rather than the
treaty that actually provides the rule of decision), even if the litigant 8has an independent procedural vehicle to raise the treaty is8
sue.
The choice between the right-of-action and rule-of-decision
models is particularly significant with respect to GTMO detainees. Rasul established their right to initiate habeas corpus proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which among other things provides for relief in the circumstance where an individual is held "in
9
custody in violation of the . . . treaties of the United States." Section 2241 thus constitutes a procedural vehicle for the detainees
to attempt to assert claims arising out of U.S. treaty obligations,

83. See Vdzquez, supra note 78, at 695 (arguing "that much of the doctrinal disarray
and judicial confusion is attributable to the failure of courts and commentators to recognize that for some time four distinct 'doctrines' of self-executing treaties have been masquerading as one").
84. See David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-SelfExecuting Declarationsand Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129, 137 (1999).
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

§ 111 & cmt. h (1986) (supporting the rule-of-decision model and describing the
right-of-action issue as a question distinct from self-execution). Defenders of this approach
explain that it reflects rather than limits the treatymakers' intentions, and thus is not inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause's statement that treaties constitute the law of the
land. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 56, at 446-49. But see Sloss, supra note
84, at 135-36.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2000) (emphasis added). Cf. Epilogue, infra Part VII.
STATES,
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eliminating any need to extrapolate a right of action from the
treaty itself.9 ° Thus, if the right-of-action model is the correct way
to view non-self-execution, then the detainees are free to litigate
their Article 3 claims in the habeas context.
It is far from clear, however, that the right-of-action model
should control with respect to CAT. Which model applies in this
context, as in any other, turns on the intent of the treatymakers
in adopting a non-self-execution declaration.9 1 The evidence on
this point with respect to CAT, unfortunately, is somewhat
mixed.
There is considerable reason to believe that the treatymakers
understood the non-self-execution declaration for CAT in the ruleof-decision sense, at least initially. The Reagan Administration
submitted CAT to the Senate in May 1988, accompanied by a Letter of Transmittal from the President, a Letter of Submittal from
Secretary of State Shultz, and a State Department memorandum
providing an article-by-article analysis of CAT and the various
RUDs sought by the administration.9 2 The President's letter does
not specifically address the issue of non-self-execution, but Secretary Shultz's letter does. After noting that "a declaration that the
Convention is not self-executing is recommended," Shultz explains that "[w]ith such a declaration, the provisions of the Convention would not of themselves become effective as domestic
law."93 The accompanying State Department memorandum elaborates that "[a]lthough the terms of the Convention, with the suggested reservations and understandings, are consonant with U.S.
law, it is nevertheless preferable to leave any further implementation that may be desired to the domestic legislative and judicial
process."9 4

90. OLC had predicted that if courts permitted a GTMO detainee to file a habeas petition, this "would allow [the] detainee to challenge the legality of his status and treatment
under international treaties." OLC Memo, supra note 13, at 8.
91. As Professor Sloss has observed, the treatymakers' intent on this point may vary
from treaty to treaty. See Sloss, supra note 84, at 137-38.
92. See S. TREATY Doc. 100-20 (1988).
93. Id. at vi.
94. Id. at 2. Professor Sloss points out that the Reagan Administration borrowed its
language from near-identical statements made by the Carter Administration in 1978 in
connection with a set of four other international human rights instruments. See Sloss, supra note 84, at 160. The "basic thrust" of the Carter statements, Sloss explains, was "that
the human rights treaties, with NSE declarations attached ...would require implementing legislation before they could provide a rule of decision for the courts." Id. at 159. By the
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Because the nature and quantity of the RUDs originally proposed by the Reagan Administration prompted extensive criticism,9" the Bush Administration submitted a shortened and revised set of recommendations in January 1990.96 The revised
package did not alter the proposed non-self-execution declaration,
however, which was "[retained without modification from the
1988 transmittal."9 7
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on
CAT soon after this revised package arrived, with State Depart9
ment Legal Adviser Abraham D. Sofaer as the first witness. " As
Professor Sloss has observed, Judge Sofaer's testimony is ambiguous with respect to his views on the meaning of non-selfexecution in relation to CAT.9 9 On one hand, there are clear
statements in his testimony that CAT "is not self-executing...
1 00 On the other
and thus will require implementing legislation."
hand, Judge Sofaer also stated that the United States will "assume" not only international but also "domestic ... legal obligations ... when the Convention is ratified,"' and later added that
"[ilf you adopt this treaty, it is not just international law. The
standard becomes part of our law."102
With respect to Article 3 in particular, Judge Sofaer wrote in
his prepared statement that the "provisions of Article 3 would be
implemented by 'competent authorities' within the Department of

same token, he notes, "one might infer that the Reagan Administration intended to preclude provisions of the Torture Convention [other than those later implemented by statute] from ever having domestic legal effect." Id. at 161.
95. See S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20, at 2 (1988); Convention Against Torture, Hearing
on S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong., 8
(1990) (statement of Hon. Abraham D. Sofaer) (describing involvement of the American
Bar Association and Amnesty International) [hereinafter CAT Hearing].
96. See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 101-30 at 2, 4 (1990) (commenting that the RUDs, "in number and substance, created the impression that the United States was not serious in its
commitment to end torture worldwide").
97. Letter from Janet G. Mullins, Assistant Sec'y, Legislative Affairs, Dep't of State,
to Sen. Claiborne Pell (Dec. 10, 1989) (enclosure), as reprintedin S. EXEC. REP. No. 101-30,
at 36 (1990).
98. See CAT Hearing, supra note 95, at 4.
99. See Sloss, supra note 84, at 162-65.
100. CAT Hearing, supra note 95, at 12.
101. Id. at 8; see also id. at 41 (responding to questions from Senator Helms concerning
the impact of CAT with respect to a hypothetical case of torture within the United States,
Judge Sofaer stated without explanation that CAT would apply in that scenario).
102.

Id. at 42.
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Justice and State as appropriate." °3 Mark Richard, then the
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division,
elaborated in his testimony that "[u]nder our existing law, the
competent authorities for ensuring the execution of this obligation are the Secretary of State for extradition and the Attorney
General for deportation."10 4 These statements imply that even
with the non-self-execution declaration in place, the obligations
imposed by Article 3 would operate directly on executive officials
with responsibility for international transfer decisions. This does
not mean, however, that Sofaer and Richards understood the obligations to be judicially enforceable. On the contrary, Richards
emphasized that "Article 3 does not require that such determinations be made subject to judicial review. The determiners and the
degree of review, if any, are left by the Convention to internal domestic law."'
Ultimately, the historical record does not provide an obviously
correct interpretation of the treatymakers' intent with respect to
non-self-execution under CAT. At least as far as Article 3 is concerned, however, the weight of the evidence does seem to favor
the rule-of-decision rather than the right-of-action model. Accordingly, the better view is that individuals may not request that a
court apply Article 3 as a rule of decision unless that provision
has been implemented through subsequent legislation. Has it?
3. Implementing Article 3
Article 3 has been implemented, but in a manner that raises
almost as many questions as it answers.
a. Implementation by Regulation
Implementation of Article 3 occurred uneasily. Indeed, the prevailing view initially was that most CAT obligations merely reflected existing United States law and that only Article 5 (requiring states to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction to prosecute
torturers) called for implementing legislation.' 6 Thus no effort
103. Id. at 12.
104. Id. at 15 (statement of Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Div.,
Dep't of Justice).
105. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
106. See, e.g., S. EXEC. REP. No. 101-30, at 10 (1990) (report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee stating that "the majority of the obligations to be undertaken by the
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was made to implement Article 3 when Congress set about the
task of "implementing" CAT in 1994.
By 1995, some legislators realized their mistake, and efforts to
°7
enact implementing legislation for Article 3 began. The precise
form that the legislation should take, however, was the subject of
disagreement. In 1997, the Senate passed a bill with strong language that would have imposed a straightforward statutory prohibition against refoulement,10 8 applicable to the United States
government as a whole.1" 9 But the House version of the same legislation merely included hortatory language purporting to estab110
lish non-refoulement as the "policy" of the United States. During the conference to resolve these and other differences, the
conferees reconciled the competing approaches by adopting the
House's policy statement and then adding a watered-down version of the Senate's prohibitory language, pursuant to which "appropriate agencies" would be obliged to enact "regulations to implement" Article 3.1"

United States pursuant to the Convention are already covered by existing law," and that
"additional implementing legislation will be needed only with respect to article 5, dealing
with areas of criminal jurisdiction" providing punishment for acts of torture occurring outside the United States). Indeed, according to Judge Sofaer, the Bush Administration did
not intend to deposit the instrument of ratification for CAT until after Congress enacted
legislation implementing that particular obligation. See CAT Hearing, supra note 95, at
12. This is, in fact, what actually happened; the United States instrument of ratification
was not deposited until 1994, after Congress enacted implementing legislation specific to
Article 5. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340B (2000).
107. See, e.g., S. 1058, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995) (recognizing lack of implementation); id.
§ 4 (banning refoulement directly); H.R. 1561, 104th Cong. § 2662 (1995); 141 CONG. REC.
13,361-403 (1995) (funding prohibiting); H.R. 1416, 104th Cong. § 4 (1995) (direct ban on
refoulement); H.R. REP. No. 104-478, at 158 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (explaining that H.R. 1561
would "partly implement" CAT).
108. I use the word "refoulement" here merely as a shorthand for the CAT Article 3
transfer rule.
109. See S. 903, 105th Cong. § 1606 (1997), 143 CONG. REC. 11,100, 11,116 (1997) (providing that the "United States shall not expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are reasonablegrounds for believing
the person would be in danger of subjection to torture") (emphasis added). By using the
words "reasonable grounds," in fact, S. 903 would have been more demanding than the
more-likely-than-not standard of Article 3 (as ratified).
110. See H.R. 1757, 105th Cong. § 1702(a) (1997), 143 CONG. REC. 9945-46 (1997) (stating that it shall be the policy of the United States "not [to] expel, extradite, or otherwise
effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial
grounds for believing that the person would be in danger of subjection to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United States").
111. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-432, at 67 (1998) (Conf. Rep.), 144 CONG. REC. 3080, 3098
(1998). The language adopted by the conferees actually had been adopted by the Senate
previously, in November 1997, in connection with amendments to H.R. Res. 2607, an om-
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This language became law in 1998 in the form of § 2242
of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998
("FARRA")." 2 Section 2242(a) is the policy statement:
It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or
otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in
which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would
be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the
113
person is physically present in the United States.

Section 2242(b) is the regulatory mandate:
Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act [Oct.
21, 1998], the heads of the appropriateagencies shall prescribe regulations to implement the obligations of the United States under Article 3 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other
Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
subject to any reservations, understandings, declarations, and provisos contained in the
United States Senate resolution of ratification of
1 14
the Convention.

b. Pentagon Regulations?
In response to the regulatory mandate of § 2242(b), the Justice
Department promulgated regulations implementing the nonrefoulement rule in connection with removal proceedings," 5 and
nibus authorization package. See 143 CONG. REC. 25,535, 25,592, 25,660 (1997). When the

House disagreed with these amendments, the Senate receded and H.R. 2607 became law
without reference to the Article 3 issue. See District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2161 (1997).
112. FARRA appears as Division G to the 1998 omnibus emergency appropriations bill
enacted as Public Law Number 105-277. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. G, §§ 1001-2813, 112 Stat.
2681-761 to 2681-854 (1998) [hereinafter FARRA]. Section 2242(a) is codified in the notes
following 8 U.S.C. § 1231.
113. FARRA, supra note 112, § 2242(a) (emphasis added). As a mere statement of "policy," § 2242(a) cannot be construed as creating enforceable rights. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 454 (finding no intent to create judicially enforceable rights in 42 U.S.C. § 1996, which purported to establish a "policy of the United
States to protect and preserve for American Indians" certain expressive and religious
rights).
114. FARRA, supra note 112, § 2242(b) (emphasis added).
115. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16-208.18 (2005) (implementing non-refoulement safeguards in
the context of removal proceedings under the immigration laws, for purposes of the Department of Homeland Security); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16-1208.18 (2005) (implementing nonrefoulement safeguards in the context of removal proceedings under the immigration laws,
for purposes of the Executive Office of Immigration Review at the Justice Department).
For ease of reference, I will continue to refer simply to the Justice Department despite the
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the State Department did the same with respect to extradition
proceedings.' 16 There is no evidence that anyone at the time
thought that other government agencies ought to do likewise, still
less that the Department of Defense should." 7 But Congress had
not limited the mandate of § 2242(b) to the removal and extradition scenarios. Rather, § 2242(b) applies to all "appropriate agencies" of the government without reference to the particular
mechanism of international transfer involved." 8 In this respect, §
2242(b) tracks Article 3, which concerns the actions of the government as a whole rather than any particular instrumentality
thereof.
Of course, the fact that the Pentagon did not respond to §
2242(b) by promulgating regulations is understandable. Particularly in light of the views discussed above concerning nonextraterritoriality, it does not seem that anyone in the 1990s anticipated a scenario in which the military would become involved
in international transfers of persons from territory over which the
United States exercised sufficient control to implicate CAT obligations." 9 Post-9/11 developments, however, have led to precisely
that situation at GTMO. The Department of Defense thus may
§ 2242(b) benot have been an "appropriate agency" at the time
120
came law, but it has unwittingly become one since.

partial transfer of immigration law responsibilities to the Department of Homeland Security. For an overview of immigration law practice under the CAT regulations, see James
Feroli, Trends in Decisions Under the Convention Against Torture, IMMIGRATION
BRIEFINGS, No. 05-05, May 2005, at 1.
116. See 22 C.F.R. §§ 95.1-95.4 (2005) (implementing non-refoulement safeguards in the
context of removal proceedings under the immigration laws, for purposes of State Department determinations in the context of extradition proceedings).
117. But see Exec. Order No. 13,107, 3 C.F.R. 234 (1999) (establishing the Interagency
Working Group on Human Rights (including representatives of the Department of Defense
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff) to facilitate compliance with obligations under treaties including CAT).
118. FARRA, supra note 112, § 2242(b).
119. This explains the statement by Professor Yoo in his article on transfers-written
before the Supreme Court ruled in Rasul-to the effect that CAT "does not apply extraterritorially" and "[tihus, the Department of Defense was not required to promulgate regulations with respect to military transfers." Yoo, supra note 9, at 1231 n.207.
120. The Charming Betsy canon of statutory interpretation provides additional support, albeit perhaps a bit indirect, for this conclusion. The CharmingBetsy canon suggests
that courts should "construe acts of Congress to avoid violations of international law
whenever possible." Wuerth, supra note 3, at 298. Here, the relevant international law
provision is the Article 3 non-refoulement obligation, which at least as a matter of international law applies to the U.S. government as a whole. Construing § 2242(b) to refer only to
a subset of U.S. government agencies involved in international transfers arguably would
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If this is correct, what does it mean for the detainees? It may
mean that they have the right under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") to compel the Department of Defense to meet its
121
regulatory obligations under § 2242(b).
APA § 706(1) provides that a reviewing court may "compel
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed." 2 2
APA § 702 clarifies that a "person suffering legal wrong because
of agency action [defined to include the 'failure to act'],123 or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning
of a relevant statute, is entitled to seek judicial review thereof."1 24
Thus, assuming that the detainees have a cognizable interest in
the promulgation of regulations to implement the non-refoulement rule, § 702 establishes a cause of action to present a § 706(1)
claim. Under APA § 703, moreover, detainees also may use habeas corpus as a procedural vehicle for asserting such a claim. 25
The Department of Defense might respond by citing provisions
of APA § 701 and § 702 which state that the APA does not override prohibitions on judicial review imposed by other statutes. 26
After all, as discussed in more detail below, FARRA § 2242 contains language purporting to limit judicial review of refoulement

not necessarily violate the treaty, but it would be in tension with it. Cf Cornejo-Barreto v.
Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000) (invoking Charming Betsy canon in the course
of construing § 2242(b) as imposing a non-discretionary duty on the Secretary of State in
extradition proceedings).
121. See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (2000). It is important to grasp that the
existence of this APA claim does not turn in any way on the question of whether CAT has
been implemented; it is simply a question of the APA implications of a federal statute that
mandates government agencies to promulgate regulations.
122. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
123. Id. § 551(13).
124. Id. § 702.
125. Id. § 703.
126. See id. § 701(a)(1) (stating that judicial review is not available if barred by statute
in issue); id. § 702 (stating that "[niothing herein . . . affects other limitations on judicial
review"). The government might also contend that APA § 551(1) excludes certain activities
from the definition of "agency," including: '(F) courts martial and military commissions"
and "(G) military authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory."
Clearly § 551(1)(F) applies to APA challenges directed at the military commission process.
But the transfer issue of course is distinct from that process. So the question is whether §
551(1)(G) applies. Because GTMO is not occupied territory, the specific issue is whether
GTMO transfers take place under the rubric of "[1] military authority [2] exercised in the
field [3] in time of war." 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(G). Elements one and three may be met, but not
two; decisions made with respect to GTMO transfers are not made "in the field." Accordingly, the Department of Defense is an "agency" within the meaning of the APA for purposes of the GTMO transfer issue.
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decisions in certain contexts and precludes review of the regulations that agencies do promulgate. 1 27 But the careful phrasing of
these limitations in § 2242 does not extend to an agency's failure
12
to promulgate regulations in the first place,' and thus it appears
that detainees could in fact mount an APA challenge.
Whether they would succeed in such a challenge is another
matter. "Section 706(1) is rarely used successfully," one treatise
observes, because of the difficulty in determining when agency
delay is unreasonable in light of the complexity associated with
"an agency's process of setting its agenda and allocating its resources among competing tasks." 2 9 In an effort to come to grips
with that complexity and thus identify undue delay, the District
30
of Columbia Circuit employs a multifactor balancing test.' Relevant considerations include: whether the amount of delay comports with a "rule of reason," whether Congress has specified a
timetable for action, whether the interests at stake involve "human health or welfare," whether compulsory action might prejuthe nature of the interdice a "higher or competing priority," and
31
delay.'
by
prejudiced
be
ests that would
Applied to the non-refoulement issue presented at GTMO, it
appears that these factors tilt the balance somewhat in the direction of the detainees. Two considerations stand out. First, the individual interests here at stake, associated with potential physical and mental harm, are highly significant. Second, perhaps in
recognition of the magnitude of these interests, Congress imposed
a tight 120-day deadline on promulgation of regulations when it
32 With respect to this secoriginally enacted FARRA § 2242(b).
ond factor, it is wholly understandable that the Department of
Defense initially did not view itself as subject to this obligation
and so it would not be fair to suggest that the Pentagon is years
behind in complying with its obligation. At the same time, how-

127.
128.
cussed
129.

See FARRA, supra note 112, § 2242(d). Section 2242(d) is discussed infra.
It also is probable that § 2242(d) fails to exclude habeas corpus review, as disin more detail below.
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAuL R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW AND PROCESS § 5.9, at 224-25 (4th ed. 2004).

130. Id. § 5.9, at 225 (citing Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr. ("TRAC") v. FCC, 750
F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
131. TRAC, 750 F.2d at 79-80 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Additionally,
there is no requirement of "impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude" in order to find
unreasonable delay. Id. at 80 (quoting PCHRG v. FDA, 740 F.2d 21, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
132. FARRA, supranote 112, § 2242(b).
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ever, it has been apparent at the very least since early 2005when the first wave of GTMO transfer litigation began-that
transfers present non-refoulement questions. It thus is possible
that a § 706(1) claim might result in a court order confirming the
Department of Defense's responsibility to promptly promulgate
regulations pursuant to FARRA § 2242(b).
Would such an order make any practical difference? It might.
APA § 705 specifies that "to the extent necessary to prevent irreparable injury, the reviewing court... may issue all necessary
and appropriate process ... to preserve status or rights pending
conclusion of the review proceedings."' 3 3 If a reviewing court were
to conclude that the Department of Defense has an obligation to
promulgate non-refoulement regulations under § 2242(b), it might
act under § 705 to ensure that in the interim detainees are not
transferred in violation of the more-likely-than-not standard. On
the other hand, as I discuss in Part II.B.4 below, the military already requires compliance with the more-likely-than-not standard as a matter of policy with respect to GTMO transfers. Thus,
a court might conclude instead that the government may continue
as before so long as it adheres to this policy. Indeed, at the end of
the day, the more important question is not whether the military
is carrying out transfers pursuant to policy or regulation, but
whether the resulting decisions fairly reflect the more-likelythan-not standard. That raises the issue of whether, and to what
extent, judges may review these determinations.
c. Precluding Judicial Review
At first blush it seems that judges cannot review nonrefoulement determinations except in very limited circumstances,
notwithstanding the fact that § 2242(b) expressly implements Article 3.T 4 Section 2242(d) states not only that "no court shall have
jurisdiction to review the regulations adopted to implement this
section," but also that:
[N]othing in this section shall be construed as providing any court
jurisdiction to consider or review claims raised under the Convention
or this section, or any other determination made with respect to the

133. Administrative Procedure Act § 705, 5 U.S.C. § 705 (2000).
134.

FARRA, supra note 112, § 2242(b).
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application of the policy set forth in subsection (a), except as part of
the review of a final order of removal pursuant to section 242 of the
1252). 135
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.

Relying on this language, courts initially declined to review
non-refoulement determinations outside the specified context of
final orders of removal. 136 A difficult question soon arose, however, with respect to whether the language of § 2242(d), express
as it was, sufficed to preclude individuals from raising nonrefoulement issues via habeas corpus.
In 2000, a divided Ninth Circuit panel held in an extradition
37
case, Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert ("Cornejo-Barreto T,),1 that §
2242(d) did not preclude habeas review of the Secretary of State's
Article 3 determination because the statute lacks a sufficiently
such review. 138
clear statement of congressional intent to preclude
After all, the language in § 2242 preventing review of CAT regu1 39
lations (i.e., "no court shall have jurisdiction") speaks broadly in
terms of jurisdiction-stripping, whereas the language regarding
review of the actual non-refoulement determination itself (i.e.,
"nothing in this section shall be construed as providing any court
jurisdiction")140 speaks more narrowly in terms of not affirmatively creatingjurisdiction. The next year, moreover, this view received indirect but substantial support from the Supreme Court,
4
which held in INS v. St. Cyr1 1 that statutes must provide "a
clear, unambiguous, and express statement of congressional intent to preclude judicial consideration on habeas," at least where

135. FARRA, supra note 112, § 2242(d); see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-432, at 150 (1998)
(Conf. Rep.), 144 CONG. REC. 3080, 3123 (1998) (stating that "[tihe provision agreed to by
the conferees does not permit for judicial review of [ the regulations or of most claims under the Convention").
136. See, e.g., Akhtar v. Reno, 123 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing
the limited nature of judicial review under FARRA § 2242); Sandhu v. Burke, No. 97 Civ.
4608, 2000 WL 191707, at *32 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2000) (holding that "nothing in [FARRA]
confers authority upon the judiciary to enforce [CAT's] provisions.. . 'nothing in the policy
makes Article 3 of the Convention enforceable in Court" (quoting FARRA, supra note 112,
§ 2242(d))).
137. 218 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2000).
138. See id. at 1015-16 & n.13. Judge Kozinski disagreed with the majority's position
on this point "because the question of whether petitioner would be entitled to judicial review of an extradition decision ...is not before us." Id. at 1017 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
139. FARRA, supra note 112, § 2242(d).
140. Id.
141. 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (examining whether a resident alien could use habeas to challenge the Attorney General's interpretation of discretionary withholding of deportation,
notwithstanding statutory language barring judicial review).
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pure questions of law are concerned. 14 2 St. Cyr dealt with immigration law provisions rather than FARRA § 2242(d), but the decision had clear implications for the latter statute, particularly
since the relevant language in § 2242(d) is nearly identical to the
immigration law provisions found to be insufficient to preclude
habeas review in St. Cyr.14 1 Since St. Cyr, five circuits (though not
the D.C. Circuit) have considered whether § 2242(d) precludes
habeas corpus jurisdiction in connection with immigration proceedings other than a final order of removal. 4 4 Citing St. Cyr, all
have held that it does not, and that litigants may rely on habeas
to challenge non-refoulement determinations in that context. 45
Do these St.Cyr-inspired cases set forth a rule that reaches beyond the immigration law context? Several courts have grappled
with this issue in the parallel context of extradition proceedings,
with mixed results. 46 Cornejo-BarretoI, discussed above, was an
extradition case in which the court found habeas available notwithstanding § 2242(d).'4 7 Because the Secretary of State had not
142. Id. at 314; see id. at 314 n.38; see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Non-Self-Executing
Treaties and the Suspension ClauseAfter St. Cyr, 113 YALE L. J. 2007 (2004) (anticipating
the broad significance of St. Cyr for the non-self-execution debate).
143. See Ogbudimkpa v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 207, 212-13 & nn.12-13 (3d Cir. 2003)
(side-by-side comparison).
144. See Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2005) (recognizing habeas jurisdiction
to review Board of Immigration Appeals removal determination with respect to CAT); Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 2004); Singh v. Ashcroft, 351 F.3d 435 (9th Cir.
2003); Ogbudimkpa, 342 F.3d 207; Saint Fort v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 191 (1st Cir. 2003);
Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2003).
145. See Auguste, 395 F.3d at 137-38 & n.13; Cadet, 377 F.3d at 1179-83 & nn.7-8;
Singh, 351 F.3d at 441; Ogbudimkpa, 342 F.3d at 216-17; Saint Fort, 329 F.3d at 200-02;
Wang, 320 F.3d at 140-42. Since then, Congress has enacted the REAL ID Act, which
among other things amends the immigration laws so as to more clearly consolidate judicial
review of removal decisions in most instances to a single petition brought directly to the
Circuit Court. See REAL ID Act § 106, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4)-(5) (2000). The impact of
these changes on habeas review of CAT determinations has been the subject of inconclusive litigation. See Malm v. Gonzalez, No. 04-1678 (4th Cir.) (appellant's brief) (on file with
author) (raising the issue); Malm v. Gonzales, 151 F. App'x 252 (4th Cir. 2005) (dismissing
Malm's petition on collateral estoppel grounds). See also Feroli, supra note 115, at 13 (describing potential impact of REAL ID on habeas review of CAT issues in the immigration
context).
146. Compare Cornejo-Barreto v. Siefert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Cornejo-BarretoI], with Cornejo-Barreto v. Siefert, 379 F.3d 1075, 1086-87 (9th
Cir. 2004), vacated as moot, 389 F.3d 1307 (9th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Cornejo-BarretoII];
see also Hoxha v. Levi, 371 F. Supp. 2d 651 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (refusing to consider Article 3
claim on habeas in extradition context on ground that Secretary exercises unreviewable
discretion in this area).
147. Cornejo-Barreto sought to use habeas to assert a claim under APA § 704, which
permits judicial review of "'final agency action for which there is no other adequate rem-
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yet made an Article 3 determination in that case, the court in
Cornejo-Barreto I ultimately dismissed the petition without
48 Eventually,
prejudice to refilling after that decision was made.
the Secretary of State did determine that Cornejo-Barreto could
be extradited consistent with Article 3.149 At that point, CornejoBarreto re-filed his petition, and ultimately ended up back before
the Ninth Circuit. 5 ° In Cornejo-BarretoII, a different Ninth Circuit panel acknowledged the ruling in St. Cyr and the various circuit court decisions that applied its superclear-statement requirement to § 2242(d) in the context of immigration proceedings,
5
but found them all distinguishable. ' The panel reasoned that in
the extradition context, the "rule of non-inquiry" traditionally ensured that the Secretary would have sole discretion to determine
whether humanitarian considerations (such as the risk of abuse
at the hands of the receiving state) warranted denial of an extradition request.'5 2 In the view of the court, nothing in FARRA alof § 2242(d)
tered this traditional rule, and in fact, the language
15 3
it.
change
to
not
intent
suggested a congressional
The rationale of Cornejo-BarretoI is more persuasive than that
of Cornejo-Barreto H. To illustrate this point, consider how the
situation would appear in the absence of § 2242(d). In that case,
Cornejo-Barreto's petition would present a simple clash between
the familiar doctrine of the rule of non-inquiry and a more recent
statute, § 2242(b), that expressly implements a binding U.S.
treaty obligation. The former would give way to the latter and
some form of review would be permitted, notwithstanding the fact
that the rule of non-inquiry otherwise would have made the risk
of torture an off-limits issue for the courts. Enter § 2242(d). If
given literal effect, it would prevent this result by precluding judicial review. But under a superclear-statement framework along
the lines of St. Cyr, one does not give § 2242(d) its literal effect.
Instead, the statute is read to still permit habeas corpus review,
edy in a court.'" Cornejo-BarretoI, 218 F.3d at 1012 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000)). Under
that the deciAPA § 706, such a decision may be set aside by the reviewing court if it finds
with
sion was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
(2000).
706(2)(A)
law." 5 U.S.C. §
148. Cornejo-Barreto1, 218 F.3d at 1016-17.
149. Cornejo-Barreto11, 379 F.3d at 1078-79.
150. Id. at 1079.
151. Id. at 1083-89.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1088-89.
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thus supplying the vehicle that enables § 2242(b) to have its full
effect, which in this case is to override the traditional rule of noninquiry.
Assuming that the same logic applies by extension in the
GTMO transfer context,'* the next issue concerns the nature and
scope of the review that results.15 5 St. Cyr had emphasized that
habeas in that instance was being used merely to enable a court
to adjudicate a pure question of law (specifically, whether
changes to the immigration laws in 1996 should be applied retroactively). The subsequent decisions applying St. Cyr in the context of non-refoulement issues raised in immigration proceedings,
however, appear to go a step further. These cases involved noncitizens whose CAT arguments did not succeed with the Board of
Immigration Appeals ("BIA") and who were attempting to use habeas to persuade the courts to review the BIA's determination
that they had failed to meet the more-likely-than-not standard.
The courts in these cases were unwilling to reexamine fact findings, but were willing to review the application of the law to the
facts that had been found.'5 6 Arguably, this marked an expansion
of the scope of habeas review from the St. Cyr scenario involving
questions associated only with the proper interpretation of a
statute. That said, in each case the court approached the review
deferentially, and ultimately concluded that the BIA had not
erred in its determination. 7
If the same approach is employed during habeas review of a
non-refoulement determination in the GTMO transfer context,
what result might follow? I address this question in the next section.5

154. The diplomatic concerns identified by the government during the first
wave of
GTMO transfer litigation are similar in kind, albeit greater in magnitude,
to those involved in the rule of non-inquiry. See supra Part I.
155. See, e.g., Mironescu v. Costner, 345 F. Supp. 2d 538, 549-50 (M.D.N.C.
2004) (describing uncertainty concerning the scope of habeas review in FARRA context);
Abra Edwards, Note, Cornejo-Barreto Revisited: The Availability of a Writ of Habeas
Corpus to
Provide Relief from Extradition under the Torture Convention, 43 VA. J. INT'L
L. 889, 906
(2003) (same).
156. See, e.g., Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 138 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that
habeas
review "islimited to constitutional issues and errors of law, including both
statutory interpretations and application of law to undisputed facts or adjudicated facts,
but does not
include review of administrative fact findings or the exercise of discretion");
id. at 150
(stating essentially the same).
157. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
158. A question might also arise with respect to FARRA § 2242(c), which states
that in

2006]

LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DETAINEE TRANSFERS

4. Habeas Review & Diplomatic Assurances
In order to anticipate the potential impact of habeas review in
the context of GTMO transfers, I begin with an overview of current Pentagon policy regarding the non-refoulement issue. This
review demonstrates the central role that diplomatic assurances
play in such determinations.
a. Current Department of Defense Policy
Although the Department of Defense does not necessarily accept that as a matter of domestic law it is bound by Article 3 and
§ 2242(b) in the sense described above, it nonetheless has stated
that "it is the policy of the United States, consistent with Article 3
of [CAT], not to repatriate or transfer individuals to other countries where it believes it is more likely than not that they will be
tortured."" 9 Indeed, the government has refused to repatriate a
promulgating regulations, the agencies "shall exclude" those "aliens described in section
con241(b)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act [INA]," to the "maximum extent
§
112,
note
supra
FARRA,
CAT.
under
States"
United
the
of
obligations
sistent with the
2242(c). The referenced language refers to, among other things, aliens whom the Attorney
General reasonably believes to pose a security threat. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv)
(2000). Naturally, the Department of Defense might view this as excluding GTMO detainconees from the implementation of Article 3. Such an argument most likely would not be
exBy
exclusions.
such
no
contains
3
Article
that
given
however,
sistent with Article 3,
pressly requiring agencies to remain consistent with Article 3 when promulgating
regulations, Congress in § 2242(c) effectively precluded the agencies from overriding the
why
non-refoulement rule despite the reference to INA § 241(b)(3)(B). This may explain
the extradition regulations do not take up the invitation of § 2242(c), and why the removal
regulations do so only in the sense that they provide deferral of removal-i.e., continued
incarceration pending an opportunity to remove consistent with non-refoulement-for such
recaliens. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.17, 1208.17 (2005). The Department of Justice approach to
what
onciling the tension inherent in § 2242(c) most likely marks the outer boundary of
the Department of Defense can achieve under that subsection if and when it implements
its own CAT regulations.
159. See, e.g., Declaration of Matthew C. Waxman para. 6., Abdah v. Bush, No. 04-1254
from
(D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Waxman Decl.] (emphasis added). See also Letter
William H. Taft IV, Legal Advisor, Dep't of State to Mr. Christopher Girod, Head of Dele(stating
gation, Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross 1-2 (May 11, 2004) (on file with the author)
that the United States operates under a law of war framework regarding GTMO detainindiees, but that U.S. policy is not to transfer where "it is 'more likely than not' that [the
if
vidual] will be tortured"). Identical declarations by Mr. Waxman have been filed in most,
transfer
GTMO
of
a
list
for
21
note
supra
A,
Table
See
cases.
transfer
GTMO
the
of
not all,
cases. The existence of a policy-based procedure does not render moot the APA argument
for promulgation of regulations, described above. First, so long as the procedure is a mere
a parproduct of policy, the Executive branch has the option of opting out of the policy in
of
ticular case or even abandoning it altogether. Second, establishing that the Department
for
basis
the
provides
context,
this
in
least
at
mandate,
2242(b)
§
the
within
falls
Defense
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group of Chinese and Uzbek Uighur detainees at GTMO, despite
determining that the men are no longer enemy combatants, on
the ground that the men cannot be repatriated consistent with
this policy; as of February 2006, the men remain at GTMO while
the State Department seeks a third-party country willing to take
them. 6 ' Given that the United States has repatriated other detainees to states with poor human rights records, however, questions do arise about the nature of the current non-refoulement
policy.
We have some insight into the specifics of that policy, thanks to
a pair of declarations submitted by government officials in connection with the first wave of GTMO transfer litigation. According to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Matthew C. Waxman, the decision to transfer a GTMO detainee ultimately is
made by the Secretary of Defense or his designee after "appropriate assurances regarding the detainee's treatment are sought
from the country to whom the transfer of the detainee is proposed."'' That process, in turn, is described in detail by the State
Department's Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, Pierre-Richard Prosper.'62
Upon request from the Department of Defense, Prosper explains, "my office would initiate transfer discussions with the foreign government concerned."' 63 The purpose of these discussions
is two-fold: "to learn what measures the receiving government is
likely to take to ensure that the detainee will not pose a continuing threat to the United States or its allies and to obtain appropriate transfer assurances."'64 Although the particular assurances
sought depend on the situation, "assurance of humane treatment"
and of compliance with "international obligations" are sought "in
every transfer case in which continued detention by the government concerned is foreseen."'6 5 Where the receiving state is not a

habeas review of decisions in particular cases. But see Epilogue, infra Part VII.
160. Wright & White, supra note 20; Northam, supranote 22.
161. Waxman Decl., supra note 159, para. 6.
162. Declaration of Pierre-Richard Prosper, para. 6. Abdah v. Bush, No. 04-1254
(D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Prosper Decl.]. Identical declarations by Prosper
Ambassor have been filed in most if not all transfer cases. See Table A, supra note 21,
for a
list of transfer cases.
163. Prosper Decl., supra note 162, T 6.
164. Id.
165. Id. 6, at 4.
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party to CAT, or where "other circumstances warrant," the State
16 6
Department "pursues more specific assurances."
According to Prosper, the "essential question in evaluating foreign government assurances is whether the competent Department of State officials believe it is more likely than not that the
individual will be tortured in the country to which he is being
transferred."1 67 This determination is made "at senior levels
through a process involving Department officials most familiar
with international legal standards and obligations and the condi16
tions in the countries concerned." ' The offices involved include
the Office of War Crimes Issues, the Office of the Legal Adviser,
and the
the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor,
"relevant regional bureau," country desk, or embassy.1 69 The inquiry considers "matters such as human rights, prison conditions,
and prisoners' access to counsel," both "in general and as they
7°
may apply to a particular case."
When evaluating assurances from foreign governments, the
State Department considers a range of factors. First, officials
"consider the identity, position, or other information concerning
71
the official relaying the assurances."' Second, officials take into
account "political [and] legal developments in the foreign country"
72
in order to "provide context for the assurances provided."' Third,
"officials may also consider U.S. diplomatic relations with the
country concerned," a factor that would include the "foreign government's incentives and capacities to fulfill its assurances to the
United States, including the importance to the government concerned of maintaining good relations and cooperation with the
United States." 7 ' Fourth, officials in some instances consider
whether to seek "assurance of access by governmental or nongovernmental entities in the country concerned to monitor the
condition of an individual returned to that country, or of U.S.

166. Id.
8, at 5.
167. Id.
7, at 4.
168. Id.
7, at 4-5.
169. Id.
170. Id. 7, at 5.
171. Id. 8, at 5.
172. Id.
could
173: Id. Prosper does not mention the possibility that this same consideration
incentives
run the other direction, in the sense that the United States may likewise have
related to the need for continued cooperation in other spheres.
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Government access to the individual for such purposes."17 4 If in
light of these considerations concerns "cannot be resolved satisfactorily, we have in the past and would in the future recommend
175
against transfer."
One may assume that if the Department of Defense were to be
obliged to promulgate regulations pursuant to § 2242(b), it might
simply codify these procedures. In all likelihood, therefore, a decision to transfer a GTMO detainee notwithstanding fear-of-torture
concerns would depend, in at least some instances, on the use of
176
diplomatic assurances.
b. Diplomatic Assurances
The practice of relying on diplomatic assurances to allay torture concerns did not originate with GTMO transfers. On the contrary, diplomatic assurances have long been available to overcome Article 3 objections in both the extradition and removal
contexts. 177 Indeed, the removal regulations specifically provide

174. Id. 8, at 5-6.
175. Id. $ 8, at 6; see also Waxman Decl., supra note 159,
7, at 4 (stating that
"[c]ircumstances have arisen in the past where the Department of Defense
elected not to
transfer detainees to their country of origin because of torture concerns").
176. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SECOND PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF
AMERICA TO THE COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE, annex I, pt. 1(II)(E) (2005),
available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/45738.htm (stating that "[i]f a case were to
arise in which
the assurances obtained from the receiving government are not sufficient
when balanced
against treatment concerns, the United States would not transfer a detainee
to the control
of that government unless the concerns were satisfactorily resolved,"
and that
"[c]ircumstances have arisen in the past where the Department of Defense
elected not to
transfer detainees to their country of origin because of torture concerns");
Letter from William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Def., to Sen. Patrick Leahy
2 (June 25,
2003), available at http://www.org/press/2003/06/letter-to-leahy.pdf (stating
that U.S. "policy is to obtain specific assurances from the receiving country that it will
not torture the
individual being transferred to that country"); Letter from William J.
Haynes II, Gen.
Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Def., to Kenneth Roth, Executive Dir. of Human Rights
Watch (Apr.
2, 2003), availableat http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/04/dodltr042O3.pdf.
177. The extradition regulations do not mention diplomatic assurances,
but then again
they mention almost nothing about required procedures. See 22 C.F.R. §§
95.1-95.4 (2005).
The use of diplomatic assurances in the extradition context has been described,
however,
by a Department of State attorney during litigation of a CAT issue. See
Declaration of
Samuel M. Witten at 11 6-7, 8-9, Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, No. 01-cv-662
(C.D. Cal. Oct.
2001) [hereinafter Witten Decl.1), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza
tion/16513.pdf. According to the federal public defender involved in that
case, the government did not actually assert at any point in that litigation that it in fact had
obtained such
assurances. See Telephone Interview with Craig M. Wilke, Fed. Pub. Defender,
Cent. Dist.
of Cal. (Aug. 10, 2005). Notably, the Witten Declaration is almost identical,
in relevant
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for their use: "The Secretary of State may forward to the Attorney
General assurances that the Secretary has obtained from the
government of a specific country that an alien would not be tortured there if the alien were removed to that country."7 8 In such
a case, the Attorney General is then to consult with the Secretary
of State in order to determine "whether the assurances are sufficiently reliable to allow the alien's removal to that country consistent with Article 3 of [CAT].179
At the time this language was adopted in 1999, the concept of
seeking diplomatic assurances in the removal context to assuage
Article 3 concerns was thought by at least some senior immigration officials to be a significant step forward for human rights
protections.' ° In the wake of revelations about the CIA's extraordinary rendition program, however, critics today contend that
diplomatic assurances, at least in some contexts, are mere formalities designed to enable both the transferring and receiving
state to maintain a pose of support for human rights without actually interfering with international transfers. 18 '
Human Rights Watch ("HRW"), for example, has published a
pair of lengthy reports that summarize the fundamental criticisms of diplomatic assurances.8 2 These criticisms boil down to

passages, to the declaration Ambassador Prosper provided in connection with the GTMO
transfer litigation.
178. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(c)(1) (2005); id. § 1208.18(c)(1).
179. Id. § 208.18(c)(2). The regulations permit delegation to the Deputy Attorney General or Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, but nothing further. Id.
180. Interview with Bo Cooper, former Gen. Counsel of the INS (1999-2003).
181. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STILL AT RISK: DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES NO
SAFEGUARD AGAINST TORTURE 3 (Apr. 2005) [hereinafter STILL AT RISK], available at
http://hrw.orgreports/2005/eca04O5.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "EMPTY PROMISES":
DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES No SAFEGUARD AGAINST TORTURE 5 (Apr. 2004) [hereinafter
EMPTY PROMISES], available at http://hrw.orgreports/2004/un0404/diplomatic04O4.pdf;
Testimony of Wendy Patten, U.S. Advocacy Director for Human Rights Watch, to the Canadian Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher
Arar, May 17, 2005.
182. See STILL AT RISK, supra note 181; EMPTY PROMISES, supra note 181; see also
OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT BY MR. ALVARO GIL-ROBLES,
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ON HIS VISIT TO SWEDEN, APR. 21-23, 2004 at 9 (2004)
(arguing that diplomatic assurances should not be accepted from a state that condones
torture), available at http://www.coe.int/T/E/Commissioner-H.R/Communication Unit/
Documents/pdf.CommDH%282004%2913_E.pdf; The Secretary General, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 30, delivered to the GeneralAssembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/324 (Sept. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Torture Report] (preparedby Theo van Boven) (same); Interview by BBC Radio 4,
Today with Manfred Nowak, U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture (Aug. 9, 2005), available
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the following considerations. First, assuming that the receiving
state makes systematic use of torture in violation of its international obligations, there is substantial reason to doubt that the
state will feel obliged to abide by promises made in the context of
mere diplomatic assurances. 8 3 Second, there also is substantial
reason to doubt that compliance-monitoring mechanisms-such
as arranging for periodic visits to the detainee by the ICRC or
diplomats-will succeed in detecting abuse."8 Detainees understandably may be reluctant to reveal such abuse for fear of retaliation, and non-experts in some instances will be unable to detect signs of abuse.' 5 Third, even in the event that noncompliance is detected, there are no mechanisms in place to impose accountability. 8 6 Enforcement would depend on the United
States deciding to take retaliatory action in another context, a
step which in many instances the United States may be reluctant
to take because of offsetting concerns in the relationship with the
receiving state.8 7 The HRW reports reinforce these concerns,
moreover, with detailed accounts of torture allegedly suffered by
individuals who were transferred on the basis of diplomatic assurances, with a particular emphasis on the much-reported case
of Maher Arar. 8 HRW thus concludes that "countries that rely
on such assurances are either engaging in wishful thinking or using the assurances as a figleaf to cover their complicity in torture
and their role in the erosion of the international norm against
torture."8 9

at http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/today/listenagain/ztuesday-20050809.shtml;
The High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Independent Expert on the Protection of
Human Rights and FundamentalFreedoms while Countering Terrorism, 56, delivered to
the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.42005/1.03 (Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter
Human Rights Report] (preparedby Robert K. Goldman) (criticizing reliance on diplomatic
assurances on numerous grounds), available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/
docs/61chr/E.CN.4.2005.103.pdf.
183. See STILL AT RISK, supra note 181, at 5.
184. Id.; see also Human Rights Report, supra note 182, $$ 56-57.
185. See STILL AT RISK, supra note 181, at 5; see also Human Rights Report, supra note
182,
56-57.
186. See STILL AT RISK, supra note 181, at 6.
187.

See id.

188. See id. at 33-36.
189. Id. at 3.
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c. Reviewing Diplomatic Assurances
Two questions arise in light of these criticisms. First, does
CAT, FARRA, or any other law preclude the Department of Defense from relying on diplomatic assurances in general? And if
not, when if ever may a habeas court second-guess the determination of Executive branch officials that diplomatic assurances suffice to allay torture concerns in a particular case?
The answer to the first question appears to be no. CAT itself
has little to say about the mechanics of determining whether a
person is likely to be tortured if transferred, and does not speak
at all to the diplomatic assurances issue, let alone forbid their
use. Article 3(2) begins with a cursory statement to the effect that
the non-refoulement decision is to be made by "competent authorities." 9 ' After articulating the uncontroversial proposition that the
decisionmaker should "take into account all relevant considerations," Article 3(2) concludes by simply noting that these considerations need not all be specific to the individual but may include
"the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of
gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights." 9 ' Beyond
these bare-bones specifications, the logistics of the nonrefoulement determination are left by CAT to be developed by
domestic law.'9 2 FARRA takes up this invitation, but adds nothing that would prohibit a government agency from considering
diplomatic assurances as part of the non-refoulement determina-

190. CAT, supra note 49, art. 3(2). Reflecting the then-prevailing view that Article 3
issues would tend to arise in the context of extradition and removal proceedings, the
Reagan Administration initially proposed a declaration to the effect that "competent authorities" refers to the Secretary of State in cases of extradition and the Attorney General
in cases of deportation. See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 50, at 7. The Bush
Administration subsequently dropped this proposal on the ground that it was unnecessary
since Article 3(2) left the issue in the hands of domestic law. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 101-30,
at 2 (1990).
191. CAT, supra note 49, art. 3(2).
192. The United States is far from alone in relying on diplomatic assurances to deflect
fear-of-torture concerns. The HRW report described previously relates examples of this
practice also by Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Austria, and
Turkey. See STILL AT RISK, supra note 181, at 47-79. This extensive state practice precludes any argument that there may be a customary international law norm against reliance on diplomatic assurances in the context of non-refoulement. See Alan Travis, Clarke
Confronts Judges on Terror Law, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 7, 2005, at 2 (describing United
Kingdom's reliance on diplomatic assurances-in the form of a '"memorandum of understanding"'-to facilitate deportation of noncitizens on incitement-to-terrorism grounds).

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:657

tion. Thus, as even some critics have conceded,'9 3 it appears that
as a general rule the Department of Defense would be free to rely
on diplomatic assurances in connection with non-refoulement determinations.'9 4
This does not mean, however, that habeas courts must defer
entirely to a non-refoulement decision based on such assurances.
It remains possible that a habeas court might determine on review of a particular case that the decisionmaker improperly concluded that the Article 3 standard had not been met in light of the
available evidence (including diplomatic assurances).
Unless and until Congress elects to become involved in this
area, "9' 5 the contours of such review are not likely to please either
the detainees or the government. On one hand, habeas review of
CAT issues in more conventional contexts, such as removal, already involves considerable deference to Executive branch decisionmakers, and when the same issue arises in the GTMO transfer context-involving much more sensitive issues of foreign
policy and diplomacy-the case for deference is stronger.
On the other hand, individualized review would be meaningless
if a court did not take into account the particulars of the assurances provided with respect to individual detainees. Generalized
descriptions of the diplomatic assurance process as a whole, such
as that provided by Ambassador Prosper in connection with the
first wave of GTMO transfer litigation, provide little if any basis

193. See, e.g., STILL AT RISK, supra note 181, at 40 (observing that "current U.S. law"
permits reliance "on the simplest and vaguest of promises from governments that routinely violate the law"). Cf U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and
Prot. of Human Rights, Question of the Violation on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Including Policies of Racial Discrimination and Segregation, in all Countries,
with ParticularReference to Colonial and Other Dependent Counties and Territories:Report of the Sub-Commission Under Commission on Human Rights Resolution 8 (XXIII), at
3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/L.12 (Aug. 4, 2005) (accepting the use of diplomatic assurances to assuage torture concerns, but urging that the assurances provide for periodic visits to the transferee, with the possibility of medical exams and private interviews).
194. Cf Agiza v. Sweden, U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Comm'n No. 233/2003,
13.4,
at 35, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (2005) (arguing that diplomatic assurances do "not
suffice to protect against" an otherwise-existing risk of torture where the assurances do
not include a "mechanism for their enforcement"). It bears noting that Representative Ed
Markey has introduced a bill that would prohibit reliance on diplomatic assurances to assuage fear-of-torture concerns, at least in some circumstances. Press Release, Rep. Ed
Markey, Congress Says No to Torture but Still Needs to End the Use of Diplomatic Assurances (June 21, 2005) (discussing H.R. 952) (on file with author).
195. For some preliminary thoughts on useful reforms, see infra Part VI.
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for determining whether the non-refoulement standard has been
met in a specific case. 196 In this respect, it should be noted that in
connection with ongoing habeas litigation on behalf of the Chinese and Uzbek Uighur detainees mentioned above, the district
judge has required the government, in the person of Ambassador
Prosper, to provide in camera briefings regarding the specific details of diplomatic negotiations regarding the prospect of a transfer.'9 7 Meaningful review of a GTMO Article 3 determination,
even if highly deferential, would seem to require something akin
to this individualized inquiry.
In light of the foregoing discussion, it appears that CAT Article
3 does apply with respect to GTMO transfers, and that there is a
role, however limited, for federal judges to play in reviewing how
the non-refoulement obligation is carried out. 9 ' But is this analy-

196. Ambassador Prosper identifies a range of harms that might follow from "public"
disclosure of the details of diplomatic assurances in particular cases, as might follow from
9-12. It is
an examination of the issue in open court. See Prosper Decl., supra note 162,
far from clear, however, that this aspect of the review would have to be conducted so publicly. Insofar as classified information is concerned, for example, the reviewing court might
follow the procedures employed in connection with such information during proceedings in
the prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui. See, e.g., United States v. Moussaoui, 65 F. App'x
881, 890-91 (4th Cir. 2003) (ordering that oral arguments be bifurcated to preserve the
security of certain classified information).
197. See Qassim v. Bush, 382 F. Supp. 2d 126, 129 (D.D.C. 2005); Transcript of Aug.
25, 2005, Oral Argument, Qassim (No. 05-0497) (indicating that an in camera hearing
would take place after the hearing "at the level of detail that [the government attorney
had] been authorized to talk about") (on file with author).
198. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") does not contain an express non-refoulement provision comparable to CAT Article 3. See International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR]. Nonetheless, the U.N. Human Rights Committee has on occasion pressed the argument that a non-refoulement rule may be gleaned from either Article 2 (addressing the
general obligations of parties to ICCPR) or Article 7 (prohibiting torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment). See U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMITTEE, GENERAL COMMENTS ADOPTED BY THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
UNDER ARTICLE 40, PARAGRAPH 4, OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND

POLITICAL RIGHTS 3-4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.3 (1992). These views are not authoritative. In any event, ICCPR is non-self-executing and its particular provisions have
not been implemented by statute. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728
(2004). But see Halberstam, supra note 79, at 91 (criticizing this conclusion). Article 33(1)
of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (as amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees) does contain non-refoulement language, but the obligation is qualified by an express national security exception. See Refugee Convention,
supra note 54, art. 33(1) (prohibiting return of refugees "where [their] life or freedom
would be threatened on account of [their] race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion"). Even assuming that a GTMO detainee might
otherwise qualify for refugee status and thus the benefits of Article 33(1), Article 33(2)
states that "[tihe benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refu-
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sis entirely misplaced in light of the fact that it arises against the
backdrop of armed conflict? Some have contended that it is.199 I
turn to that issue now.
III. WHEN IHRL AND IHL BOTH APPLY
The detainees are held at GTMO under color of the President's
Article II war powers and the Authorization for Use of Military
Force ("AUMF") issued by Congress on September 18, 2001.200
This implicates the law of war, 20 1 also known as international
humanitarian law ("IHL").2 °2 And it also raises a question concerning the status of U.S. obligations under CAT in this context.
Does the relevance of IHL displace CAT or otherwise alter its impact?
A wartime context might alter international human rights
treaty obligations in two distinct ways. First, some treaties have
derogation clauses that permit states to opt-out of their obligations during emergencies.2 °3 Second, some contend that where
both an international human rights treaty and IHL address a
particular topic, the potential clash between the competing norms
should be resolved in favor of IHL. While the United States has

gee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the
country in which he is." Id. art. 33(2).
199. See Yoo, supra note 9, at 1230-31.
200. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
201. The context of armed conflict implicates the law of war in two ways. With respect
to the international obligations of the United States, military operations in the context of
armed conflict are governed by the law of war. Simultaneously, in the domestic sphere, the
meaning of the President's Article II powers and the AUMF are informed at least to an
extent by the law of war. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516-20 (2004); see also
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 2088-102.
202. The terms law of war, law of armed conflict ("LOAC"), and international humanitarian law ("IHL") have come to be used interchangeably in recent years to refer to that
body of international law that attempts to regulate armed conflict. See Theodor Meron,
The Humanization of HumanitarianLaw, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 239, 239 (2000) ("Although
the term 'international humanitarian law' initially referred to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, it is now increasingly used to signify the entire law of armed conflict."); Robert
Cryer, Anthony P.V. Rogers, Law on the Battlefield, 10 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 121, 121
(2005) (book review) (commenting on the distinct viewpoints frequently implied from the
use of the varying terms).
203. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 198, art. 4, (permitting derogation from selected articles during proclaimed emergency threatening the "life of the nation"); Derek Jinks, International Human Rights Law and the War on Terrorism, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 58,
64-65 (2002) (discussing ICCPR derogation).
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not invoked the former argument in connection with Article 3,204
there is reason to believe that it may subscribe to the latter position.2 0 5
Generally speaking, the relationship of IHL to international
human rights law ("IHRL") is the subject of considerable debate
and uncertainty.2 6 Some have advanced the view that the two
bodies of law are mutually incompatible, that in the, context of
armed conflict IHL in effect occupies the field and negates obligations imposed by human rights instruments regardless of
20'
Conwhether they permit derogation by their own terms.
204. CAT Article 2 contains a non-derogation clause specifically forbidding states from
derogating from the torture prohibition even during war. Article 3 contains no such clause,
but conventional wisdom nonetheless holds that the non-refoulement rule also is nonderogable. See, e.g., Tapia Paez v. Sweden, U.N. Comm. Against Torture, No. 39/1996,
14.5, U.N. Doc. CAT/c/18/D/39/1996 (1997) (stating that the "nature of the activities in
which the person concerned engaged cannot be a material consideration when making a
determination under article 3 of the Convention"); Human Rights Report, supra note 182,
52, at 18; Torture Report, supra note 182, 31 cmt.9.
205. See Dennis, supra note 64, at 136 n.112 (observing that the United States has contended in litigation that it is the law of war that "'covers the detainees,'" not international
human rights law instruments such as the ICCPR) (citing Brief for Appellees, at 45-46,
Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers & Professors v. Bush, No. 02-55367 (9th Cir. 2002)); cf Yoo,
supra note 9, at 1230-31 (observing that application of CAT to the "extraterritorial detention of prisoners of war would create an unacceptable conflict with the GPW"). It is unclear whether Professor Yoo would take the same view regarding a detainee clearly within
U.S. territory (e.g., Jose Padilla or Ali Saleh al-Marri, both of whom are held as enemy
combatants within the United States itself). His views may be worthy of particular attention, however, in light of the possibility that his 2004 article reflects the contents of an asyet unreleased March 13, 2002, memorandum to William J. Haynes, General Counsel, Department of Defense, from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, titled The President's Power as Commander in Chief to Transfer Captured Terrorists to the
Control and Custody of Foreign Nations (March 13, 2002). See Letter from Sen. Patrick
Leahy to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Jan. 4, 2005) (describing the
March 13, 2002, memo), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200501/Gonzales
010404.pdf.
206. See, e.g., U.N. Gen. Assembly, Int'l Law Comm'n, First Report on the Effects of
Armed Conflicts on Treaties, IT 86-87, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/552 (Apr. 21, 2005) (preparedby
Ian Brownlie, Special Rapporteur); Dennis, supra note 64, at 133 (stating that "there is no
clear understanding concerning the precise manner in which the obligations assumed by
states under international human rights treaties interact with the lex specialis of international humanitarian law"); Memorandum from the Secretariat, International Law Commission, "The Effect of Armed Conflict on Treaties: An Examination of Practice and Doctrine," to the General Assembly 22-24 & n.114, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/550 (Feb. 1, 2005)
(surveying the literature).
207. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm'n, Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Second Periodic Report Addendum, Israel,
8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/2001/2 (2001) (citing the "well-established distinction between
human rights and humanitarian law under international law" and concluding that the
Committee's mandate, tied as it is to the scope of Israel's ICCPR obligations, "cannot relate to events in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, inasmuch as they are part and parcel of
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versely, some have contended that the restraints imposed by human rights instruments not only apply at all times, but that they
should also supersede more permissive restraints imposed by
IHL.2 ° ' To the extent that there is a prevailing view, however, it
may lie between these extremes.
It helps to begin with a brief discussion of the concept of lex
specialis derogate lex generali. Lex specialis addresses the situation in which two different rules apply to the same subject-matter
(without respect to whether the competing rules derive from different sources or a common origin). In such cases, a choice may
have to be made as to the priority of the competing rules. Where
one rule is more specific than the other, the lex specialis rule provides that the more specific rule controls.2" 9 This can be understood as the specific rule outright displacing the general one, or
instead as the two rules being harmonized (in the direction of the
more specific rule) through interpretation.2 1 °
Famously, the lex specialis rule played a critical role when the
International Court of Justice considered the relationship of IHL
and human rights law in the course of its 1996 advisory opinion

the context of armed conflict as distinct from a relationship of human rights"). Israel also
contends that its ICCPR obligations do not extend to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, on
non-extraterritoriality grounds. See id. But see U.N. Human Rights Comm'n, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding
Observation of the Human Rights Committee: Israel 21/08/2003, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/
78/ISR (2003) (disagreeing with both propositions).
208. See, e.g., David S. Koller, The Moral Imperative: Toward a Human Rights-Based
Law of War, 46 HARV. INTL L.J. 231, 259-63 (2005) (arguing that the law of war and
IHRL are "fundamentally incompatible with each other," and that IHRL could just as well
be viewed as the lex specialis relative to the lex generalis of the Law of War); Human
Rights Report, supra note 182,
22-24 (suggesting that IHRL and the Law of War apply
.cumulatively" and "should be interpreted and applied as a whole so as to accord individuals during armed conflicts the most favorable standards of protection"); The Int'l Inst. of
Humanitarian L. ["IIHL"] & The Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross ["ICRC"], Summary Report,
InternationalHumanitarianLaw and Other Legal Regimes: Interplay in Situations of Violence 8 (2003) [hereinafter Summary Report], available at http://www.help.icrc.org/
Web/eng/siteengO.nsffhtmlall/5UBCVX/$File/Interplay-other regimesNov 2003.pdf (noting view of some participants, "strongly criticized" by others, that the rule providing the
"highest protection" to the individual should apply in the event of inconsistency).
209. See Martii Koskenniemi, Int'l Law Comm'n, Study Group on Fragmentation, Topic
(a): The Function and Scope of the Lex Specialis Rule and the Question of "Self-Contained
Regimes": An Outline at 4 (2003), available at httpJ/www.un.org/law/ilc/sessions/55/ fragmentation outline.pdf; see also U.N. Gen. Assembly, Report of the International Law
Commission, 305 at 285, U.N. Doc. A/59/10 (2004) [hereinafter ILC Report] (describing
the lex specialis rule as "widely accepted" and providing policy arguments in support of it).
210. See ILC Report, supra note 209, $ at 287 (asserting that the distinction is not significant).
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The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons .211 The ICJ
first observed that the right against arbitrary deprivation of life
found in human rights law was non-derogable even in the context
of armed conflict. But that did not make IHL provisions addressing the same issue irrelevant. On the contrary, the ICJ used
those IHL concepts to flesh out the meaning of the IHRL stan2 12 In short, the ICJ relied
dard-arbitrariness-in that context.
on lex specialis not to displace a non-derogable human rights
norm but, instead, to interpret that norm to conform to the more
213 The same approach also was emparticular provisions of IHL.
ployed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in another
24
much-discussed case, Abella v. Argentina. Although uncertainty
remains with respect to whether the lex specialis rule applies
equally in the converse situation in which the relevant IHL provision is less specific than the relevant human rights law provision,2 15 some degree of consensus has emerged that harmonization via lex specialis is the preferable approach to reconciling the
tensions raised when IHL and human rights regimes apply simultaneously. 6
According to this approach, the fact that GTMO transfers may
be subject to IHL constraints does not displace CAT. It might,
however, impact the manner in which one interprets the CAT Article 3 obligation. That is, if it can be shown that a specific IHL
rule speaks to the non-refoulement issue in the context of armed
conflict, then there is at least an argument for construing Article
3 in conformity with that rule.
211. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 256-57 (July 8).
212. See id. at 240.
213. See id.
214. Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-am C.H.R. Report No. 58/97,
OEAISer.L.N/II.98 doc.6 rev. 161 (1998) (relying on the law of war to inform the meaning of arbitrary deprivation of life).
215. See Summary Report, supra note 208, at 9 (describing "lively debate" on this
topic).
216. See id. (describing the "great majority of the participants" as invoking the approach taken by the ICJ in Nuclear Weapons); U.N. Gen. Assembly, Human Rights
Comm., General Comment No. 31 on Article 2 of the Covenant: The Nature of the General
Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/741
CRP.4/Rev.6 (2004) (accepting that "more specific rules of international humanitarian law
may be specially relevant for the purposes of the interpretation of [ICCPR] rights") (citing
U.N. Gen. Assembly, Human Rights Comm'n, General Comment No. 29[721: Derogation
from Provisionof the Covenant Duringa State of Emergency, 3, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/21Rev.
29-31 (surveying au1/Add.11 (2001)); see also Human Rights Report, supra note 182,
thorities and concluding that they are consistent with the ICJ's approach).
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IHL does in fact contain a number of rules that limit international detainee transfers in certain circumstances, including rules
specifically concerned with potential abuse of detainees on the
part of the receiving state. A careful examination of these rules
that fully accounts for the significant variation in the circumstances of the GTMO detainees suggests, however, that none of
these particular rules actually apply to these individuals.217 As a
result, the substantive meaning of CAT Article 3 remains unaffected by the wartime context notwithstanding the lex specialis
rule. I turn now to a discussion of these IHL rules.
IV. IHL AND INTERNATIONAL

DETAINEE TRANSFERS

Assuming that GTMO detainees are proper subjects of IHL, it
is Geneva Law-governing the treatment of persons who are not
combatants and those who once were but who have since become
hors de combat-that concerns them. The phrase Geneva Law refers to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, the two 1977 Additional Protocols to these treaties, and related principles of customary international law.21 While the United States is not a
party to the Additional Protocols of 1977 and does not accept that
all their provisions reflect customary international law,21 9 it is a
party to all four of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.220

217. Whether and to what extent detainees should receive the benefit of other IHL protections is beyond the scope of this article.
218. See, e.g., Geneva Convention [IV] Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War of August 12, 1949, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 281
[hereinafter GC]; Geneva Convention [III] Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of
August 12, 1949, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter
GPW]; Geneva Convention [III for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949, adopted Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GWS Sea]; Geneva Convention [I] for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick In Armed Forces in the Field of
August 12, 1949, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GWS].
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II].

219. See, e.g., Martin P. Dupuis et al., The Sixth Annual American Red CrossWashington College of Law Conference on InternationalHumanitarianLaw and the 1977
ProtocolsAdditional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L & POLy 415, 420

(1987) (statement by Department of State Legal Adviser, Michael J. Matheson, identifying
Protocol I provisions that are accepted as customary international law by the U.S.);
Memorandum from W. Hays Parks et al., to John H. McNeil, Assistant Gen. Counsel, U.S.
Dep't of Def. (May 8, 1986) (on file with author) (same).
220. In discussing certain Geneva provisions in the pages that follow, I do not take a
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A. RegardingInternationalDetainee Transfers
The Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 ("GPW") contains a provision
that speaks directly to the transfer issue. GPW Article 12 prohibits all international transfers of prisoners of war ("POWs") except
where two conditions are met: (i) the receiving state also is a
party to the Geneva Conventions and (ii) the transferring state is
convensatisfied that the receiving state will actually apply the
21 The first
prisoner.
transferred
the
tions in its dealings with
prong of Article 12 has no practical impact, as all but one stateNauru-are parties to the Geneva Conventions and there is no
reason to think that transfers to Nauru are in the offing. The second prong of GPW Article 12 has more bite. GPW expressly pro22 2 and Article 12 requires the
hibits torture and abuse of POWs,
will not
transferring state to determine that the receiving state
22 3 Because
transferees.
to
respect
with
prohibitions
violate those
the mechanics of this determination are left up to the transferring party, 224 however, it is far from clear that Article 12 protections would impose as much of a restraint as would CAT Article
3's more-likely-than-not standard.

position on the question of whether these provisions may be directly enforced in habeas
litigation. See, e.g., Hamdan, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (answering "no" to that question). Because CAT Article 3 protections are enforceable on habeas, and because the meaning of those protections may be impacted by the meaning of comparable IHL provisions
pursuant to lex specialis, the transfer rules of the Geneva Conventions have relevance
even if not enforceable in and of themselves.
221. GPW, supra note 218, art. 12.
222. Prisoner of war benefits include protection from "acts of violence or intimidation
and against insults," see id. art. 13, and also freedom from "physical or mental torture...
[and] any other form of coercion .. .to secure from them information of any kind whatever," see id. art. 17. With respect to most (though not all) non-POW's, GC Articles 31 and
32 prohibit all "measures of brutality whether applied by civilian or military agents," and
specify that "[n]o physical or mental coercion shall be exercised against protected persons
arts. 31...to obtain information from them or from third parties." GC, supra note 218,
32; cf. Derek Jinks, The Declining Significance of POW Status, 45 HARV. INT'L L. J. 367,
399-413 (2004) (arguing that non-POW detainees nonetheless receive substantial IHL
protections pursuant to GC, Common Article 3, and Article 75 of Protocol I).
223. Article 12 also requires the transferring state to attempt to reacquire custody
should it learn that the receiving state is not in fact complying with its convention obligations, but does not specify the nature or amount of evidence required to trigger this obligation. GPW, supra note 218, art. 12.
224. See id. art. 12 (referring to the transferor satisfying "itself"); cf. Int'l Comm. of Red
Cross, Commentary, III Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisonersof War
136 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) (arguing that "the future Protecting Power" of the detainee
"would seem to be the best qualified authority to effect such an investigation") [hereinafter
Pictet's Commentaries,GPW].

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:657

In contrast to GPW, the Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12,
1949 ("GC") (dealing with certain persons who do not qualify as
prisoners of war under the terms of GPW) contains two transferrelated provisions that at the very least match the protections of
CAT Article 3. The first is located in Article 45, a provision that
appears in the section of GC addressing the rights of protected
persons who are aliens located in enemy territory (i.e., persons
located in the territory of a state with which their own state
is at war, such as an Iraqi student in the United States during
the 1991 Gulf War or an American journalist in Baghdad during
Operation Iraqi Freedom). GC Article 45 not only duplicates the
protections of GPW Article 12, but also adds that "[i]n no circumstances shall a protected person be transferred to a country
where he or she may have reason to fear persecution for his
or her political opinions or religious beliefs.

'225

The "reason to

fear" language of Article 45 arguably connotes a more forgiving standard of proof than the more-likely-than-not rule for CAT
Article 3.
GC Article 49 contains even stronger transfer-related language. This article appears in the section of GC addressing the
rights of protected persons who are located in occupied territory.
Such persons may not be transferred out of that territory for any
reason other than protection from encroaching hostilities or "imperative military reasons;" even then, they must be "transferred
back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question
have ceased."226
This mix of potential protections generates interesting possibilities. If GPW Article 12 applies to GTMO detainees, then pursuant to lex specialis there would be an argument for harmonizing CAT Article 3 protections down to the GPW Article 12 level;
at the very least, application of GPW Article 12 would not lead to
greater protections than those already afforded in this context by
CAT. On the other hand, if GC Articles 45 or 49 apply, they might
225. GC, supra note 218, art. 45. This language is similar to that found in the Refugee
Convention, but unlike that convention it does not contain a security exception.
226. GC, supra note 221, art. 49. Cf. Memorandum from Jack L. Goldsmith, Assistant
Attorney General, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Mar. 19, 2004) (draft),
reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 367 (Karen J. Greenberg &
Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) (discussing other potential grounds for the removal of protected persons from occupied territory) [hereinafter THE TORTURE PAPERS].
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exceed the protections afforded by CAT. A careful examination of
the circumstances of the GTMO detainees vis-A-vis these particuthe
lar rules, however, suggests that none of them apply, mooting
2 27
concerns.
IHL issue altogether with respect to risk-of-torture
B. Do the Conventions Apply to GTMO Detainees?
are not
The protections afforded by the Geneva Conventions
228 On the
conflicts.
armed
all
in
equally applicable to all persons
contrary, a series of questions must be answered affirmatively before concluding that a given treaty provision applies in a particular case. The professors at the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School refer to this "as the 'Right Kind of
229
Conflict/Right Kind of Person' Inquiry." First, one must examine the type of armed conflict in issue to determine whether it
implicates the full range of protections under the Geneva Conventions, the limited protections set forth in Common Article 3
thereof, or-as some would argue-no Geneva Convention protections at all. Second, even assuming that the type of conflict in issues implicates the full range of potential protections, one must
also determine whether the particular person in issue actually
23 °
qualifies for protected status under one of the conventions.
These questions have proven particularly difficult with respect to
persons captured in Afghanistan in connection with Operation
Enduring Freedom and elsewhere around the world in connection
231
with counterterrorism operations, ' and the Bush AdministraImplementation
227. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction No. 5810.01B,
personnel, esmilitary
all
to
applicable
2002),
25,
(Mar.
Program
of the DOD Law of War
tablishes as a matter of policy:
The Armed Forces of the United States will comply with the law of war
during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized,
and, unless otherwise directed by competent authorities, the US
Armed Forces will comply with the principles and spirit of the law of
war during all other operations.
law of war requires
Id. at 4(a). This leaves open the question, of course, as to what the
context.
particular
a
in
(even if applicable)
Conventions
228. That said, it bears emphasis that the general thrust of the Geneva
law.
humanitarian
international
by
afforded
protections
of
range
was to expand the
or 'Extra229. Lt. Col. Paul E. Kantwill & Maj. Sean Watts, Hostile Protected Persons
ExPosed
Terrorism
on
War
the
in
Combatants
Unlawful
Conventional Persons": How
INT'L L.J.
traordinary Challenges for Military Attorneys and Commanders, 28 FORDHAM
681, 722 (2005).
230. Id. at 722-25.
231.

AFGHANISTAN
See JAG'S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., 1 LEGAL LESSONS LEARNED FROM
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tion's resolution of them has been the subject of considerable criticism.232 In the pages that follow, I offer an analysis that concurs
in some aspects of the Administration's approach while disagreeing with others.
1. The Right Kind of Conflict?
The starting point for categorizing an armed conflict233 by type
is "Common Article 2" of the Geneva Conventions, so-called because it appears in identical format in all four conventions. Common Article 2 functions as a jurisdictional prerequisite, stating
that the protections of the Conventions "shall apply to all cases of
declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise be-

tween two or more of the High ContractingParties."23 4 Put simply,

Common Article 2 requires that there must be at least one party
to the conventions fighting on each side in order to categorize the
conflict as "international" in character and thus make possible
consideration of the full range of Geneva Convention protections.23 5
On February 7, 2002, President George W. Bush resolved
months of uncertainty 236 and internal debate 23 7 within his adAND IRAQ 51, 53 (2004) ("The legal issues associated with detainee operations in Afghanistan were initially unsettled .... As the U.S. began detaining personnel, the most difficult
issue was the status of Taliban and al Qaeda detainees.") [hereinafter LESSONS LEARNED],
available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/oef oif-volumel.
pdf.
232. See, e.g., Kantwill & Watts, supra note 229, at 687, 702-08.
233. Some deny that there is an "armed conflict," at least with respect to the relationship between the United States and al Qaeda. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy
Status After 9/11: Attacks on the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INTL L. 325, 326-28 (2003); Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L.
1, 8 n.16 (2001). But see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 2066-72.
234. See GPW, supra note 218, art. 2 (emphasis added). Common Article 2 also is triggered by a case of "partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party,
even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance." Id.
235. GPW Article 2 specifically contemplates the possibility that non-parties may also
be involved in the armed conflict. Id. (stating that in such a case, the parties remain
bound vis-&-vis one another, and even are bound in their relations to the non-party "if the
latter accepts and applies" the conventions).
236. "The legal issues associated with detainee operations in Afghanistan were initially
unsettled ....
As the U.S. began detaining personnel, the most difficult unsettled issue
was the status of Taliban and al Qaeda detainees." LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 231, at
51, 53.
237. Detainee status issues were the subject of intense interagency dispute, with the
Department of State resisting positions taken by the Department of Justice Office of Legal
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ministration by determining that Common Article 2 had been
triggered with respect to the Taliban, but not with respect to al
Qaeda.2 38 It is unclear that either determination is entirely correct.2 39
a. Armed Conflict with the Taliban
Both the United States and Afghanistan were High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions at the time combat operations began on October 7, 2001, and thus, insofar as the Taliban
had sufficient de facto authority to exercise belligerent rights on
Afghanistan's behalf, the conflict between the United States and
24 °
the Taliban was a Common Article 2 conflict as of that date.
The President's order thus was correct with respect to the Tali241
ban, at least in retrospect. But by the time the President's or2002, order.
Counsel in a series of memoranda that preceded the President's February 7,
25, 2002)
See Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales to President George W. Bush (Jan.
Presithe
that
(stating
118
at
226,
note
supra
PAPERS,
TORTURE
THE
in
(draft), reprinted
to al
dent determined on January 18, 2002, that the Geneva Conventions do not apply
of State requests
Department
against
advising
and
describing
and
Taliban,
the
and
Qaeda
& Robert
for reconsideration); Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.,
of Def. (Jan.
J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't
that the
9, 2002) (draft), reprintedin THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 226, at 38 (arguing
AssisGeneva Conventions did not apply to either); Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy
Advisor,
Legal
Taft,
H.
William
to
Counsel
Special
Delahunty,
Robert
&
Gen.
tant Att'y
from Taft
Dep't of State (Jan. 14, 2002) (responding to a January 11th memorandum
commenting on their January 9th draft), available at http://www.cartoonbank.com/new
R. Gonzayorker/slideshows/02yootaft.pdf; Memorandum from Colin L. Powell to Alberto
for Nat'l Sec.
les, Counsel to the President & Condoleeza Rice, Assistant to the President
122 (seeking
Affairs (Jan. 26, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 226, at
Taft, IV,
reconsideration of the January 9th OLC memo); Memorandum from William H.
Legal Advisor, Dep't of State to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Feb. 2,
the January
2002), reprinted in, THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 226, at 129 (criticizing
9th OLC memo).
B. Che238. Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Vice President Richard
at 134.
ney, et al., (Feb. 7, 2002), reprintedin THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 226,
the occa239. This is not to say that it necessarily would be proper for a court, having
different outsion to consider the President's resolution of these questions, to insist upon a
are bound by
come. Cf.Hamdan, 415 F.3d 33, 41-42 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (asserting that courts
the President's conclusion that the conflicts with the Taliban and al Qaeda are distinct,
Geneva Convenand that the President's interpretation of ambiguous provisions in the
reasonable).
is
it
tions must control so long as
from the out240. Cf. GC, supra note 218, art. 6 ("The present Convention shall apply
Enduring
Operation
to
Prior
2.").
Article
in
mentioned
set of any conflict or occupation
3 existed in
Freedom, an internal armed conflict within the meaning of Common Article
Afghanistan, between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance.
2001, as the
241. LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 231, at 14 (identifying December 17,
notwithstanding
conclusion
this
reached
President
the
close of the "first phase"). Notably,
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der issued in February 2002, much had changed. Most notably,
the Taliban had been deposed as the de facto government of Afghanistan. On December 7, remaining members of the Taliban
regime had fled Kandahar, 242 and on December 22, 2001, the Afghan Interim Authority-a provisional government headed by
Hamid Karzai-had taken office.2 " With the Taliban removed
from power and a friendly government thus in place in Kabul, the
United States and its allies at that point no longer were in conflict with a High Contracting Party to the conventions. 2 " Nonetheless, the Bush Administration takes the view that hostilities
in Afghanistan retained-and continue to retain-their Common
Article 2 character.
Can this be correct? The question matters a great deal, given
that some detainees were captured before and others after the
downfall of the Taliban regime.24 5 Some have questioned the administration's view and suggest that the conflict in Afghanistan
has evolved into an internal armed conflict in which the United
States participates at the invitation of the Karzai Administration.2 46 There is a substantial argument, however, to support the

advice from the Office of Legal Counsel that Afghanistan was a 'failed state" whose status
as a High Contracting Party had lapsed, and that the Taliban in any event exercised insufficient authority to act on Afghanistan's behalf. Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy
Assistant Att'y Gen., & Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel to William J. Haynes, II,
Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def. (draft) (Jan. 9, 2002) (reprintedin THE TORTUNE PAPERS, Supra note 226, at 38).
242. See LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 231, at 14.
243. The Afghan Interim Authority, as well as the Loya Jirga and Transitional Authority that followed it, was the product of a U.N.-sponsored conference of representatives
from various Afghan factions who met in Bonn, Germany in December 2001. See International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)-Interim Administration of Afghanistan ("Interim
Administration"): Military Technical Agreement, Jan. 4, 2002, 41 I.L.M. 1032.
244. Common Article 3 arguably came into play at that point-hostilities continued but
no longer had an "international" character within the meaning of Common Article 2-but
for present purposes that issue is moot, as none of the provisions of the 'mini-convention"
speak to the transfer issue.
245. Note that the issue of whether the conflict with the Taliban continues to have
Common Article 2 status is distinct from the issue of when the conflict itself comes to an
end. For discussions relating to the latter issue, see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at
2123-27; Stephen I. Vladeck, When Wars Don't End, 1 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POLY (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript on file with author).
246. See W. Hays Parks, Special Forces' Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 493, 505 (2003) (stating that the case for treating the conflict in Afghanistan as an
internal conflict has become "absolute"); cf. JENNIFER ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
Treatment of 'Battlefield Detainees' in the War on Terrorism 13 (2005), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31367.pdf (noting this possibility).
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view that the conflict with the Taliban continues to satisfy the
Common Article 2 trigger.
Common Article 2 does not itself purport to describe the circumstances that bring a covered conflict to an end. Other provisions, however, provide at least indirect support for the Bush
Administration's perspective. Most notably, GC Article 6 specifies
that "[iin the territory of Parties to the conflict, the application of
the present Convention shall cease on the general close of military operations."247 According to Pictet's commentaries, the rapporteur of the committee that drafted this language understood it
248
to refer to the moment "when the last shot has been fired." Pictet adds that the general close may be identified by "an armistice,
a capitulation or simply [a] 'debellatio,"' i.e., "the occupation of
the whole of the enemy's territory and the cessation of all hostilities, without a legal instrument of any kind."2 49 Pictet concludes
that "[iut must be agreed that in most cases the general close of
military operations will be the final end of all fighting between all
those concerned." 25" To reinforce the point, he notes that "the armistice which ended the struggle between France and Germany
in 1940 did not represent the general close of military operations
in the sense in which the phrase is used in the Convention we are

discussing. "251
Although there is no parallel provision in the other Conventions-each contains language to the effect that protected persons
continue to receive convention benefits until repatriated-the
relatively clear statement in GC Article 6 provides considerable
support for the view that an armed conflict may retain its Common Article 2 character, formally even if not functionally, after
the hostile regime of the opposing High Contracting Party loses
its authority. 2 The question is an ambiguous one, but the Ad-

247. GC, supra note 218, art. 6.
248. See Int'l Comm. of Red Cross, Commentary, IV Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protectionof Civilian Persons in Time of War, at 62 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) (quoting 2A
FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949 at 815 (1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
249. Id. at 62 & n.6.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. The relevance of GC Article 6 decreases somewhat if one takes the view that Gi
protections apply only in two geographic contexts: a belligerent state's own territory and
foreign territory that has been formally occupied. See infra notes 359-61 and accompanying text. Even if that interpretation is correct, however, Article 6 still demonstrates that
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ministration at least arguably is justified in its characterization
of the ongoing conflict with the Taliban.2 53 The conflict thus both
was-and is-of the "right type" insofar as Taliban detainees are
concerned.
b. Armed Conflict with al Qaeda
The situation with respect to al Qaeda is more complicated.
President Bush, in his February 2002 memorandum, drew a
sharp distinction between the armed conflict with al Qaeda and
the armed conflict with the Taliban. Whereas he found the latter
to be a Common Article 2 conflict, he determined that the former
was not, at least in part because al Qaeda is not and cannot be a
High Contracting Party to the Conventions.25 4 The D.C. Circuit,
moreover, has recently held that the President is entitled to deference in making this "political-military decision."2 55
It certainly is true that al Qaeda is not and cannot be a party to
the conventions. And if it is proper to segregate the entirety of the
conflict with al Qaeda from that with the Taliban for purposes of
the Geneva analysis, then it does follow that Common Article 2
does not apply to the former. But, it is not entirely clear that all
aspects of the conflict with al Qaeda can be so cleanly carved off
from the conflict with the Taliban. It is difficult to square that
approach with the fact that a key component of the conflict between the United States and al Qaeda took place in Afghanistan
in circumstances that were intimately intertwined with the Common Article 2 conflict with the Taliban.2 5 6 One might therefore
argue that the conflict with al Qaeda, though not a Common Article 2 conflict standing alone, becomes part of one insofar as combat in Afghanistan is concerned.

the functional benefits of Common Article 2 status continue to exist, even if limited in geographic scope, beyond the formal collapse of the opposing regime.
253. Similar uncertainty surrounds the status of the armed conflict in Iraq.
254. See Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Vice President Richard B.
Cheney, et al., supra note 238, at 1-2.
255. Hamdan, 415 F.3d 33, 41-42 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am.
Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986)).
256. The same conclusion may apply to the activities of al Qaeda in Iraq, which the
Administration also considers to be a Common Article 2 conflict.
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Assume for the moment that this argument is correct. 25 7 It
would follow that the conflict is of the "right type" as to some al
Qaeda detainees (those captured in Afghanistan) but not others
(those captured elsewhere). A careful reconstruction of the publicly available information about the location and circumstances
of capture of GTMO detainees suggests that there are substantial
numbers of detainees in both categories.25 8 With respect to those
captured outside Afghanistan, the Common Article 2 trigger is
not satisfied and the aforementioned transfer provisions cannot
apply.25 9 With respect to those captured in Afghanistan, however,
it is arguable that the trigger is satisfied. As to that sub-set of al
Qaeda detainees, as with the Taliban detainees mentioned above,
the analysis must continue.
2. The Right Kind of Person?
The next question is whether any of these detainees-those
held as Taliban members and those held as al Qaeda members

257. If it is not correct-if the correct view is that expressed by the majority of the
panel in Hamdan v. Bush, that the conflict with al Qaeda is not in any respect an international armed conflict within the meaning of Common Article 2-then a question arises as
to whether the conflict necessarily should be classified as a Common Article 3 conflict or as
a conflict to which the Conventions simply do not speak. The Geneva Conventions each
contain an identical Article 3, known as Common Article 3 or the "mini-convention," designed to provide a set of baseline protections for persons involved in at least some armed
conflicts that do not satisfy the Common Article 2 requirement. The textual trigger for application of Common Article 3 is the existence of an armed conflict "not of an international
character," language which could be read in either of two ways. First, it could refer to any
conflict not between two states, a reading which draws strength from the Common Article
2 definition of an international armed conflict as a conflict between two or more High Contracting Parties, i.e., state parties to the Convention. Second, it could be read in a narrow
geographic sense to refer to conflicts confined within one state's border, i.e., civil war. The
Bush Administration endorses the geographic view, see, e.g., Letter from John Yoo &
Robert J. Delahunty to William H. Taft, IV, supra note 237 at 1, 3, and this position recently was upheld by a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit in Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 41-42.
But see Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 44 (Williams, J., concurring) (arguing that Common Article
3 does apply). The merits of that important dispute are beyond the scope of this article,
however, as Common Article 3 contains no provisions specific to the issue of detainee
transfers and thus has no impact on the risk-of-torture issue even if applicable.
258. See Chesney, supra note 21, Online Appendix Table B [hereinafter Table B].
259. It may not be so easy to draw a distinction between captures in Afghanistan in
connection with Operation Enduring Freedom and captures "elsewhere," particularly
when one considers that many detainees were captured in Pakistan after fleeing from hostilities in Afghanistan. It proves unnecessary to unravel this complication, however, in
light of the conclusions set forth below regarding the availability of transfer-related Geneva protections even for those who were clearly detained in the context of a Common Article 2 conflict.
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captured in Afghanistan 2 6 -qualify for protected status under either convention, or if instead they are "extra-conventional" persons who fall into supposed gaps in the conventions' coverage.
a. Prisoner of War Status
GPW provides its protections, including the Article 12 transfer
rule, only to those who qualify as POWs. The requirements for obtaining such status are specified in GPW Article 4. Article 4(A)
provides that any person who falls "into the power of the enemy"
constitutes a POW if he or she falls within any one of the six fol261
lowing categories:

* 4(A)(1) - Armed Forces of a Party2 2 - "Members of
the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such
armed forces."263

* 4(A)(2) - UnincorporatedMilitia/Volunteers - "Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps,
including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside
their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, or organized resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for
his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable
at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance
2
with the laws and customs of war." 6

260. The following discussion assumes for the sake of argument that the detainees are
in fact Taliban or al Qaeda members. Many, if not most, of the detainees, of course, claim
that they are not members of the Taliban or al Qaeda at all, but instead are innocent civilians held by mistake. For discussions of the issues associated with the factual debates regarding classification of detainees, compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 210716, with Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Replies, InternationalLaw, U.S. War Powers, and
the Global War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2653, 2654-58 (2005).
261. Article 4(B) goes on to identify additional scenarios that may result in POW
status, but none are at issue here.
262. The italicized labels are mine, added for clarity's sake.
263. GPW Art. 4(A)(1).
264. Id. Art. 4(A)(2) (emphasis added).
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4(A)(3) - Armed Forces of Unrecognized Power "Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to
a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power. "265
9

* 4(A)(4) - Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces "Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually
being members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors,
members of labour units or of services responsible for the
welfare of the armed forces, provided they have received
authorization, from the armed forces which they accompany ...."266

e 4(A)(5) - Civilian Crew - "Members of crews . .. of
the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the
Parties to the conflict ....267
e 4(A)(6) - Levee en Masse - "Inhabitants of a nonoccupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed
arms openly to respect the laws
units, provided they 2carry
68
war."
of
and customs
One of the most notable features of the Article 4(A) categories
is the fact that only Articles 4(A)(2) and 4(A)(6) refer expressly to
behavioral preconditions for obtaining POW status; the other
provisions, by their text, are merely status-based. Thus, Article
4(A)(1) on its face merely requires the detainee to be a member of
a state's armed forces, whereas Article 4(A)(6) requires a member
of a levee en masse both to carry arms openly and respect the
laws and customs of war, and Article 4(A)(2) requires members of
unincorporated militias, volunteer groups, and resistance movements to comply not only with those two criteria but also to have
a command hierarchy and to wear insignia visible at a distance.
Thus, a pure textualist understandably might conclude that the
265. Id. Art. 4(A)(3). Note that Article 4(A)(3) refers to "regular armed forces," whereas
Article 4(A)(1) refers merely to "armed forces." Professor Levie concludes that this distinction merely reflects "bad draftsmanship, the intent of the draftsmen having been the same
in both cases." HOWARD S. LEVIE, PRISONERS OF WAR IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT

36 n.138 (1978).
266. Id. Art. 4(A)(4).
267. Id. Art. 4(A)(5).
268. Id. Art. 4(A)(6).
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four criteria specified in Article 4(A)(2) as preconditions for POW
status (or the two listed in Article 4(A)(6)) are not also preconditions for POW status under the other categories.
This is perhaps what one would expect with respect to Articles
4(A)(4) and (5), both of which refer to civilians who presumably
ought not to be engaging in the types of activities regulated by
the four conditions in the first place. But the same is not true
with respect to Articles 4(A)(1) and (3), which refer to the members of the armed forces. Is it really the case that members of the
armed forces obtain POW status even when they or their group
do not comply with one of the four conditions? This issue is the
subject of considerable controversy, and it bears directly on the
question of whether Taliban or al Qaeda detainees might plausibly claim POW status.
i. Taliban Members
Should any members of the Taliban have POW status in light
of these provisions? President Bush in his February 7, 2002,
memorandum determined that they may not, although he did not
specify the grounds for this determination other than to say that
the Taliban are "unlawful combatants" according to facts supplied
by the Department of Defense and advice supplied by the Department of Justice.2 69 Office of Legal Counsel memoranda from
January 9 and January 22, 2002, however, describe the basis for
2 70
this conclusion.
In light of the fact that the United States and its allies did not
recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, OLC's treatment of this issue began by considering whether
Taliban members could qualify under Article 4(A)(3), which extends POW status to "[i]embers of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by
269. Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Vice President Richard B. Cheney et al., supra note 238, at 2. For the contrary view, see The Nomination of the Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales as Attorney General of the United States: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 9-10 (2005) (statement of Harold Hongju Koh) (criticizing Attorney General Gonzales's position that Taliban fighters, essentially acting as
Afghanistan's army, were not entitled to POW status).
270. See Memorandum from John Yoo & Robert J. Delahunty to William J. Haynes II,
supra note 237; see also Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen. to Alberto
R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President & William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def.
(Jan. 22, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee Memo], reprintedin THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note
226, at 81.
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the Detainee Power."2 7 ' According to the memo, the Taliban failed
this test for several reasons.
First, OLC questioned whether the Taliban itself could qualify
as a "government or an authority" within the meaning of Article
4(A)(3), in light of the fact that no other state in the world recognized the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan once Pakistan had withdrawn its recognition. 2 At first blush, this argument appears to conflict with the manifest purpose of Article
4(A)(3) to eliminate lack of diplomatic recognition as a grounds
for denying POW status. It finds direct support, however, in Pictet's commentary on Article 4(A)(3). Pictet recognized the potential for Article 4(A)(3) to be abused by self-recognized armed
bands such as the unaffiliated "'Great Companies"' that plagued
2
Fourteenth Century France during the 100 Years' War. He also
observed that Article 4(A)(3) was a direct response to the status
issues that arose during the Second World War with respect to
members of the Free French Forces and, also, certain Italian
onward. 7 4
forces that fought against Germany from late 1943
Synthesizing these concerns, Pictet viewed a third-party recognition requirement as an implicit component of Article 4(A)(3): "It is
not expressly stated that this Government or authority must, as a
minimum requirement, be recognized by third States, but this
condition is consistent with the spirit of the provision, which was
27 5
founded on the specific case of the forces of General de Gaulle."
If Pictet's interpretation is correct, then the lack of any diplomatic recognition of the Taliban as a legitimate governing authority counts heavily against application of Article 4(A)(3). However
persuasive that argument is in the abstract, though, President
Bush's February 7 memorandum foreclosed it by determining
that a Common Article 2 conflict exists with respect to the Taliban. That determination necessarily presumed that the Taliban
constituted the government of Afghanistan and thus qualified as
a High Contracting Party (or at least this was so in 2001). That
being the case, it is difficult, if not impossible, to argue that the
Taliban simultaneously was not a "government or an authority"
within the meaning of Article 4(A)(3).

271. Memorandum from John Yoo & Robert J. Delahunty to William J. Haynes II, supra note 237, at 25.
272. GPW, supra note 218, art. 4(A)(3).
273. Pictet's Commentaries, GPW, supra note 224, at 63.
274. Id. at 61-62.
275. Id. at 63.
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It does not follow, however, that the Taliban's armed members
receive the benefit of Article 4(A)(3). In fact, the OLC memorandum argues in the alternative that Taliban fighters cannot so
qualify, apparently taking the view that the four conditions expressly stated in Article 4(A)(2), i.e., having a command hierarchy; wearing of fixed insignia; carrying arms openly; and complying with the laws of war, should be read into Article 4(A)(3) as
well.2 6 This argument directly engages the controversy mentioned above.
Notwithstanding the awkward fact that the four conditions are
expressly stated only in connection with Article 4(A)(2), there is
considerable authority for the proposition that they ought to be
read into Articles 4(A)(1) and (3) as well, on the theory that they
are inherent in the definition of the term "armed forces" used in
those categories. The argument boils down to the claim that the
drafters of Article 4(A), following the practice under various
predecessors to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, assumed that it
would be understood that an "armed force" was a group that had
these characteristics. 7 We might call this the "implicit inclusion"
interpretation.

276. See Memorandum from John Yoo & Robert J. Delahunty to William J. Haynes II,
supra note 237, at 90 (stating that the Article 4(A)(2) requirements "also apply to any
regular armed force under other treaties governing the laws of armed conflict"). In support
of that statement, the OLC memorandum cites the 1907 Hague Convention, relevant portions of which are discussed infra at notes 295-97 and the accompanying text. See also
ERIK SAAR & VIvECA NOVAK, INSIDE THE WIRE 161-62 (2005) (describing presentation
given to GTMO personnel on the detainee status issue, during which the presenter emphasized, without distinguishing between al Qaeda and the Taliban, the detainees' lack of
a command structure, their failure to comply with IHL, and their failure to wear uniforms).
Many commentators have observed that two additional criteria are implicit additions to
the list of four criteria in Article 4(A)(2): that the group be organized and that it be subordinate to a government of a State involved in the armed conflict. See, e.g., G.I.A.D. Draper,
The Status of Combatants and the Question of Guerilla Warfare, reprintedin REFLECTIONS
ON LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: THE SELECTED WORKS ON THE LAW OF WAR BY THE LATE

PROFESSOR COLONEL G.I.A.D. DRAPER, OBE 206, 217 (Michael A. Meyer & Hilaire McCoubrey eds., 1998). For ease of reference in this article, however, I will continue to refer to
the "four" conditions of lawful belligerency.
277.

See, e.g., MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL JOSEF PARTSCH & WALDEMAR SOLF, NEW RULES

FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 234 (1982) ("It is generally assumed that these conditions were deemed, by the 1874 Brussels Conference and the 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace
Conferences, to be inherent in the regular armed forces of States. Accordingly, it was considered to be unnecessary and redundant to spell them out.. . ."); JOSEPH BAKER & HENRY
CROCKER, DEP'T OF STATE, THE LAWS OF LAND WARFARE CONCERNING THE RIGHTS AND

DUTIES OF BELLIGERENTS 24 (1919) ("It is taken for granted that all members of the army
as a matter of course will comply with the four conditions; should they, however, fail in
this respect they are liable to lose their special privileges of armed forces.").
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The implicit inclusion interpretation has received an impressive array of support, having been endorsed by commentators in80
cluding John Yoo, 278 Yoram Dinstein,2 79 W. T. Mallison,2 and,
most recently, the International Committee of the Red Cross (in
its multi-volume attempt at a restatement of the customary as2
pects of international humanitarian law). ' It also has normative
appeal. Requiring compliance with the four conditions as a prerequisite to status even for members of the armed forces increases their incentives to distinguish themselves from civilian
populations and more generally to comply with the law of war.
But does the implicit inclusion interpretation reflect the actual
intent of the United States in becoming a party to GPW? The ratification history associated with the issue is inconclusive. The one
direct reference appears to be a passage in the 1955 report of the
Committee on Foreign Relations urging Senate consent to the
Conventions, which raises the topic in connection with the issue
of whether the Conventions would extend POW status to mem282
bers of organized resistance movements known as "partisans."
The report observes that under GPW Article 4, "[sluch movements are placed on the same footing as militia and volunteer
corps not forming part of the regular armed forces," and thus that
"[b]oth these groups and partisans must conform to [the four conditions] ."23 There is a plausible argument that the specific reference to militia and volunteer corps not forming part of the regular
armed forces supports the reading that the four conditions apply
only to those groups as to whom the conditions are expressly

278. See John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, Status of Terrorists, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 207, 21920 (2003).
OF
279. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 36 (2004) (stating that "regular forces are not absolved

from meeting the cumulative conditions binding irregular forces," and that there is a "presumption that regular forces would, by their very nature, meet those conditions.").
280. See Remarks of Professor W. T. Mallison, The Sixth Annual American Red CrossWashington College of Law Conference on InternationalHumanitarianLaw: A Workshop
on Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 415, 532 (1987) (arguing that Article 4(A) "insufficiently emphasizes that the criteria for regular combatants are identical with the criteria
for irregular combatants").
281.

See 1 INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN

LAW 15 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).
282. Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, Report of the Committee
on Foreign Relations on Executives D, E, F and G, Ex. Rep. No. 9, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
(June 27, 1955), at 5.
283. Id.
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stated in Article 4(A)(2), although the evidence is hardly conclusive on the point.
The extent to which the implicit includion interpretation finds
support in the actual practice of the U.S. or other states is unclear,28 4 in part because we lack research into the actual application of Article 4 (with respect to this issue) in the contexts of
POW status determinations by the U.S. in Vietnam and in the
first Gulf War. Another problem is the fact that many states, including the U.K. but not the U.S., have acceded to Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 ("AP I"), which departs in some ways from the GPW Article 4 framework. For this
reason, discussions of status and compliance issues in recent editions of law of war manuals from other countries may provide
only limited insight into the Article 4 interpretation issue." 5 This
problem may also undermine the utility of the ICRC's "restatement" of CIL, mentioned above.
What of U.S. military manuals? U.S. Army Field Manual No.
27-10, the Law of Land Warfare, was published in 1956, shortly
after U.S. accession to the Geneva Conventions. Unfortunately,
the Manual does not take an express position on the issue of
whether the four criteria specified in Article 4(A)(2) ought to be
read into Articles 4(A)(1) and (3). In its paragraph on the definition of "prisoners of war," it merely quotes the entirety of Article
4286 It may be significant that the Manual goes on to provide in-

284. Some commentators have rejected the implicit inclusion interpretation. See,
e.g.,
ALLAN ROSAS, THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS OF WAR 328 (1976); Jordan J. Paust,
War
and Enemy Status after 9/11: Attacks on the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 325,
333-34
(2003).
285. Cf. U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
(2004) [hereinafter U.K. MILITARY MANUAL]. The newly minted U.K. Manual is,
in any
event, itself somewhat unclear on this issue. In its chapter on POW status, the
Manual
provides an outline of qualifying categories that seems to specify only two conditions
as
prerequisites to status for armed forces members (existence of a command hierarchy
and
an internal disciplinary system obliging compliance with the laws of war), while expressly
listing all four of the Article 4(A)(2) conditions only with respect to the status of members
of militias, volunteer corps, and resistance movements. See id. at 143-44. Elsewhere,
however, the Manual states that failure to distinguish one's self from the civilian population
(by, for example, not bearing arms openly and wearing a visible insignia) results
in the
denial of POW status. See id. at 43-44. Cf. UNITED KINGDOM WAR OFFICE, MANUAL
OF
MILITARY LAw 240 (1914) ("It is taken for granted that all members of the army as
a matter of course will comply with the four conditions; should they, however, fail in this
respect
they are liable to lose their special privileges of armed forces.").
286. See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, 61 (1956)
("Prisoners of War Defined") [hereinafter THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE].
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terpretive discussions of the four conditions, however, under a
paragraph solely addressed to the "Qualifications of Members of
28 7
Militias and Volunteer Corps." The interpretations provided in
that section provide considerable' insight into the Army's understanding of what constituted compliance with each condition, but
in keeping with the title of the paragraph, the interpretations are
specifically geared to militias and volunteer groups, not the
armed forces.2 88 This arguably suggests that these criteria were
not understood by some law of war experts at the time to apply to

Articles 4(A)(1) and

(3).289

The most significant problem with the implicit inclusion interpretation, however, concerns the negotiating history behind GPW
Article 4. When the delegates assembled in April 1949 to begin
the work that would become GPW, they had before them a draft
convention produced in Stockholm, Sweden at the XVIIth Inter29 °
national Red Cross Conference (1948) (the "Stockholm Draft").
Article 3 of the Stockholm Draft closely resembled what ultimately would become GPW Article 4, although it ordered its categories in slightly different fashion. In relevant part, Article 3 of
the Stockholm Draft read:
"Article 3. - Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention,
are persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have
fallen into the power of the enemy:

287. Id. 64. The content of the interpretations under this heading-referring repeatedly to the activities of militias and volunteer corps, not the armed forces-reinforces the
view that paragraph 64 has implications only for Article 4(A)(2). See id. So too does the
express reference to Article 4(A)(2) as the source of the four conditions, at the outset of the
paragraph. See id.
288.

See id.

The Navy's law of war manual-THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
OPERATIONS-provides a degree of support for the view that the four conditions do
not constitute preconditions to POW status for members of the regular armed forces. In a
brief passage addressing POW status, the Handbook first observes that such persons are
entitled to POW status on capture, and then in the next sentence observes that "[m]ilitia
with the regular armed forces qualify
* . . and other partisans not fighting in association
for [POW] status upon capture, provided they [comply with the four conditions]." DEP'T OF
OF NAVAL
THE NAVY, NWP 1-14M, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
289.

NAVAL

OPERATIONS, 11-2.

The Stockholm Draft is contained in 1 FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC
1949, at 73 (2004) [hereinafter FINAL RECORD]. The Stockholm Draft, in turn, reflected the work of the ICRC at the Preliminary Conference of National Red Cross Societies in 1946 and the Conference of Government Experts in 1947. See
290.

CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF

Pictet's Commentaries, GPW, supra note 224, at 6.
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(1) Members of the armed forces of the Parties to the conflict,
including members of voluntary corps which are regularly constituted.
(2) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to
a Government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining
Power.
(6) Persons belonging to a military organization or to an organized resistance movement constituted in an occupied territory
to resist the occupying Power, on condition:
(a) That such organization has, either through its responsible leader, through the Government which it acknowledges, or through the mediation of a Party to the
conflict, notified the occupying Power of its participation
in the conflict.
(b) That its members are under the command of a responsible leader; that they wear at all times a fixed distinctive emblem, recognizable at a distance; that they
carry arms openly; that they conform to the laws and
customs of war; and in particular, that they treat nationals of the occupying Power who fall into their hands in
accordance
with the provisions of the present Conven29 1
tion."

Consideration of Draft Article 3 at Geneva began on April 26th,
1949, at the second meeting of the relevant committee.29 2 ReneJean Wilhelm, an ICRC legal expert assisting the committee in
its deliberations, observed that Draft Article 3(6)-that which ultimately would become GPW Article 4(A)(2)-"was the trickiest
part of Article 3. " 293 He explained that the Conference of Government Experts, convened in Geneva in 1947 to assist in the production of what became the Stockholm Draft, "had come to the
conclusion that strict rules should be laid down governing the
conditions which civilian combatants captured by the enemy
should fulfil [sic] in order to be treated as prisoners of war."2 94 He
added that most of the proposed conditions-including the four
that would survive into Article 4(A)(2)-"had been accepted by all
the Government experts without difficulty; they were the traditional conditions contained in the 1907 Hague Convention." 295

291.
292.
293.
294.

1 FINAL REcoRD, supra note 290, at 74 (2004).
See 2-A id. at 237.
Id. at 240.
Id.

295. Id. The problematic suggestions were proposals to require the group to exercise

control over territory and to provide notice to the Occupying Power of their intended bel-

ligerency. See id. Neither of these provisions are included in GPW Article 4(A)(2).
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At this point, it is necessary to point out that the drafters in
Geneva were not writing on a blank slate. On the contrary, a
treaty regime governing POW status had been in place since
1907: the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, found in the Annex to the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907 (the
29 6
"Hague Regulations"). Article 1 of the Hague Regulations read
as follows:
The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also
to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions:
1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;
3. To carry arms openly; and
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war.
army,
2 97or
In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the
"army."
denomination
the
under
included
are
form part of it, they

Returning to Geneva, then, Wilhelm's point with respect to
Draft Article 3(6) seemed to be that the conditions listed therein
had not raised objections among the Government experts because
they already were familiar with the comparable provisions in Article 1 of the Hague Regulations. But even with that clarification,
ambiguity remained. Did this mean that the conditions were traditional with respect to all claims of POW status, or merely with
of
respect to claims by militia and volunteer corps? The phrasing
raised
Hague Regulation Article 1 permits both readings. No one
this question at the time of Wilhelm's statement on April 26th,
but the question eventually would have to be addressed.

incorporated by refer296. The POW status portions of the Hague Regulations were
of War of 1929.
Prisoners
of
Treatment
the
to
Relative
Convention
Geneva
the
in
ence
here, but can be
originate
not
did
conditions
297. Hague Regulations, art. 1. The four
the unratified declaration
1874,
of
Conference
Brussels
the
as
far
as
least
at
back
traced
Declaration of
from which contains quite similar language in its ninth article. See Brussels
to the army, but
1874, art. 9 ("The laws rights, and duties of war are applicable not only
the following conditions . . .
likewise to militia and corps of volunteers complying with
V. Mallison, The Juridical
Sally
&
Mallison
Thomas
W.
Cf.
[listing the four conditions].").
Law of Armed ConStatus of IrregularCombatants under the InternationalHumanitarian
the four conditions
of
origins
(describing
(1977)
43-44
39,
L.
INT'L
J.
RES.
W.
flict, 9 CASE
war,
in response to Prussian treatment of French irregulars during the Franco-Prussian
applicable to regubut also asserting-without citation-that the conditions "are equally
lars").
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On May 2, 1949, the delegates formed a special committee with
a mandate to revise the wording of Draft Article 3.29 Shortly after
it began its work, the U.K. delegation offered an amendment to
Draft Article 3 that would bring the four traditional conditions
from the Hague Regulations directly into the draft text in additional locations.2 99 In particular, the first category of Draft Article
3 would be changed to refer to those:
who . . . are in the service of an adverse belligerent as members of
the armed forces including militia and volunteer corps, fulfilling the
following conditions:
(I) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
(II) that of wearing a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance;
(III) that of carrying arms openly;
(IV) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the
3
laws and customs of war. 00

Further, the proposed amendment also called for the four criteria to be stated as express preconditions to POW status under the
second category of Draft Article 3. 3 °1 Because this second category
refers only to the regular armed forces and not also to militias
and volunteer corps, there is little doubt that the U.K.'s proposal
was meant to suggest that the four conditions were to be seen as
prerequisites to POW status even for members of the armed
forces.3 °2
The fate of the U.K. proposal remained to be seen, as the special committee turned its attention to a range of other disputes
arising under Draft Article 3, most of which concerned the effort
under category (6) to extend POW status to at least some resistance groups in light of the recent experience of the Second World
War. 3 3 An early sign that not all delegations agreed with the
U.K. perspective on the broad reach of the four conditions of the
Hague Regulations emerged on May 18th, however, when the

298. See 2-A FINAL RECORD, supra note 290, at 255 (2004).
299. See id. at 413-14.
300. See 3 id. at 61. Note that in the minutes of the committee meeting itself, there
is a
transcription of the U.K. delegate's oral rendition of this language, and in the transcription there is no comma between "corps" and "fulfilling." See 2-A id. at 414.
301. See 3 id. at 61.
302. This view was consistent with the interpretation of the Hague Regulations stated
in the then-existing U.K. Military Manual. See supra note 285.
303. See 2-A FINAL RECORD, supra note 290, at 418-27.
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head of the Soviet delegation, General Nikolai Slavin, mentioned
in connection with a related point that the four conditions specified in the Hague Regulations were "conditions with which combatants not belonging to the armed forces must comply in order to
qualify as belligerents."" 4
Subsequently, on June 23, 1949, the Rapporteur of the special
committee produced a new working text meant to "sum[] up the
previous discussions on Article 3V35 Most notably, this working
text incorporated the U.K. proposal described above. In relevant
part (i.e., with respect to the members of the armed forces), POW
status would be available to:
(1) Members of armed forces who are in the service of an adverse belligerent, as well as members of militia or volunteer corps belonging
to such belligerent, and fulfilling the following conditions:
(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
(b) That of wearing a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance;
(c) That of carrying arms openly;
(d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the
laws and customs of war.
(2) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a Government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power, and
conditions set out in sub-paragraphs (a), (b), (c),
who fulfil [sic]3 0the
6
above.
(d)
and

Not surprisingly, in light of his earlier remarks, the reading30of7
this text prompted an immediate objection from the Soviets.
Slavin observed that under "the working text it would appear
that members of the Armed forces would have to fulfil [sic] the
four traditional requirements mentioned in (a), (b), (c) and (d) in
30 This, he stated, "was
order to obtain prisoner of war status."
"1309
contrary to the Hague Regulations.
The first response came from Major-General Rene H.G. Devijver from Belgium, who contended not that Slavin was wrong

304. See id. at 428 (emphasis added).
305. See id. at 465.
306. See id.
307. See id. at 466.
308. Id.
309. Id.
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about the Hague Regulations but, instead, that Slavin was misreading the working text. Contrary to how Slavin had read it,
Devijver claimed that "the working text carefully specified that
only members of the militia or volunteer corps should fulfil [sic]
all four conditions."3 1 ° The special committee's chairman, Philippe
Zutter of Switzerland, then intervened to propose an amendment
that would eliminate the confusion. 1' In Zutter's formulation,
POW status would apply to:
(1) Members of the armed forces who are in the service of an adverse
belligerent.
(2) The militia and volunteer corps of this belligerent provided they
fulfil [sic] the following conditions . . . . [listing the four conditions] .312

This did not satisfy Slavin, who pointed out that under the
Hague Regulations, some militia and volunteer corps could constitute part of the armed forces. 313 What was needed, he said, was
text that imposed the four conditions only on militia and volunteer corps that were not incorporated within the armed forces.3 14
That suggestion was taken up by a U.K. delegate, William Gardner from the War Office, who at this point proposed the language
that (with a few alterations not bearing on this issue) exist today
as GPW Articles 4(A)(1) and (2). 3 " This mollified the Soviets, who
moved for appointment of a working group to prepare a formal
version of Gardner's language.3 16 When that group later presented the special committee with the final revision of Draft Article 3 -incorporating Gardner's solution to the Slavin objectionthere was much discussion of other issues, but not a word said in
opposition to citing the four conditions as conditions of POW
status to be met only by militias and volunteer groups not constituting part of a state's armed forces.3 17
While none of the delegates had joined Slavin in stating expressly that the four conditions from the Hague Regulations are
not preconditions to POW status for members of the regular
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Id.
See id.
Id. at 467.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 477-80.
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armed forces, everyone who did respond to Slavin's objection did
so in a way that clearly accepted his premise.318 To the extent
31 9
that any weight should be accorded to this negotiating history,
it contradicts the implicit inclusion interpretation of Article
4(A)(2).32 °
Not all of the arguments run entirely against the implicit inclusion interpretation, however. Notwithstanding the textual and
historical arguments set forth above, at the end of the day there
must be some criteria for recognition of the military entities that
count as the "armed forces" within the meaning of Article 4(A)(1)

and

(3).321

For states that have adopted AP I, identification of the

318. Interestingly, this history has elicited relatively little scholarly comment. Although some have observed the significance of these exchanges, see, e.g., ROSAS, supra
note 284, at 328 (recognizing the rejection of the implicit inclusion interpretation during
the special committee proceedings), many observers have offered accounts that somewhat
miss the mark. See, e.g., Howard S. Levie, Prisonersof War in InternationalArmed Con-

flict, 59 INT. L. STUD., at 37 n.142 (1977) (observing only that "the Delegate of the Soviet
Union ... appeared to argue that none of the four requirements was applicable to members of the armed forces," but concluding that "it is believed that the interpretation here
given [that the four requirements apply to all categories under Article 4] is more appropriate and much more widely accepted"); Mallison, supra note 280, at 532-33 (stating that "it
was proposed on the floor of the conference that the four criteria for irregulars in article
4(A)(2) be amended and specified as applying to regulars under article 4(A)(3)," and that
the "response was that it was so well-known that these same four criteria applied to regular combatants that it was actually not necessary to specify it at all"); see also Mallison &
Mallison, supra note 297, at 48 (acknowledging failure of British effort to have the four
conditions stated expressly with respect to regular forces, but concluding that this effort
failed not because it was rejected on the merits but because the point was taken to be understood already).
319. One can object, of course, that little weight should be accorded these negotiating
details because they do not necessarily reflect the views of the states involved as signatories to the GPW. But see The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 32, Nov. 8,
1972, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 8 I.L.M. 679 (indicating that one may resort to preparatory work in
the event of textual ambiguity).
320. None of this is to suggest, of course, that members of armed forces have no obligation to obey the laws of war. On the contrary, whether granted POW status or not, violations of the laws of war may result in criminal prosecution. See G. I. A. D. Draper, The Legal Classification of Belligerent Individuals, in REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND ARMED

CONFLICT 196, 203 (Michael A. Meyer & Hilaire McCoubrey eds. 1998) (observing that
"[riegular soldiers who systematically conduct their operations contrary to the law of war
... are still entitled to POW status upon capture although they may be tried, as POW, for
their war criminality before capture," in contrast to "fighters who are not soldiers" who
must comply with the four factors); Draper, The Status of Combatants and the Question of

GuerrillaWarfare, in id. at 213 (similar). Cf Levie, supra note 164, at 37 n.144 (drawing a
distinction "between a conventional war crime," the commission of which does not deprive
the person of POW status, at least until conviction, and "other types of offenses such as
acting as a spy or saboteur while wearing civilian clothes").
321. Some have argued that the matter can be resolved by reference to the domestic
law of the state in question. See LEVIE, supra note 265, at 36. This is a plausible approach
with respect to a modern state with a relatively developed framework of laws, but will not

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:657

relevant criteria is relatively simple. Article 43 of AP I provides
an express definition of "armed forces." These consist of all units
"which are under a command responsible to that Party for
the
conduct of its subordinates" and which are "subject to an internal
disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance
with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict."3 22 While the United States is not a party to AP I (for other
reasons),32 3 the Article 43 approach may reflect the manner in
which the same term is understood under the GPW framework,
and goes a long way toward reconciling the disagreements set
forth above.3 24 On this view, at least two of the four traditional
conditions (the existence of a command hierarchy, and the existence of a disciplinary structure enforcing compliance with the
law of war) end up being read into Article 4(A)(1) and (3) after
325
all.
Assuming this to be the best interpretation of Article 4, further
questions arise. When assessing compliance with the criteria discussed above, should the inquiry be carried out solely with reference to the conduct of the individual in question? Should the inquiry also take into account the activities of that individual's
unit? The conduct of the entire enemy force? Some combination of
the above factors?
Some elements of the POW status inquiry do not seem to be
solely a question of an individual's particular activities or affiliations. 2 6 Consider the requirement of conducting operations in ac-

help in cases such as Taliban-era Afghanistan.
322. AP I, art. 43(1).
323. See S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (summarizing problems with
AP I, particularly Article 44 thereof).
324. See LEVIE, supra note 265, at 36 n.138 (citing Article 43 for this point).
325. According to U.S. ARMY FIELD MANuAL 27-10, persons who would qualify for POW
status under Article 4(A)(1) lose that privilege if they "deliberately conceal their status [as
combatants] in order to pass behind the military lines of the enemy for the purpose of
gathering military information or for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or
property. Putting on civilian clothes or the uniform of the enemy are examples of concealment of the status of a member of the armed forces." THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE
74.
Does this rule effectively read the fixed insignia condition into Rule 4(A)(1)? Arguably so,
at least to a limited extent.
326. It is important here to distinguish between two distinct concerns that may arise
with a detainee. One concern is whether the detainee merits POW status, which is to say
that the detainee is properly detained but is entitled to the privileges associated with that
status. The second, distinct question is whether the detainee is properly detained in the
first place, which is to say that the detainee might be an innocent civilian who has not
committed a belligerent act. In an ideal world, Article 5 would have been drafted to ac-
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cordance with the laws and customs of war. According to U.S.
Army Field Manual 27-10, the Law of Land Warfare, this condition "is fulfilled if most of the members of the body observe the
laws and customs of war, notwithstanding the fact that the indi3 27
vidual member concerned may have committed a war crime."
The U.K.'s military manual goes a step further on a closely related point, stating explicitly that "[tihe decision to deny an
armed group the status of 'armed force' under international law"
for failure to maintain a disciplinary system enforcing law of war
3 28 As to this
compliance "must be taken at governmental level."
factor, it may make little sense to envision an exclusively individualized inquiry during the status determination process; such
procedures could result in an array of conflicting decisions about
the same entity. The other conditions also arguably partake of a
dual-character in this regard, as they too seem amenable to a
reading that gives them both individual-compliance and groupcompliance aspects.32 9
How do Taliban detainees fare under these standards? It is important to be frank about how indeterminate this inquiry actually
is. Precisely how many IHL violations must occur before one can
conclude that a force lacks systemic adherence? How recent must
they have been? How serious in magnitude? Does it matter if the
particular individual involved has strictly adhered to IHL, even if
the group has not? There simply are no clearly dispositive legal
answers to these questions.33 °
The United States government's position is that the Talibanas a group-failed to sufficiently adhere to IHL to warrant
"armed forces" status. The OLC's January 22, 2002, memorandum refers to a "series of 'fact sheets' issued [by the State Department] during the [Afghan] campaign," providing descriptions
of "atrocities committed by the Taliban and al Qaeda before and

count expressly for both concerns, but it was not so drafted. In actual practice during the
first Gulf War, though, Article 5 tribunals did address the "innocent civilian" issue.
327. THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 64.d (emphasis added).
328. U.K. MILITARY MANUAL, supra note 285, at 39 n.13 (emphasis added).
329. Writing on this point in 1973, Professor Draper stated that "[i]t is not possible to
say with confidence that any one view is accepted as representing an established and accepted legal position." See Draper, The Status of Combatants, supra note 320, at 217.
330. See Col. Kenneth W. Watkin, Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents and Conflict
in the 21st Century, 1 ISRAEL DEF. FORCES L.R. 69, 82 (2003) (stating, with respect to both
GPW and AP I, that there "appears to be no firm consensus as to which of the conditions
are collective and which are individual").
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during the United States' military operations."3 3 ' With respect to
the Taliban, these dispatches assert that Taliban forces had executed POWs, hid military personnel and equipment in civilian areas (including mosques), and intentionally attacked civilian populations.3 32 From this, OLC concluded that "the Taliban militia
regularly refused to follow the laws of armed conflict."33 3 On this
basis, it appears that the government has concluded that the
Taliban's forces were not "regular armed forces" within the meaning of Articles 4(A)(1) or (3) for lack of systemic adherence to IHL
principles, a conclusion that also would dispose of a claim of
status under Article (4)(A)(2) .3 4 Given the indeterminacy of the
quantitative issues associated with this determination,
it is dif-

331. See Bybee Memo, supra note 270, reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note
226, at 100.
332. See id. It is unclear, however, what particular events support these claims.
333. Id. OLC made this assertion in support of the claim that the President could suspend the Conventions as to the Taliban, or alternatively, that the Taliban's Afghanistan
was a "failed state" ineligible to claim High Contracting Party Status. See id. Regardless
of those arguments, the assertion speaks directly to the Article 4(A)(3) issue.
334. See Detention Policies and Military Justice: Hearing Before the Pers. Subcomm.,
Armed Servs. Comm., 109th Cong., July 14, 2005, 2005 WLNR 11115327 (statement of
Daniel Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def., stating in response to a
question from Senator John McCain that the decision was made to deny status to the
Taliban on the ground that "across the board" they failed to comply with IHL); cf.LESSONS
LEARNED, supra note 231, at 54 n.144 (observing that "much of the legal analysis underlying the presidential decisions remains classified," but also citing a memorandum from the
Office of the Staff Judge Advocate stating that the Taliban "do not possess the attributes
of regular armed forces, which requires distinguishing themselves from the civilian population and conducting their operations in accordance with [the] laws and customs of war")
(alteration in original). This line of argument is not without risks. While the U.S. military
clearly satisfies the requirements of having an internal disciplinary system and use of that
system to require compliance with IHL, there nonetheless is a risk that opponents may
seize on alleged IHL violations by the U.S. as grounds for denying POW status to some or
all captured United States personnel.
335. Colonel Watkin concludes that, "[w]hile it is not without controversy it is open to a
state to deny all the members of a group combatant status if that group does not 'enforce
compliance with the rules of international law applicable to armed conflict.'" Watkin, supra note 330, at 32 (citing, inter alia, ICRC Commentaries to art. 44, para. 1688, stating
that "armed forces as such must submit to the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict, this being a constitutive condition for the recognition of such force, within
the meaning of Articile 43"); see also U.K MILITARY MANUAL, supra note 285, at 39 n. 13
("The decision to deny an armed group the status of 'armed force' under international law
is not one for the commander in the field and must bet aken at governmental level."). Applying a group-oriented standard is not necessarily inconsistent with the existence of the
Article 5 tribunal process under GPW. Article 5 provides that "[s]hould any doubt arise as
to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of
the enemy, belong to any of the catagories enumerated in Article 4," they shall be given
POW status until a contrary status is "determined by a competent tribunal." GPW, supra
note 218, art. 5. At first blush, this language appears to contemplate an individualized in-
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ficult to say that the government's conclusion is wrong as a legal
matter. 336
(ii) al Qaeda Members
It is comparatively easy to resolve the status of al Qaeda members detained in Afghanistan. 33' Al Qaeda does not constitute part
of the regular armed forces of Afghanistan, meaning that neither
Article 4(A)(1) or (3) have application. On the other hand, al
Qaeda did provide personnel to fight alongside the Taliban 33' and
to protect its senior leadership, suggesting the possibility that an
al Qaeda member captured in Afghanistan might claim POW
status under Article 4(A)(2), which extends that status to certain
militias and volunteer groups that "belong[] to a Party" but which
are not incorporated into the Party's regular armed forces. 339 Any
such argument, however, is certain to fail because of the four
conditions requirement. 34 ° Given that al Qaeda as an organiza-

terpretation. And certainly it is true that the questions of whether a particular detainee is
in fact associated with an enemy force such as al Qaeda or the Taliban must be determined on an individual basis. It is less clear, however, that the existence of the Article 5
process compels the conclusion that particular prerequisites for members of an enemy
force to obtain POW status cannot be determined with reference to at least some group
characteristics.
336. See also United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 558 (E.D. Va. 2002) (rejecting lawful combatant defense on ground that Lindh had failed to carry burden of proof
with respect to application of three of the four criteria with respect to Taliban forces).
337. Cf.Watkin, supra note 330, at 83 (observing that "[e]xclusion of a group from combatant status is perhaps most easily applied in respect of terrorist organizations that by
definition do not respect the fundamental distinction between combatants and civilians in
their actions and sometimes overtly reject any requirement to do so").
338. The Taliban's "elite" 55th Brigade may have been an al Qaeda unit. Cf Ann Scott
Tyson, Strikes Inflict Little Harm on Terrorist Group, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 29,
(questioning
2001, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/1029/p2sl-usmi.html
whether the 55th Brigade should be viewed as an al Qaeda unit).
339. GPW, supra note 218, art. 4(A)(2). OLC contended, in its January 22, 2002, memorandum, that no al Qaeda member could possibly invoke Article 4(A)(2) because the conflict with al Qaeda is not an international armed conflict in the first place. See Bybee
Memo, supra note 270, reprintedin THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 226, at 89-90. This
argument conflates the right-kind-of-conflict and right-kind-of-person inquiries.
340. Bradley and Goldsmith assert that "it is unlikely that al Qaeda 'belongs to' Afghanistan (which is a Party to the conflict)" and thus that "one need not even reach the
issue of whether it has satisfied the four traditional criteria." Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Rejoinder, The War on Terrorism: International Law, Clear Statement Requirements, and Constitutional Design, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2683, 2691 n.48 (2005); cf
LEVIE, supra note 265, at 40-43 (discussing uncertainty associated with the "belonging to"
requirement).
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tion3 41 affirmatively rejects the core precept of the Law of Warthe principle of distinction between lawful and unlawful targetsthere is little prospect for satisfying Article 4(A)(2).342 Al Qaeda
members thus would not receive POW status even if captured in
the context of an international armed conflict.34 3
In the final analysis, therefore, neither al Qaeda nor Taliban 44
members qualify for POW treatment. Ironically, from the detainees' perspective, this conclusion has a silver lining with respect to
the transfer issue: if the detainees are not POWs, then GPW Article 12 does not apply to them, and thus there is no ground for using lex specialis to harmonize the CAT Article 3 standard down to
the arguably more permissive standard implicit in GPW Article
12.
The Geneva analysis does not end here, however. It remains to
be seen whether any detainees may qualify as "protected persons"
subject to the distinct transfer-related provisions found in GC.
b. Protected Persons Status under GC
If a person detained in an international armed conflict does not
qualify as a POW under GPW, it does not follow automatically
that he or she receives no protection under the Geneva Conventions; on the contrary, in most instances such persons will qualify
as "protected persons" within the meaning of GC. 34 ' Remarkably,

341. Throughout this article I have referred to the al Qaeda "organization." Whether al
Qaeda is best understood as a discrete organization or instead as a network of groups and
individuals with varying degrees of affiliation has been the subject of much debate since
9/11. Adding to the confusion, the answer to that question may vary depending on the
point in time at which one asks it, as it probably is accurate to say that al Qaeda in late
2001 had more of an organizational structure than it does in the fall of 2005.
342. See GPW, supra note 218, art. 4(A)(2). Al Qaeda also violates the requirements of
bearing arms openly and wearing a fixed insignia visible at a distance with respect to its
terrorist operations outside the context of the ground war in Afghanistan, although a
question might arise as to whether those actions should enter into the Article 4 analysis
within the context of OEF.
343. Cf. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 340, at 2691 n.48 (observing that al Qaeda
"almost certainly has not" satisfied the criteria); Goodman & Jinks, supra note 260, at
2657 ("Although militant groups could satisfy these criteria in theory, it is unlikely that
many, if any, will do so in fact.").
344. The case concededly is much less clear with respect to the Taliban.
345. See Kantwill & Watts, supra note 229, at 738; see also Human Rights Report, supra note 182,
19-21 (stating that persons captured in Afghanistan should be classified
either as POWs or protected persons); cf Jinks, supra note 222, at 380, 399-413 (emphasizing protections afforded to non-POW detainees under GC, Common Article 3, and Arti-
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though, neither the President's February 7, 2002, order nor the
underlying legal memoranda giving rise to it provide any discussion of this issue en route to the conclusion that Taliban and al
Qaeda members are, in effect, "extra-conventional" persons.34 6
The scope of "protected person" status under GC is described in
Article 4, which begins by defining the category in broad terms:
"Persons protected by the Convention are those who . . . find
themselves.., in the hands of a Party to the conflict or occupying
Power of which they are not nationals." 4 7 Article 4 then goes on
to carve out three situations in which such persons will not receive protected person status. Two of these exceptions are inapplicable here. First, status will be denied to those who qualify as
POWs under GPW (a situation not implicated by the GTMO detainees, for the reasons stated above).34 Second, status also will
be denied to persons who are nationals of a state not bound by the
Geneva Conventions (a situation applicable only in the unlikely
event of a detainee from Nauru).
The remaining exception, in contrast, is quite meaningful when
applied to Taliban detainees and al Qaeda members captured in
Afghanistan. In two situations, GC Article 4 denies protected person status to a person who is a citizen of a government that "has
normal diplomatic representation in the States in whose hands"
the detainee is.34 9 First, status automatically is denied in those
circumstances if the person is a citizen of a state that is a cobelligerent of the detaining power. ° Second, if the person instead
is a citizen of a state that is neutral in the conflict, status will be
denied if the person is found "in the territory of a belligerent
State."35 '
In a traditional armed conflict between states, this "diplomaticrelations exclusion" would have relatively little impact. It is the
peculiar nature of the conflict with al Qaeda-in which most of

cle 75 of Additional Protocol I).
346. See Kantwill & Watts, supra note 229, at 705-08 (making this point, and discussing possible explanations for the omission). As Kantwill and Watts explain, the term "extra-conventional" indicates the view that a person is not within the categories of persons
who benefit from treaty protections. See id. at 681 n.1.
347. GC, supra note 218, art. 4.
348. See id.
349. Id.
350. See id.
351. Id.
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those who fight for the enemy are citizens of friendly states-that
gives it such bite.
The clearest effect of the diplomatic-relations exclusion is to
preclude GTMO detainees who are citizens of co-belligerent states
(such as the United Kingdom and Australia) from asserting protected person status, as citizens of co-belligerents are covered by
this rule wherever captured. The tougher question is the extent to
which the diplomatic-relations exclusion for neutral-state citizens
applies.
Certainly there are large numbers of detainees captured in Afghanistan who are citizens of neutral states having ordinary diplomatic relations with the United States. But unlike citizens of
co-belligerents, the location of capture for citizens of neutrals does
matter. And so the critical question is whether capture in Afghanistan (for the reasons discussed previously, only Taliban
members and al Qaeda members captured in Afghanistan are
held in connection with the "right kind of conflict" to render GC
protections potentially available) satisfies the GC Article 4 requirement that they be found "in the territory of a belligerent
State. 35 2
A literal reading of the Article 4 language suggests that the answer to that question must be yes. Afghanistan, after all, is a belligerent state insofar as the Common Article 2 conflict there is
concerned. But, an argument exists that the language "territory
of a belligerent State" should be understood narrowly to refer
only to the territory of the detaining belligerent state, which in
this case would mean only the territory of the United States.35 3
The plain text of Article 4 does not clearly mandate one construction or the other. But Pictet's commentaries on Article 4, although far from dispositive, weigh in favor of the more expansive
reading. The Commentaries state that "nationals of a neutral

352. Id.
353. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate International Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 811, 819 n.28, 851 n.149 (2005) (arguing that the exception applies only to
neutral-state citizens found in the United States itself). On this theory, the only person
excluded from GC protected person status by the "neutral state" aspect of Article 4 would
be the Qatari citizen Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, who was arrested in the United States
and is now held as an enemy combatant, though not at GTMO. See Eric Lichtblau, Detainee at Brig in Charleston Accuses His Jailers of Abuse, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 9, 2005, at
A13.
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State in the territory of a Party to the conflict are only protected
persons if their State has no normal diplomatic representation in
354
the State in whose hand they are." The general thrust of the
commentary is that where the ordinary diplomatic process for
protection of the interests of nationals is available, it must be relied upon.
Understood in this way, the only GTMO detainees arguably
qualifying for protected person status would be the Afghan citizens among the detainees (presumably including most or all Talilackban detainees) and any detainees who are citizens of states
35 6 such
States,
United
the
with
ing ordinary diplomatic relations
357
as Iran, Iraq, Libya, or-least likely-North Korea. Moreover,
with ordinary diplomatic relations now having resumed between
the United States and both Iraq and Afghanistan (as indicated,
for example, in the actual ongoing negotiations with the Karzai
government regarding repatriation of these very individuals),
there is an argument that those detainees too should not be considered protected persons under GC.
This would leave only Iranian, Libyan, and North Korean citizens captured in Afghanistan as potentially qualifying for protected person status. Do any GTMO detainees fit this description?
It appears that the vast majority do not, but that at least half a
dozen do.3 58 As to them, a further question arises. Does protected
person status in this context actually entitle detainees to the
39
benefits of Articles 45 or 49 in particular? Remarkably, the answer to that question appears to be no.

354. PICTET, supra note 248, at 48.
355. See id. at 48-49.
356. See Jason Callen, Unlawful Combatants and the Geneva Conventions, 44 VA. J.
INT'L L. 1025, 1070 (2004).
357. The fact that most detainees are precluded from protected person status by the
diplomatic relations exception does not mean that they are wholly unprotected by IHL.
Derek Jinks has argued, for example, that the protections of Common Article 3 and Article
75 of Additional Protocol I apply in this scenario. See Jinks, supra note 222, at 399-413;
see also Dupuis et al., supra note 219, at 427-28 (Remarks of Michael J. Matheson) (identifying the fundamental guarantees contained in Article 75); Parks et al., supra note 219
(identifying Article 75's fundamental guarantees as a reflection of customary international
law). Even assuming that this is correct, however, neither provision contains a transferrelated rule.
358. See Table B, supra note 258 (listing one Iranian and five Libyan detainees).
359. This question becomes all the more pressing, of course, if (i) Afghani and Iraqi detainees remain protected persons despite the subsequent resumption of diplomatic relations between those states and the United States, or (ii) if the better view is that the dip-
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Whereas GPW provides relatively undifferentiated protections
to POWs, the benefits provided by GC do not apply uniformly to
all persons protected under that convention. On the contrary, GC
is divided into sections that provide different benefits in different
scenarios.
Both Articles 45 and 49 appear in Part III of GC, which describes the benefits owed to protected persons.3 6 ° But Part III itself is divided into three subsections. One deals with protected
persons who are located in occupied territory, another addresses
protected persons who are aliens located in the territory of their
state's enemy, and a third provides rules that apply in both scenarios (or perhaps in all circumstances). Notably, Article 45 is located in the enemy territory subsection, while Article 49 is found
in the subsection concerned with occupied territory.
Arguably, this format introduces geographic limitations to the
benefits afforded by GC to protected persons.3 6 ' If so-and it is
hard to see what point the subsection structure has if not-then
GTMO detainees captured in Afghanistan are not covered by
GC's transfer-related provisions even if they qualify as protected
persons. These individuals were not aliens located in the territory
of their state's enemy, nor were they located in occupied territory.

lomatic-relations exception has no application outside the territory of the detaining state
itself.
360. Part II of GC describes the benefits afforded to whole populations, while Part IV
governs the process of internment. GC, supra note 218, pts. II, IV.
361. See Kantwill & Watts, supra note 229, at 729 (noting that GC Part III "seems to
overlook protections for hostile protected persons in their own territory"). Rejection of this
interpretation, notably, opens up other complications. Unlike GPW, GC contains a derogation clause that enables the detaining state to deprive protected persons of convention
benefits under certain conditions. That clause, Article 5, actually contains two derogation
provisions, both of which are defined with reference to the same geographic criteria described above. GC, supra note 218, art. 5. If the geographic limits imposed by the subdivisions of Part III are disregarded, this might support an argument to disregard the comparable limits imposed on the derogation option as well. In this respect, it is worth bearing in
mind that the U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL ON THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE already asserts a
right to derogate from GC protections where neither of the geographic conditions (occupied
or enemy territory) is met, notwithstanding lack of support in the text of GC Article 5 for
this proposition. See FM 27-10, supra note 286, 248(b); Letter from Gen. Janis Karpinski
to ICRC Eva Svoboda, Protection Coordinator, Dec. 24, 2003 (on file with author) (writing
in connection with Abu Ghraib that "as you will have noted, while the armed conflict continues, and where 'absolute military security so requires' security internees will not obtain
full GC protection as recognized in GCIV/5, although such protection will be afforded as
soon as the security situation in Iraq allows it"); cf Kantwill & Watts, supra note 229, at
730-31 (commenting that the FIELD MANUAL position implies a belief that protected persons can exist outside the contexts of enemy and occupied territory).
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They were, instead, located in what might be called contested territory-the territory of a non-detaining belligerent state, not yet
under occupation-a scenario to which Articles 45 and 49 simply
362
do not apply on this reading of GC.
In the final analysis, therefore, it appears that the particular
circumstances of the GTMO detainees do not trigger any of the
provisions of the Geneva Conventions concerning detainee transfers. As a result, the contemporaneous applicability of CAT and
IHL with respect to the GTMO detainees neither adds to nor subtracts from the non-refoulement safeguards previously discussed.
There is, however, one additional source of law pertaining to the
transfer issue that requires discussion.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS

When the United States began transferring detainees from Afghanistan to GTMO in January 2002, it certainly was not with
the expectation that by doing so the detainees would thereby be
invested with federal constitutional rights. But in light of the Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Rasul concerning the nature and
extent of United States's control over GTMO, one court has held
that this is precisely what has happened and that, as a result, detainees at the very least have fundamental rights such as due
process. 363 The issue is currently on appeal before the D.C. Circuit, and will undoubtedly be litigated before the Supreme
362. Cf. Callen, supra note 356 (arguing that most GC protections do not apply to persons captured in the zone of combat operations unless an occupation is underway). Significantly, if one were to read the "enemy territory" limitation in a broad way so as to provide
GC Part III protections to persons captured outside the territory of the detaining state, it
would then become all the more difficult to reject taking a similarly broad approach to the
interpretation of the neutral-state citizen aspect of the diplomatic-relations exception.
363. Judge Leon and Judge Green disagreed on this issue in their conflicting opinions
Khalid v. Bush and In re Guantdnamo Detainees Cases. For Judge Leon, the Rasul deci-

sion means only that federal habeas jurisdiction extends to GTMO, not that non-citizens
detained there are endowed with any constitutional rights by virtue of their location.
Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 322-23 (D.D.C. 2005). In his view, noncitizens at
GTMO are no more able to invoke constitutional rights than noncitizens seized by U.S.
personnel anywhere else overseas. See id. Judge Green held otherwise, on two grounds.
First, she reasoned that the Supreme Court in Rasul did not intend to extend a meaningless formality to the detainees when it granted them access to the federal courts. See In re
Guantdnamo Detainees Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 453-64 (D.D.C. 2005). Second, she
found that the degree of control exercised by the United States at GTMO made that location analogous to other U.S.-controlled territories in which mere presence endows noncitizens with "fundamental" constitutional rights. See id.
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Court.3 64 In the interim, assuming for the sake of argument that
GTMO detainees do have due process rights under the federal
constitution,36 5 the question arises whether due process provides
protection relevant to the issue of non-refoulement and, if so,
whether that protection exceeds the protections afforded by CAT
Article 3.366 Put in practical terms, the issue is whether a due
process analysis would require a more exacting standard for
measuring the risk of torture than the more-likely-than-not test
of CAT Article 3 or, alternatively, whether a reviewing court relying on due process grounds would be less deferential to the Executive than a court considering a CAT Article 3 argument.
The applicability of due process protections in this context can
be understood most usefully through the lens of substantive due
process.36 7 Substantive due process prohibits the government in
at least some circumstances from depriving a person of certain
protected interests without regard to the procedural safeguards

364. This remains likely despite the passage of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, for
reasons set forth in the Epilogue, infra Part VII.
365. See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt III, Guantdnamo and the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and
Beyond, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2017, 2018-30 (2005); cf. Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal
Representation for Detained Aliens: Litigation and Administrative Reform, 29 CONN. L.
REV. 1647, 1660 n.43 (1997) (describing the KnaufflMezei doctrine that non-citizens who
have not "entered" the United States lack due process rights even if physically in U.S. territory, and discussing the possible impact of statutory reforms on this doctrine); Haitian
Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326, 1339-40 (2d Cir. 1992) (affirming determination of a serious question on the merits as to whether Haitian would-be immigrants
found on the high seas en route to the United States and taken to GTMO obtain due process rights by virtue of their presence there), vacated as moot sub nom. Sale v. Haitian
Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 918 (1993).
366. OLC clearly anticipated a result along these lines when it vetted GTMO back in
December 2001, warning that "[i]f a federal district court were to take jurisdiction over a
habeas petition, it could review the constitutionality of the detention and the use of a military commission...." Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin & John C. Yoo to William J.
Haynes, II, supra note 13, at 1; see also id. at 8 ("We are aware of no basis on which a federal court would grant different litigant rights to a habeas petitioner simply because he is
an enemy alien, other than to deny him habeas jurisdiction in the first place."). If true,
then by the same token a court could review the constitutionality of a detainee transfer.
But see infra note 386.
367. I do not provide a separate discussion of the potential impact of a procedural due
process challenge because, on close inspection, such an argument simply collapses back
into the substantive due process analysis presented below (in the sense that the substantive due process argument ultimately turns on the fact that the government relies on a
process-diplomatic assurances-to overcome fear-of-torture concerns). For a discussion of
procedural due process in the post-9/11 context, see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004) and compare Sayne v. Shipley, 418 F.2d 679, 686 (5th Cir. 1969) (opportunity for
habeas review of an administrative determination of eligibility for extradition satisfied
procedural due process).
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involved. Although the precise scope of the interests protected by
substantive due process is unclear, it is uncontroversial that the
doctrine at least protects a person's interest in freedom from
physical harm. Substantive due process thus imposes categorical
restraints on the ability of government agents to inflict such
harm themselves. But does it also restrain the government's ability to place a person in a situation that poses a risk that third
parties will harm them?
A. The State-Created DangerRule
Not surprisingly, there is no precedent exactly on point with
respect to the situation in which a military detainee of the federal
government argues that substantive due process precludes transferring him to the custody of a foreign government that might torture him. There is, however, a substantial body of caselaw addressing somewhat analogous situations in which individuals
have argued that the government is responsible, albeit indirectly,
for harms inflicted by private actors.368
The leading case in this area is the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services.3 69 DeShaney dealt with a substantive due process claim asserted on behalf of a boy who had been badly beaten by his
father.3 7 ° The boy and his mother alleged that state officials were
aware for some time that the father was abusive, and that the
government's failure to remove the boy from the home despite
this knowledge constituted a deprivation of his interest in free371
dom from bodily harm. The Court rejected this argument, concluding "[a] s a general matter ... that a State's failure to protect
an individual against private violence simply does not constitute

§ 1983 (2000),
368. This case law arises in the context of lawsuits under 42 U.S.C.
of constitutional
which provides a statutory vehicle to seek civil damages for violations
concededly introrights occurring under color of state law. Although the § 1983 context
GTMO detainees (in
duces many wrinkles that have no relevance for the situation of the
actual content of subparticular, concerns about constitutionalizing state tort law), the
the issue arises in
whether
on
depending
vary
stantive due process protections should not
litigation in this
1983
§
of
overview
general
a
For
contexts.
corpus
habeas
or
1983
§
the
Doctrine, 13
Danger
State-Created
The
Pit:
Snake
the
into
area, see Laura Oren, Safari
WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1139, 1159-81 (2005).
369. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
370. Id. at 191.
371. Id. at 192-93.
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a violation of the Due Process Clause."3 72 But the Court did not
entirely foreclose the possibility of state responsibility for thirdparty violence.
First, the Supreme Court acknowledged that a different rule
might apply in the situation in which "the State takes a person
into its custody" and "renders him unable to care for himself."3 73
In that case, an "affirmative duty to protect" the individual "arises . . . from the limitation which [the State] has imposed on his
freedom to act on his own behalf."3 74 This caveat is sometimes referred to as the "custody exception."3 75 Second, the Court also implied that the result might have been different in DeShaney had
the State played a part in the creation of the threatened harms,
or if it had done "anything to render [the victim] any more vulnerable to them."3 76 This exception has become known as the
"state-created danger" rule.37 7
Any uncertainty about the status of the state-created danger
rule 378 was put to rest after every single circuit court adopted it as
a potential basis for finding a substantive due process violation.3 7 9
The last circuit to do so-the D.C. Circuit-has particular relevance for purposes of the GTMO transfer cases. Fortunately,
when the D.C. Circuit adopted the state-created danger rule in
2001 in Butera v. Districtof Columbia, it went to great lengths to
clarify the analytical framework associated with the rule.

372. Id. at 197; see also Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2810 (2005)
(holding
that respondent lacked cognizable interest in police enforcement of a protective
order).
373. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199, 200.
374. Id. at 200.
375. See, e.g., Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 648 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
376. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201. It had not done so in DeShaney, despite the
fact that
the State at one point had custody of the boy before returning him to his father,
because
this "placed [Joshua DeShaney] in no worse position than that in which he
would have
been had it not acted at all." Id.
377. Oren, supra note 366.
378. The concept of state-created danger as grounds for a substantive due process
violation in the context of privately-inflicted violence actually pre-dated DeShaney,
see Butera, 235 F.3d at 649 n.ll (describing circuit precedent predating DeShaney),
but the reference to it in DeShaney was quite oblique and, in any event, dicta.
379. Butera, 235 F.3d at 649 n.10 (listing cases).
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B. The Analytical Framework for State-CreatedDanger Claims
The fundamental prerequisite for a state-created danger argument, according to Butera, is that the government must engage in
"affirmative conduct ... to increase or create the danger that re8 ° Not all such risk-increasing
sults in harm to the individual."
conduct violates due process, of course. The Supreme Court's
1998 opinion in County of Sacramento v. Lewis"' held that a substantive due process challenge to executive action is never actionable unless it concerns conduct that is "so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary
conscience. 1'381
In practical terms, this threshold requirement means that a
on governsubstantive due process claim can never be premised
83
the other
On
harm.
of
ment negligence with respect to the risk
can satclearly
hand, government action intended to cause harm
3' This leaves open the quesisfy the shocks-the-conscience test.
tion of whether an intermediate level of culpability also could sat85
isfy the shocks-the-conscience threshold inquiry. In particular,

380.

Butera, 235 F.3d at 650; see also id. at 651 (holding that "an individual can assert

a substantive due process right to protection ...

from third-party violence when ...

offi-

the indicials affirmatively act to increase or create the danger that ultimately results in
that
given
expect
would
one
as
retrospective,
is
Butera
in
language
The
vidual's harm").
claim
most § 1983 litigation arises in the aftermath of the harm. If a state-created danger
in
were to arise concerning GTMO transfers, in contrast, the claim would be prospective
nature.
381. 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
process
382. Id. at 847 n.8. For an overview of the impact of Lewis on substantive due
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New?
or
Wine
Old
Chesney,
Robert
see
analysis generally,
Standard and the Distinction Between Legislative and Executive Action, 50 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 981, 981-86 (2000).
383. Butera, 235 F.3d at 651 (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848-49 (stating that negligent
government action is '"categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process"')).
384. Id. at 651.
the
385. It is worth emphasizing that the shocks-the-conscience test is not the end of
warinquiry. Its purpose is merely to screen out claims that are not sufficiently serious to
rant further constitutional scrutiny. According to Lewis, actions that are found to shock
Chesthe conscience then should be examined using a fundamental rights framework. See
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gree, however, by the Court's subsequent decision in Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760
(2003), addressing aggressive police interrogation of a severely wounded suspect. See John
T. Parry, ConstitutionalInterpretation,Coercive Interrogation,and Civil Rights Litigation
After Chavez v. Martinez, 39 GA. L. REV. 733, 822-23 (2005) (discussing impact of Chavez
deon the Lewis approach). Justice Thomas, writing for four justices, including himself,
scribed the shocks-the-conscience test as an alternative to the fundamental rights approach. See id. Justice Souter (the author of Lewis) wrote an opinion for the majority on
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can a litigant satisfy this standard where the government acted
not with negligence or intent but, instead, with the intermediate
mens rea of recklessness or deliberate indifference to the risk of
harm to the individual?
The answer is yes, but only in the limited circumstance "where
the State has a heightened obligation toward the individual."" 6
Such special circumstances arise, to give a pertinent example,
when the government (i) has custody of the individual (thus reconnecting the state-created danger exception with the "custody
exception" mentioned above) and (ii) has leisure to make 'unhurried judgments, upon the chance for repeated reflection."'3 7
How might this framework apply to a substantive due process
claim by GTMO detainees objecting to transfer on fear-of-torture
grounds?8 . One must begin by acknowledging the significant distinctions between the GTMO detention context and the civilian
contexts in which state-created danger claims previously have
arisen. This suggests, at the very least, that a reviewing court
will proceed deferentially. That said, the general contours of the
state-created danger doctrine map onto the non-refoulement scenario reasonably well. The detainees, obviously, are held in government custody, creating the requisite special relationship with
the individuals involved. And in light of the pace and methods
through which transfer decisions have been made in the past, it
seems probable that the time-for-deliberation factor also would be
this issue that did not contest Justice Thomas's description but instead simply remanded
the case for further consideration of the substantive due process issue. See id. On remand,
the Ninth Circuit appears to have followed Justice Thomas's formulation, although the
brief opinion is far from clear. See Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 337 F.3d 1091, 1092
(9th
Cir. 2003) (finding that the interrogation both shocked the conscience and that the investigating officer deprived the suspect of a fundamental right).
386. Butera, 235 F.3d at 651.
387. Id. at 651-52 (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 853); see also Fraternal Order of Police v.
Williams, 375 F.3d 1141, 1145-46 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that the deliberate indifference
standard could not be invoked by prison guards objecting to city decision to increase prisoner-to-guard ratios, although officials had leisure to deliberate in making the decision,
because no special relationship existed).
388. It should be noted that non-citizens subject to removal under the immigration
laws have had little success in invoking the state-created danger doctrine as an alternative or supplement to CAT Article 3 protections. See, e.g., Enwonwu v. Gonzales, __ F.3d
-,
2006 WL 321186, No. 05-2053, slip op. at *6-7 (1st Cir. Feb. 13, 2006) (rejecting statecreated danger argument on the ground that recognition of it would impermissibly interfere with the plenary power of Congress to regulate immigration); Kamara v. Att'y Gen.
of
the United States, 420 F.3d 202, 217-18 (3d Cir. 2005) (same). But see Builes v. Nye, 239
F. Supp. 2d 518, 525-26 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (prohibiting removal of a noncitizen on fear-oftorture grounds under the state-created danger doctrine).
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satisfied. Detainees accordingly would not have to show that the
government intended to subject them to physical harm (at the
hands of the receiving state), but could instead argue that the
government has deliberately disregarded the prospect of such
harm.
This raises a further definitional question, however: What
counts as deliberate indifference? Put another way, what level of
risk renders it inappropriate for the government to place the individual in a potentially harmful situation? In the CAT Article 3
context, the requisite level of risk is fixed by the more-likely-thannot standard. Does the substantive due process approach result
in a different standard?
The D.C. Circuit has not spoken directly to this issue of the
meaning of "deliberate indifference." Other circuits have, however, in the context of claims brought on behalf of children injured or killed after the state placed them with abusive foster
families. Two formulations have emerged from these cases. The
Fifth Circuit, for example, has stated that deliberate indifference
requires that the relevant decision-maker "must [have been] both
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also [have]
draw[n] that inference."33 9 The Seventh Circuit, on the other
hand, has simply stated that the individual must establish that
the officials involved "knew or suspected that abuse was occurring or likely."390
It is not clear whether either formulation rises to the level of a
more-likely-than-not standard, even in the child abuse context,
although both are capable of being read as consistent with that
approach. Even assuming that one or both formulations refers to
a less-demanding standard, however, it does not necessarily follow that a court would apply the same approach if the statecreated danger issue were to arise in the quite distinct context of
a GTMO transfer. True, the foster home abuse scenario does have
significant parallels with the GTMO scenario; in both cases the
government compels an individual into the hands of a potentially

389. Hernandez v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Reg. Servs., 380 F.3d 872, 881 (5th Cir.
2004) (quoting Smith v. Brenoettsy, 158 F.3d 908, 912 (5th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added)).
In this passage, the court is borrowing definitional concepts from the parallel area of
Eighth Amendment doctrine.
390. Lewis v. Anderson, 308 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added).
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abusive custodian in circumstances where the government may
have reason to anticipate abuse. But the GTMO scenario introduces constitutionally significant considerations wholly lacking in
the foster-placement scenario, including in particular the deference afforded to the Executive Branch with respect to foreign relations.3 9 ' Accordingly, it is doubtful that a court would adopt
anything less than a more-likely-than-not standard of deliberate
indifference in the context of a substantive due process argument
by a GTMO detainee hoping to avoid custodial repatriation.
Assuming that the risk-of-torture judgments thus required by
both due process and CAT Article 3 involve the same substantive
standard, 9 2 there is little to recommend one approach over the
393
other from the point of view of the government or the detainees.
Most notably, with respect to the most critical issue-i.e., the
permissibility of relying on diplomatic assurances-there is no
reason to believe that the requirements of substantive due process would be any more or less forgiving than those of CAT.
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Notwithstanding calls by some critics to shut down the detention facilities at GTMO, there is no reason to believe that the government will in fact do so any time in the near future. It is clear,
however, that the government frequently will be transferring individual detainees from U.S. custody there to the custody of foreign states-and these states often will be among those as to
whom we may have legitimate concerns about the prospect of torture.
As with so much else related to the conflict with al Qaeda since
9/11, the legal aspects of this development are in significant respects unprecedented. They cannot be resolved simply by refer-

391.
392.

See, e.g., Prosper Decl., supra note 162, at 12.
Technically, the shocks-the-conscious standard for substantive due process chal-

lenges is only the first step in the analysis, with the litigant next being obliged to demonstrate the existence (and violation of) a fundamental right. See supra note 385. Presumably this would not present an obstacle in the event that the litigant succeeded in the
deliberate indifference inquiry.
393. From the point of view of a court considering an attempt by a detainee to assert
both kinds of arguments, of course, the existence of equivalent options under substantive
due process and CAT present an opportunity for declining to engage the issues presented
by one or the other.
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ence to familiar legal frameworks such as formal extradition, on
the one hand, or the traditional rights of belligerents, on the
other. Instead, ascertaining the law of international detainee
transfers requires a patient and nuanced examination of a host of
issues, some esoteric, and most freighted with implications for
other factual scenarios.
It is unclear, for now, whether and to what extent the courts
will come to grips with these difficulties. The initial stage of
GTMO transfer litigation was not much more than a brief foray
into uncharted territory. Because none of the dozens of motions
involved an actual attempt to transfer a detainee, the issue was
framed in case after case in terms of prophylactic relief designed
merely to ensure that the underlying substantive issues could be
raised if the need were to arise; the courts were not obliged in this
first wave to explore the full range of arguments and issues related to non-refoulement, and did not come anywhere close to doing so. But the time may come when a court must decide whether
or not to regulate or perhaps even prohibit a particular transfer
on risk-of-torture grounds.
Under the law of international detainee transfers as it currently stands, and in light of the unusual territorial status of
GTMO recognized in Rasul, the central issues in this determination most likely will be the impact of Article 3 of the Convention
against Torture, as implemented by § 2242 of the Foreign Affairs
Reform and Restructuring Act, and the state-created danger aspect of substantive due process doctrine under the Fifth Amendment. Both sources of law establish an obligation not to transfer
detainees if it is more likely than not that the detainee would be
tortured by the receiving state. Indeed, it appears that the Department of Defense has come into an obligation to promulgate
regulations to operationalize this standard. In contrast, although
international humanitarian law contains several transfer-related
provisions, none of these appear applicable to the circumstances
of the GTMO detainees.
Many of the topics explored in this article call for further discussion, including, in particular, the scope of habeas review in
connection with non-refoulement where diplomatic assurances are
at issue (as they almost always will be). It is readily apparent
that the use of diplomatic assurances can lead to abuse, yet it is
equally apparent that some form of assurances is a necessary
part of international cooperation in the current conflict. In any
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event, there does not appear to be any ground in current law for
precluding their use.
Ultimately, the problem with the GTMO transfer scenario is
that it involves a clash between competing interests that neither
side can simply dismiss. On one hand, the government in its military aspect must have sufficient latitude to determine for itself
when it would be desirable to allow a detainee's own government
to take custody, and in its diplomatic aspect, must have similar
latitude to effectively negotiate the transfer of such detainees
back to their home states. On the other hand, the United States
has legal and moral obligations to take reasonable steps to ensure
that in carrying out transfers, it does not take undue risks that
the detainee will be tortured-a risk that is particularly acute
with respect to states that often will be on the receiving end of
GTMO transfers.
These competing interests are not irreconcilable, but it is far
from clear that the current law of international detainee transfers does an adequate job of striking the balance. The framework
described in this article is at once too deferential and too intrusive. Because of the discretion permitted to the government by
the current CAT and substantive due process regimesparticularly with respect to diplomatic assurances-there is relatively little prospect that these legal frameworks could actually
result in a transfer prohibition in a particular case. At the same
time, however, the unspecified nature of judicial review of the
risk-of-torture determination creates too much opportunity for
unnecessary public disclosure of the details of negotiations with
foreign states on this most delicate of issues.
As to both points, it would be far better to permit a more
searching form of review, but to have that review carried out in a
classified environment akin to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC"). FISC review of surveillance applications, of
course, has been much criticized on the grounds that it takes
place ex parte, and thus lacks the adversarial quality that tends
to generate accuracy. To avoid a similar problem while still preserving confidentiality, legislation creating a classified forum for
review of risk-of-torture judgments relating to GTMO could provide for the detainee's interests to be represented by a specially
appointed federal public defender with the requisite clearances.
In this way, Congress could step in to provide a more balanced
and effective regime for enforcing the law of international detainee transfers than that described in this article.
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VII. EPILOGUE: THE DETAINEE TREATMENT ACT OF 2005
Writing on the topic of national security law in the post-9/11
world has its disadvantages. One is the risk that unforeseen
events will render an article partially or even completely moot between the completion of a draft and its publication in hard copy
some nine months later. I was well aware of this risk in early
2005 when I took up the drafting of what eventually became
Leaving Guantdnamo: The Law of InternationalDetainee Transfers. In a very real sense, the article had been made possible by
the Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Rasul v. Bush,3 94 which held
that statutory habeas corpus jurisdiction extended to noncitizen
detainees held at GTMO. This was an exceedingly important ruling, opening the door to actual litigation of a wide range of complex, even exotic, legal issues such as the non-refoulement topic
upon which my article concentrates. But it was also a statutory
ruling, and as such, its continuing impact depended upon acquiescence from Congress.
Enter the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 ("DTA"), which became law on December 30, 2005."' 5 The DTA contains six sections,
most of which pertain to interrogation standards.39 6 One section,
however, deals instead with the litigation rights of GTMO detainees. This provision-DTA § .1005-constitutes a direct response to
Rasul.
Section 1005 begins in a relatively uncontroversial manner,
with a series of provisions relating to Congressional oversight of
the procedures used by the military at GTMO and elsewhere to
determine the status of detainees (at GTMO, the relevant process
is called a Combatant Status Review Tribunal, or "CSRT") and
the need for their continued detention, as well as the rules gov-

394. 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. §
2241, applies to noncitizens held by the U.S. military at GTMO).
395. The Detainee Treatment Act appears in both the Defense Department appropriations and authorization legislation for Fiscal Year 2006. See Pub. L. No. 148, Div. A, Tit. X,
119 Stat. 2739 (enacted Dec. 30, 2005) (Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2006)
(to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241); Pub. L. No. 163, Div. A, Tit. XIV, 119 Stat. 3136 (enacted Jan. 6, 2006) (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
396. Section 1001 provides the DTA's title. Sections 1002 through 1004, descendants of
the McCain Amendment, address interrogation standards. Section 1006 imposes certain
training requirements relating to interrogation standards for Iraqi forces. I discuss § 1005
below.

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:657

erning war crimes trials before military commissions.39 7 Section
1005, however, is not limited to Congressional oversight.
DTA § 1005(e), entitled "Judicial Review of Detention of Enemy
Combatants," contains a series of subsections that appear to have
the net effect of imposing narrow limits on the jurisdiction of federal courts to entertain claims by GTMO detainees. Section
1005(e)(1) begins by adding a new, jurisdiction-stripping section
to the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241.398 Notwithstanding its placement in the habeas statute, however, the
jurisdiction-stripping language is not limited to habeas petitions.
Section 1005(e)(1) provides not only that "no court, justice or
judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider" habeas corpus
petitions filed by GTMO detainees held as enemy combatants, but
also that courts lack jurisdiction over "any other action against
the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the detention" of such persons by the military. 9 DTA § 1005(e)(1), in
short, reverses Rasul's habeas holding as to GTMO detainees. °°

397. Section 1005(a), for example requires the Secretary of Defense to produce a report
for various congressional committees detailing the procedures used at GTMO in Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT's are proceedings to determine whether a detainee
has been properly categorized as an enemy combatant) and in Administrative Review
Boards ("ARB's" are annual proceedings to determine whether a detainee should be released or transferred to the custody of his country of origin notwithstanding his enemy
combatant status), as well as for detainee status determinations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
See DTA § 1005(a). See Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz, Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy, OrderEstablishingCombatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004),
(describing CSRT procedures), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/
d20040707review.pdf; Department of Defense News Release, Administrative Review Implementation Directive Issued (Sep. 15, 2004) (describing ARB procedures) available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040915-1253.html. The DTA does not dictate the content of these procedures, other than to require (i) that the Defense Department
official with final review authority in CSRT and ARB proceedings be a civilian holding an
office subject to Senate confirmation, see DTA § 1005(a)(2); (ii) that the rules for CSRT's
and ARB's permit consideration of new evidence that may emerge over time concerning a
detainee's enemy combatant status, see id. at § 1005(a)(3); and (iii) that the decisionmaking bodies in CSRT and ARB proceedings take into account whether statements from
the particular detainee in issue were obtained through coercion and, if so, whether they
have probative value, see id. at § 1005(b)(1). This last provision does not require exclusion
of such evidence.
398. See DTA § 1005(e)(1) (enacting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)).
399. Id. The latter aspect of § 1005(e)-the aspect concerned with forms of judicial review other than habeas-is written so as to apply only to GTMO detainees who are "currently in military custody" or, even if no longer in military custody, who had been "determined ... to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant" pursuant to a review
procedure established elsewhere in the DTA. Id. Note that this language arguably leaves
open the possibility of a suit brought by a former detainee who is not in military custody
and whose detention was never ratified pursuant to the D.C. Circuit-review procedure.
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The matter does not come to rest there. On the contrary, the
DTA then goes on in § 1005(e)(2) and (3) to restore a degree of judicial review by granting "exclusive jurisdiction" to the D.C. Circuit to consider some, but not all, detainee claims. 401 The scope of
this exclusive jurisdiction is limited, however, in two important
respects. First, this jurisdiction arises only in two specific contexts: appeals from (i) CSRT detainee status determinations and
(ii) final decisions in war crime trials before military commissions. °2 Second, the D.C. Circuit's review in either context is limited to consideration of two categories of argument:
(i) whether the government actually applied the same "standards
and procedures" for CSRT's or military commissions as were reported by the Secretary of Defense to Congress pursuant to the
4 3
DTA's oversight provisions; 0 and
with
(ii) whether such "standards and procedures"
4 0 4are "consistent
the Constitution or laws of the United States."

Section 1005 concludes with a general statement in §
1005(h)(1) to the effect that the "section shall take effect on the
date of the enactment of this Act, followed by a more specific admonition that "[plaragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (e) [i.e., the
paragraphs that invest the D.C. Circuit with "exclusive jurisdiction" to consider CSRT and military commission appeals] shall
apply with respect to any claim whose review is governed by one

Even if this is correct, of course, it would not provide a mechanism for current detainees to
litigate transfer-related issues.
400. Curiously, Congress did not take this occasion to impose an affirmative bar
against habeas petitions (and other claims) that might be asserted by noncitizen detainees
held in locations other than GTMO. While Rasul dealt only with GTMO detentions, some
might argue that the scope of the majority's rationale in finding statutory habeas jurisdiction in that case is not so limited; arguments for and against such a reading can be drawn
from the majority's opinion. Compare Rasul, 542 U.S. 466, 483-84 (2004) (emphasizing
that "[n]o party questions the District Court's jurisdiction over petitioners' custodians,"
and stating that "Section 2241, by its terms, requires nothing more"), with id. at 480 (concluding that the presumption against extraterritorial application of a statute has no bearing in this case in light of the particular degree of U.S. control at GTMO). One possible
explanation for the narrow focus of § 1005 is that, in the government's view, persons detained by U.S. forces in Iraq (and possibly also in Afghanistan) are not actually in U.S.
custody but, instead, in the custody of a multinational force. See supra note 6.
401. See id. § 1005(e)(2)-(3).
402. See id.
403. DTA § 1005(e)(2)(C)(i) (CSRT appeals); id. § 1005(e)(3)(D)(i) (commission appeals)
(to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
404. Id. § 1005(e)(2)(C)(ii) (CSRT appeals); id. § 1005(e)(3)(D)(ii) (commission appeals)
(to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
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of such paragraphs and that is pending on or after the date of the
enactment of this Act."4 °5
Not surprisingly, questions concerning the impact of the DTA
already have become the subject of intense litigation in connection with the pending GTMO habeas cases. Indeed, at -the time of
this writing in February 2006, the government and GTMO detainees are engaging these issues simultaneously before both the
Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit. 4 6 Accordingly, definitive
answers to these questions are likely to emerge from the courts in
the coming months. In light of this prospect, what ultimate impact might the DTA have on the detainee transfer issues that are
the focus of this article?
It helps to distinguish the individual issues-each the subject
of sharp dispute-that must be resolved in order to flesh out the
DTA's impact for this (or any other) purpose.
First, the DTA will have little or no impact on transfer litigation unless its jurisdiction-stripping aspect-§ 1005(e)(1)-is construed to apply to the many pending habeas petitions. Assuming
that it is so construed, however, the next task would be to determine whether § 1005(e)(1) strips jurisdiction over all possible
claims by GTMO detainees or just some of them. Looking closely
at the language that § 1005(e)(1) engrafts upon the federal habeas statute, there is at least an argument that transfer-related
claims might still be brought. The new language in 28 U.S.C. §
2241 very clearly removes jurisdiction for courts to consider habeas petitions brought by GTMO detainees, without reference to

405. Id. § 1005(h)(2).
406. Issues concerning the DTA have arisen in the Supreme Court pursuant to the
government's January 2006 motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in Hamdan v.Rumsfeld, No. 05-184, a case that on the merits presents questions about the President's power
to establish military commissions and the judicial enforceability of the Geneva Conventions. Issues concerning the DTA have arisen in the D.C. Circuit in connection with that
court's parallel consideration of a number of appeals that each challenged the legality of
the CSRT process on constitutional and international law grounds. See Boumediene v.
Bush, No. 05-5062 (D.D.C. 2005); Khalid v. Bush, No. 05-5063 (D.D.C. 2005); al Odah v.
United States, No. 05-5064 (D.D.C. 2005), and consolidated cases Nos. 05-5095 through
05-5116 (D.D.C. 2005). DTA issues have also arisen in Qassim v. Bush, No. 05-5477
(D.D.C. 2005), involving a habeas petition by Chinese Uighur detainees who, though no
longer classified as enemy combatants, remain in custody at GTMO while the government
strives-so far fruitlessly-to locate a third country willing to accept them (as noted elsewhere in this article, the government declines to repatriate these individuals to China out
of concern for how they will be treated by Chinese authorities).
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the subject-matter of the petition." 7 As to the removal of jurisdiction over other forms of judicial review, however, the new language conspicuously adds a subject-matter qualifier; jurisdiction
is removed over "any other action against the United States or its
agents relating to any aspect of the detention by the Department
of Defense" of a GTMO detainee."' One can certainly argue that a
challenge to a custodial transfer relates to an aspect of detention,
of course, but the contrary claim is not frivolous. Accordingly, it is
possible that a reviewing court might find that it continues to
have jurisdiction over such challenges when presented not via
habeas but instead via some alternative vehicle, such as the federal question jurisdiction approach spoken of with approval by
the majority in Rasul.4 °9
Assume that a reviewing court rejects this possible interpretation of § 1005(e)(1). The next requirement is to determine which
claims remain viable in connection with the special appellate jurisdiction granted to the D.C. Circuit by § 1005(e)(2) and (3), and
which (if any) are instead excluded from that mechanism and
thus rendered nugatory for want of a forum for judicial enforcement. Whatever else may be said about the scope of judicial review permitted to the D.C. Circuit by § 1005(e)(2)(C) and
(e)(3)(D), 410 it is at least clear that to be included in that scope a

407. DTA § 1005(e)(1) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1)).
408. Id. (to be codified 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2)).
409. See 542 U.S. 466, 484-85 (2004).
410. Counsel for Salim Hamdan, a detainee who has been designated for trial before a
military commission and whose habeas petition challenging the commission process currently is pending before the Supreme Court, has argued that the narrow scope of review
permitted to the D.C. Circuit under the DTA would not permit inquiry into such matters
as the constitutional or statutory authority for creating the commissions in the first place.
See Petitioner's Opposition to Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No.
05-184, at 1-2 (U.S. Jan. 31, 2006) (arguing that "if Hamdan were permitted only to proceed.., under the procedures specified by the DTA, no court would have jurisdiction to
consider his principal claims that the President's Nov. 13, 2001 order establishing his commission lacks legislative authorization . . . or that his commission violates the Geneva
Conventions"). Hamdan also contends that he would be unable to assert treaty-based
claims in the D.C. Circuit. See id. It is far from clear that such crabbed interpretations of
the scope of D.C. Circuit review under the DTA are correct. The presidential authority issue goes to the legality of the commission itself, and though not a challenge to the factual
or legal conclusions of a commission proceeding, a broad reading of the consistent-with-law
standard under § 1005(e)(3)(D)(ii) might encompass it. Similarly, it is not at all obvious
that the phrase "laws of the United States" in § 1005(e)(3)(D)(ii) would exclude treatybased claims, assuming, that is, that the treaty in issue is otherwise capable of judicial
enforcement. In any event, it does at least appear that the D.C. Circuit could reach other
significant threshold issues such as the question of whether GTMO detainees have constitutional rights in the first place. Cf DTA § 1005(f) (stating that "[niothing in this section
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claim must have some kind of nexus either with the CSRT or the
military commission processes. Claims that attempt to block
transfers on non-refoulement grounds most likely would not qualify under either heading.4 1 1
Even assuming that all the foregoing is correct-that §
1005(e)(1) strips all federal courts of jurisdiction over all detainee
claims (other than as provided in § 1005(e)(2) and (e)(3)) and that
§ 1005(e)(2) and (e)(3) do not provide a judicial forum for litigating transfer-related claims-yet another issue arises. Is it constitutional to bar all federal courts from adjudicating a category of
claims such as those raised in the transfer context? Resolving this
issue will require answers to a range of subsidiary questions.
What is the nature and scope of the constitutional (as opposed to
statutory) habeas corpus right? What is the territorial status of
GTMO,4 12 and to what extent does that status invest noncitizens
present there with constitutional rights? Is Johnson v. Eisentrager still good law on the issue of "constitutional habeas?" Finally, does the DTA constitute a valid suspension of the writ?
By the end of 2006, many if not all of these questions will have
been answered, possibly by the Supreme Court itself.4 13 Even
then, however, the law may remain unsettled, particularly if
Congress returns to the field in response to the manner in which
the courts interpret the DTA. This latest wave of GTMO litigation
may be proceeding to resolution more quickly than prior ones, but
it almost certainly will not be the last.

shall be construed to confer any constitutional right on an alien detained as an enemy
combatant outside the United States," with the "United States" being defined in § 1005(g)
as not including GTMO for purposes of § 1005).
411. Significantly, much the same could be said about claims pertaining only to conditions of detention, including those pertaining to interrogation standards. In this respect,
the pairing in the DTA of § 1005(e) with the McCain Amendment provisions setting standards for interrogations in §§ 1002-03 is particularly noteworthy.
412. The Rasul majority all but declared that GTMO is not extraterritorial for purposes
of interpreting the federal habeas corpus statute, though it ultimately refrained from stating this in direct terms. See 542 U.S. at 480.
413. See Order, Hamdan v. Rumsfield, No. 05-184 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2006) (deferring consideration of the DTA jurisdictional issues until the hearing on the merits).

